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Preface 
 
 
This dissertation aims to contribute to a better comprehension of how the international 
community can best engage with countries emerging from conflict, supporting the 
effort of post-conflict peacebuilding.  
 
The first segment examines the changing nature of UN operations in post-conflict 
settings, drawing on various definitions and events that shaped the literature on UN’s 
engagement with conflicts with particular focus on the post-Cold War era. The second 
segment will review the Afghan post-conflict transition process governed by the Bonn 
Agreement by analyzing its origin, content, progress and factors that affected its 
implementation. Subsequently, assessment of the Bonn Process will be made both in 
terms of its achievements and shortcomings, as well as by identifying two broad stands 
of dilemmas in post-conflict peacebuilding process. Based on the findings of the Afghan 
case study, the final segment will determine the strengths and weaknesses of UN 
peace operations, identifying factors constraining UN’s ability to deal more effectively 
with conflict situations and explore ways to maximize UN’s capacity to deal effectively 
with post-conflict peacebuilding. 
 
While the research benefited tremendously from prior work, discussion and advisory 
comments of many organizations and individuals (as detailed in the footnotes and in 
the Acknowledgement), the content of this dissertation is a result of digestion of 
various work and new perspectives articulated by the author. Therefore, the 
responsibility for accuracy and relevance rest solely with the author. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the United Nations.  
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1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
The questions of how to deal with conflict situations and to avoid conflict from 
recurring are at the heart of the United Nations (UN)’s mandate since the inception of 
the world body in the aftermath of the Second World War1. However, it was in the 
1990s when these questions gained unprecedented importance for the UN as the end 
of the Cold War bipolar structure brought with it fresh opportunities and responsibilities 
for the UN to perform a more active role in dealing with and preventing conflict 
situations2.  
 
The number of peacekeeping missions operated by the UN increased dramatically since 
the end of the Cold War. Twice as many peace operations have been established in the 
15 years after the end of the Cold War than in the previous 45 years of the UN’s 
history3. This period of unprecedented increase in UN peace operations ---both in 
number and in substance of the type of operations performed--- displayed mixed 
results. While some operations ---such as Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Cambodia and East Timor--- were generally perceived as success, several 
operations –--such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Angola--- created a strong public 
perception of UN’s weaknesses in responding to conflict situations. While it is difficult 
to draw generic conclusions from these very different cases due to differences in the 
underlying conditions for UN’s intervention, various efforts are being made to learn 
lessons from these increased experiences in dealing with conflict situations.  
 
As it will be explored in detail in Part II, against such background of post-Cold War 
paradigm shift, the United Nations intensified its efforts to identify the optimal 
intervention of the international community in conflict situations. In the 1992 UN report 
published in the name of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali entitled the Agenda 
for Peace4 and in subsequent reactions from the Security Council and the General 
Assembly of the UN, the notion of preventing conflict and following up with post-
conflict peacebuilding activities were officially recognized as key components of UN’s 
                                                 
1 Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations. See more detailed discussion in 
Part II, Chapter 1.  
2 Olara Otunnu & Michael Doyle (eds), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the new century  
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 
3 19 missions were set up during the first 45 years of UN’s history (1945-90) while 40 missions 
were set up between 1991-2005. In 2005, there were 18 missions with 85,000 military, police 
and civilian personnel. Source: UN/DPKO home page. 
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activities in successfully dealing with conflict situations. Although some of the difficult 
experiences encountered in the first half of 1990s post-Cold War period rendered the 
1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace to tone down some of the original report’s 
optimistic, ambitious role for the UN in the area, UN’s role in dealing with conflict 
situations and peacebuilding continued to increase during the second-half of the 1990s 
and reached a new peak around the turn of the millennium through its operations in 
Kosovo and East Timor. In an effort to conceptually grasp and give recognition to this 
evolution, the Security Council itself discussed the UN’s role in “maintenance of peace 
and security and post-conflict peace-building” in an open debate in 1998 and issued a 
presidential statement5 which is the most explicit guidance provided by the Council on 
this topic. In 2000, the report by the Panel on Peace Operations6 (commonly referred 
to as the “Brahimi-report”, taken from the name of the Chairperson of the Panel) as 
well as the High-level Panel’s report on Threats, Challenges and Change7 shed many 
new lights to the way UN conducts its peace operations. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s 2005 Report In larger freedom8 also laid important further grounds on this 
topic, taking stock of a wide range of issues being analyzed to improve the 
international community’s capacity to deal with conflict situations in the most effective 
way.  
 
Although a consensus of the international community on the role for the UN in 
peacebuilding remains unfixed, these debates reflect the gradual expansion of UN’s 
focus in dealing with conflicts. During the 15 years after the end of the Cold War, the 
concept and practice of UN intervention expanded from the notion of “peacekeeping” 
referring to narrowly defined activities related to militarily intervention stopping 
warring parties and monitoring a seize fire which characterized much of UN’s activities 
during the Cold War era9 to include more proactive and comprehensive notions of 
“peacemaking” and “peacebuilding” ---especially in post-conflict situations--- which 
eventually culminated to the most widely accepted reference to “peace operations”. By 
the turn into the new Millennium, it became widely recognized that in order to deal 
                                                                                                                                               
4 S/24111 
5  S/PRST/1998/38 
6  Report of the Panel on Peace Operations (S/2000/809) 
7  Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565) 
8  A/59/2005 
9  With a few notable exceptions such as UN’s activities in the Congo in the 1960s. Analysis of 
the changing definition and various “generations” of UN peacekeeping activities will be 
discussed in detail in Part II, Chapter 2.    
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with conflicts effectively, assistance from the international community in bringing about 
conditions conducive to a lasting peaceful statehood was required and the notion of 
peacebuilding in post-conflict settings became an integral part of peace operations 
planning and implementation. Reflecting this change in perception, the “Peacebuilding 
Commission” was established in 2006 as concretization of one of the key 
recommendations put forward in the Secretary General’s report prescribing UN’s new 
role in the 21st Century In larger freedom.  
 
With this background in mind, this dissertation will define the concept of “post-conflict 
peacebuilding” as a systematic and holistic approach in dealing with post conflict 
societies, aiming to introduce a stable and sustainable state structure and enabling 
conditions that will prevent the recurrence of conflicts. It begins with the assumption 
that full integration of this approach ---developed in the early 1990s as a rebound to 
the fragmented approach of the past in dealing with post conflict situation--- to the 
design and practice of peace operations is key in future peace operations. This 
approach is highly relevant as societies where conflicts occur are often faced with 
multi-dimensional challenges in security, politics, humanitarian and economic fronts. 
However, the difficulty of integrating this approach in practice ---especially from the 
viewpoint of paramount consideration for security and stability--- should also be taken 
into consideration and this point will also be discussed.     
 
2. THE CASE STUDY AND QUESTIONS BEHIND THE RESEARCH 
 
After reviewing the conceptual underpinnings of the peacebuilding approach in Part II, 
its application to an actual situation will be analyzed in Part III through an in-depth 
analysis of the post-conflict transition management of Afghanistan during what came 
to be known as the Bonn Process10, beginning in December 2001.  
 
Of the many countries that experienced conflicts during UN’s history ranging over six 
decades, the case of Afghanistan is conspicuous, as its history for over quarter of a 
Century has been coloured by continuous conflict and civil unrest. Soviet intervention 
since the late 1970s and the sustained resistance movement led by the Mujahideens; 
                                                 
10 Reflecting common usage in the policy community involved in post-9.11 Afghan assistance, 
“Bonn Process” is defined for the purpose of this dissertation as the four year period between 
December 2001 to December 2005 during which Afghanistan made a series of transitory steps 
as outlined in the Bonn Agreement.  
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the retreat of the Soviet troops which signalled the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War led to subsequent intensification of internal battle between various Afghan 
factions; the rise of the Taliban fundamentalist movement with its extremist policies 
and the abrupt end of the regime as a consequence of the terrorists incidents of 
September 2001 at the global level; all attest to a turbulent history of incessant 
conflict. Although UN was continuously engaged with Afghanistan throughout this 
period, its role was severely limited until new opportunities emerged in the autumn of 
200111. Afghanistan’s post-conflict stage was set with tremendous challenges. 
 
Following the incidents of 9.11, the Security Council reiterated its request to the 
Taliban regime to cooperate in the investigation against the suspected terrorist group 
al-Qaida on 27 September 200112 but, as expected, it was met with no reaction from 
the regime. Through subsequent US-led strikes beginning in October 2001, the Taliban 
regime disintegrated and the negotiation for post-conflict peace agreement was 
intensively pursued during October and November 200113. This resulted in the peace 
talks held in Germany and the adoption of the Bonn Agreement that the 
representatives of the Afghan parties signed under UN auspices on 5 December 
200114. The Security Council endorsed the agreement15 and authorized the creation of 
a 20,000-strong multilateral military presence, International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF)16 to work along-side the peacebuilding support mission which later became the 
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)17. In addition to ---and 
preceding--- this multilateral, formally authorized mechanism, the US-led coalition 
forces Operation Enduring Freedom sustained their presence throughout the period. 
Layers of various international actors making policy interventions proved to be a key 
characteristic of the international community’s engagement in the post-2001 Afghan 
peacebuilding process18. Another characteristic feature introduced was the concept of 
“lead nations” among donors for assisting in specific priority areas introduced in the G8 
                                                 
11 Kiyotaka Kawabata, Afghanistan: UN peacekeeping activities and regional conflict (Misuzu 
Shobo, 2002) (in Japanese)  
12 S/RES/1373 (2001) 
13 Kawabata, p9. 
14 Contained in the letter of 5 December 2001 from the Secretary General to the Security 
Council President (S/2001/1154). 
15 S/RES/1383 (2001) 
16 S/RES/1386 (2001) 
17 S/RES/1401 (2002) 
18 Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada & Abby Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and beyond: 
Prospect for improved stability reference document (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, 2005)  
15 
framework (under which US was leading security/military reform, Germany the police 
reform, Italy the judicial reform, Japan the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants, UK the counter narcotics). These frameworks of 
international assistance were maintained throughout the Bonn Process, which 
progressed with landmark events such as the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga’s 
mandating of the Transitional Authority, the adoption of a new constitution in January 
2004 following the Constitutional Loya Jirga, election of the President in autumn 2004 
and the election of the members of the lower house of the Parliament and Provincial 
Councils in autumn 2005.  
 
The Bonn Process came to the end of its prescribed road with the inauguration of the 
Parliament in December 2005 and the London Conference of January 2006 set the 
“post-Bonn” agenda prescribing the priorities for the subsequent five years, adopting 
the “Afghan Compact”19. At this point, Afghanistan’s immediate post-conflict status has 
arguably ended although it was widely recognized that sustained attention and 
assistance from the international community would be required for and beyond the 
next five years20. End of the Bonn Process brought with it the need to review the post-
conflict management in Afghanistan during the Bonn period with special focus on the 
role of the international community. With the advantage of hindsight ---but also with 
fresh accounts and not too distant a memory of interlocutors--- several questions merit 
being comprehensively analyzed. The research that lead to this dissertation begun with 
the following initial questions in mind: 
 
1. What were the characteristics of the Bonn Agreement and the pursuant 
“process”, both in terms of legal/policy orientation and in its application? Where 
does the Afghan experience stand in relation to other attempts by the UN to 
deal with post-conflict peacebuilding? 
2. What were the key factors that influenced the course of post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Afghanistan? How can one better comprehend various 
dilemmas encountered in the implementation process? 
3. Did the Bonn Process provide a useful roadmap for the initial stage of post-
conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan? Are there any elements that can be taken 
                                                 
18  S/2006/90, annex. 
20 Barnett Rubin, “Afghanistan’s uncertain transition from turmoil to normalcy” (Council on 
Foreign Relations CSR No. 12, March 2006) 
16 
as lessons learnt for application to other post conflict situations? 
 
3. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 
The objective of this dissertation is fourfold, roughly corresponding to the various parts 
of the dissertation following this introductory part. The first objective is to analyze the 
legal and political foundations as well as the key debates and political developments 
related to UN’s engagement with conflicts. Here the natural focus will be on 
development of the past two decades since the demise of the Cold War bipolar 
structure, as this is the time when UN transformed formidably and many experiments 
were made. However, adequate review of the legal mandates stemming from the 
Charter, the foundational concepts such as collective security and the innovation of 
practice that came to be called “peacekeeping” will be required in order to fully 
appreciate the changes that occurred in the post-Cold War world and the underlying 
debates that dates back to the final years of the Second World War when the current 
world order was designed. Attainment of the first objective will equip us with the 
comprehension of the wider international context required to appreciate the case study. 
 
The second objective is to reconstruct a particular case of post-conflict peacebuilding 
that is fresh in the minds of many: Afghanistan. Attempting to provide an analytical 
narrative of the process, various aspects of knowledge required to assess the process 
will be reviewed. This requires analysis for various elements that range from a very 
brief context of the conflict, factors that led to the termination of conflict, the design 
and characteristics of the agreement, landmark developments in the course of 
implementation, to a brief assessment of several key factors that impacted heavily on 
the process.  
 
Having reconstructed the Bonn Process as a flowing narrative, the next objective is to 
assess the overall outcome of the process. While the assessment of whether and in 
what way the Bonn Process can be judged as a success in post-conflict peacebuilding 
is an important element of the third objective, an equally important preoccupation is to 
carefully identify and analyze the dilemmas encountered in the process of post-conflict 
peacebuilding in the Afghan context. While it is easy to point to the negative 
developments and conclude that things are not working, it is much more difficult to 
identify the structural complexities which present dilemmas. It is this dissertation’s 
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main objective to identify and closely assess the various dimensions of the problems 
that collectively lead to the sometimes unencouraging state of affair. There are 
tensions in the transition process that are difficult to reconcile and referring to them as 
“dilemmas in post-conflict peacebuilding”, this dissertation will assess challenges 
including the following: the need to brining about greater security and stability even 
when the ones that can offer to do so ---short of full international commitment to 
assign international military presence to take on the task--- are former combatants or 
warlords that symbolize everything but respect for the rule of law to the local 
population; the fact that liberal democratic processes has a high chance of enshrining 
dubious actors into position of power. While some may argue to put off the electoral 
process off until civil societal and state institutional capacities are sufficiently created, 
but how to balance this with the reality of donor fatigue; the fact that while most post-
conflict peacebuilding processes are impossible to realize without extensive support 
from the international community, international assistance brings its own complications 
such as the dilemma between need for international standards of accountability and 
local priority setting and capacity building. And in some extreme cases the international 
assistance has been criticized for the potential to undermine central government’s 
legitimacy. Clear identification and better comprehension of these sets of complicated 
dilemmas encountered in the Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding process is one of the 
key objectives in the context of assessing the overall outcome of the process.   
  
The fourth objective is to determine the strengths and weaknesses of United Nations 
peace operations, by examining the core of UN’s relevance in relation to 
ending/preventing conflicts and help creating peace, identifying the factors 
constraining its ability to deal effectively with conflicts. The final part of the dissertation 
that addresses this objective will be concluded with several proposals on how UN’s 
capacity to deal with conflicts can be maximized.  
 
4. HYPOTHESIS PRESENTED IN THE STUDY  
 
As it will be reviewed in depth in the pages to follow, in the post-conflict period under 
the Bonn Process, ensuring security was the paramount consideration for the Afghan 
and international decision-makers. This dissertation argues that this determinant 
feature of the Process was due to two inter-related factors: first, as the Bonn 
Agreement excluded one major party to the conflict ---the Taliban--- from taking part 
18 
in the post-conflict transition process, there was a real potential and threat that 
security situation will deteriorate and derail the peace process; second, as the War on 
Terror waged by the United States and its coalition forces continued i.e. foreign 
military engagement (different from the UN–mandated security support force) was 
sustained for combat purposes throughout the Bonn Process, the situation in 
Afghanistan in parts of the country’s territory was not one to be characterized as “post-
conflict”. Analysis presented in this dissertation will demonstrate that for these 
reasons, attaining and maintaining security had to be at the top of the agenda in the 
implementation phase of the Bonn Process, sometimes at the cost of other important 
objectives in the peacebuilding process described in the Agreement, such as state 
institution building, socio-economic development, accountability to past action and 
promotion of human rights and reconciliation between different ethnic groups.    
 
A key variable underlying the two factors that led to the supremacy of security 
consideration21 described above, is the relationship of Taliban to the peace process. 
From the outset, as the Bonn Process emerged responding to US attack on Afghanistan 
in the aftermath of 9.11, it was a given condition that the Taliban was grouped with Al-
Qaida and treated as a terrorist organization of international significance. It was the 
enemy of the United States and its allies in the War on Terror and as that War never 
ended22, this scenario remained throughout the Bonn Process. Therefore, all associated 
with the Taliban and those regarded to be affiliated with them continued to remain 
outside the post-conflict transition process and grew as the center of “insurgency” 
acting against central government which was backed by the international community. 
Herein lie two critical elements. The relationship of the Taliban to the post-conflict 
process (or lack of it) was dictated by its significance from an international perspective, 
rather than from its domestic significance. Taliban as an Afghan entity is less a 
“supporter of terrorism” than one among various groups of contending warlords 
composed of Pashtuns albeit with extremist views. Taliban also embodies partially the 
                                                 
21 Expressed by the Afghan government and its international partners on various occasions of 
policy discussion e.g. SRSG Brahimi’s brief to the Security Council on 19 July 2002 (S/PV.4579)  
22 President Bush pledged that “Our War on Terror begins with Al-Qaida but it does not end 
there… it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
defeated” speaking on 20 September 2001 before beginning the attacks in Afghanistan. 
(“Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People” http://whitehouse.gov 
/news.releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) Various criticism were made to the notion of War on 
Terror as being indefinite, indeterminate, and counterproductive ---most authoritatively by 
RAND Corporation’s comprehensive study titled “Defeating Terrorist Groups” presented to the 
US House Armed Services Committees in September 2008--- but throughout the Bush 
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Pashtun population’s frustration towards non-Pashtun attempts for political dominance 
after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. By excluding the Taliban from the post-
conflict transition process and not taking other measures to bring the non-Taliban 
conservative tribal Pashtuns solidly on board to the process, a sizable segment of the 
most numerous ethnic group of the country remained outside of the process they had 
to be a part of if post-conflict peacebuilding was to happen. As we shall see in detail, 
this was never corrected during the Bonn Process and led to unignorable growth of 
“insurgency” movements to which some non-Taliban population joined due to 
dissatisfaction with the central government policy or Coalition’s military action.  
 
This dissertation sets and explores the hypothesis that this was a situation where 
external conditions at the inter-state level (i.e. War on Terror) dictated the internal 
peace process at the intra-state level (i.e. not to include the Taliban in the peace 
process and therefore having to place security consideration above all other goals) and 
that in turn negatively affected the peace process to deliver desired results (i.e. 
security and lasting stable peace), with an impact back to both levels of analysis. 
Differently put, it is argued that if it was not for the significance of the War on Terror, 
Afghanistan’s post-conflict transition process would have looked substantively different 
---involving different actors--- and had the peacebuilding process been more inclusive, 
prospects for consolidating peace would have been greater. Upon designing the Bonn 
Agreement and in the initial stages of its implementation on the ground, should the 
international community, led by the United Nations, have taken more intrusive 
measures to alter the power structure of the country and resolving underlying causes 
of conflictual relationship among the country’s various actors? Should there have been 
more weight given to institutional capacity building based on these principles? Was the 
international mediator’s position too close to accepting the status quo, not addressing 
the underlying causes of continued fighting and dissatisfaction among the Afghan 
population? If we suppose that above questions are to be answered affirmatively, then 
another question renders itself to be asked: was there an alternative in a realistic 
sense? 
 
From a theoretical point of view, proponents of a more intrusive international presence 
to manage transitional process in post-conflict countries such as Roland Paris who 
proposes the “Institutionalization before liberation approach” are critical of the peace 
                                                                                                                                               
Administration’s second term, the phrase was used as an ongoing state of affairs.     
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operation in Afghanistan under the Bonn Process assessing it as a disappointing step 
back in the evolution of UN’s peace operations after transitional administrations UN 
administered in Kosovo and East Timor23. However, in drawing relevant lessons for 
future post-conflict peacebuilding operations, the counter-arguments drawn from 
Lakhdar Brahimi and others engaged in practice of designing and administering peace 
operations should also be weighed appropriately. The “light footprint approach” that 
guided the UN’s work in the Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding that argued that 
national ownership of the process is paramount will also be analyzed in this 
dissertation.  
 
5. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY AND METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation aims to address these questions and test the abovementioned 
hypothesis through three segments of analysis. First, it will examine the changing 
nature of UN operations in post-conflict settings, drawing on various definitions and 
events that shaped the literature on UN’s engagement with conflicts. Second, it will 
review the Afghan post-conflict transition process governed by the Bonn Agreement by 
analyzing its origin, content, progress, factors that affected its implementation, leading 
to assessment of the process. Third, it will determine the strengths and weaknesses of 
UN peace operations, identifying factors constraining UN’s ability to deal more 
effectively with conflict situations and to explore ways to maximize UN’s capacity in this 
regard. In these three distinct but related segments, the following methodology of 
research will be applied: 
  
(i) Theoretical and conceptual underpinnings Analysis: Review and analysis of 
preceding academic/analytical work and policy statements concerning UN’s role in the 
management of conflicts and in particular post-conflict peacebuilding: Its place in 
International Relations at the beginning of the 21st Century. 
  
(ii) Comparative analysis: Brief review and analysis of several key cases in 
internationally led post-conflict peace building efforts in the post-Cold War era: 
Different circumstances and external conditions in which UN became involved with very 
different mandates, implication of these on the outcome of the peace building process. 
                                                 
23 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p212-227. 
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(iii) Historical narrative and content analysis of relevant official documents: 
Constructing a detailed narrative of development surrounding and in Afghanistan from 
December 2001 to January from the perspective of post-conflict peacebuilding: 
Deriving the pertinent issues through review of socio-political development, policy 
statements and official documents (including relevant reports by the United Nations 
and the government of Afghanistan). 
 
(iv) Interview with relevant actors and analysis of perspectives: In-depth review of 
relevant literature and interview with individuals engaged in the design and 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement: Analysis of their perspectives will aid in 
identification of characteristics of the Bonn Process, guiding factors/priorities set by the 
actors involved and its impact on the outcome of the peacebuilding process.  
 
6. LIMITATIONS AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
As described in depth in the following chapters, the field of research on post-conflict 
peacebuilding has a distinct characteristic that, to a great extent, the practice led 
theorization. Furthermore, this is a field of study that is constantly being updated from 
new experiences gained with every new major engagement by the United Nations and 
other mandated bodies. Therefore, the definitional clarity and analytical rigour cannot 
be expected to be at the standards of research where the object of analysis is static 
and non-debated. It is beyond the scope of the study to arrive at a definitive notion or 
an ideal model of concepts central to the analysis such as post-conflict peacebuilding.    
 
In relation to the case study in particular, the recent nature of the event and the very 
condition that the Afghan government institutions are in limited access to primary data 
that should be available from government sources. Much of the primary data in written 
form was drawn from official documents of United Nations and other government and 
academic institutions outside of Afghanistan. In order to fill the gap of knowledge, 
these were complemented by some primary data obtained through questionnaire and 
interviews conducted for this research. As for sources for secondary analysis, many 
journalistic reporting and contemporary assessments were used to construct some 
picture even if they are fragmented. These sources may be put in better perspective at 
a later point with the benefit of historical and comprehensive analysis that is not 
available at the time of writing of this dissertation.  
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Finally, common to any attempt at analyzing a political process which is conducted in 
the “real world” of geopolitical and strategic interests, sources of credible information 
to shed light on the reasons that motivated certain course of action is difficult to 
obtain. In addition to the problem of having limited sources of information described 
above, where access to additional relevant information was made possible through this 
research mainly through interviews, a level of subjectivity in the respondent’s account 
needs to be factored in. With the impossibility to interview key actors on all sides, it is 
difficult to claim for a rigorous comparison of viewpoints and a comprehensive picture. 
It must be said that these were beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Limitation in the scope of the study outlined above notwithstanding, this dissertation is 
put forward to claim relevance for contribution to a better comprehension of the 
Afghan post-conflict transition process governed by the Bonn Agreement. Bonn Process 
being one of the key contemporary cases in post-conflict peacebuilding that UN 
engaged in, identifying new angles of analysis as well as uncovering and analyzing 
additional primary data related to the process will contribute to better assessment of 
this intervention. The dissertation also makes its contribution to and forwards the 
contentious debate on the optimal model of UN’s engagement in post-conflict 
peacebuilding process. Contending perspectives by leading scholars and practitioners 
on the ideal modality of UN’s engagement will be surveyed in detail in Part II, then 
applied in the context of the Afghan Bonn Process in Part III and specific insights from 
this study will be elaborated in Part IV and V.      
 
An additional relevance of this dissertation is to be found in its approach to combine 
the “lessons learnt” and other critical perspectives accumulated among practitioners of 
international peace operations and the analysis and findings based on theorization 
offered by the academic community. Deliberately drawing on sources from both ends, 
the study aims to make a modest contribution to the bridging of the sometimes distant 
circles of knowledge, sharing common interest in better understanding how the 
international community should best support post-conflict societies in peacebuilding. As 
the unfortunate trend of instability and conflict grows around the world, and with the 
recognition of the post-9.11 world that unattended conflicts can have global 
repercussions, such integrative aspect of this study’s relevance is believed to have 
greater significance in the years to come.     
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One of the key objectives prescribed to many intergovernmental organizations ---in 
particular those of universal nature, such as the United Nations and its predecessor the 
League of Nations--- is the maintenance of peace and security. But the precise nature 
of how the United Nations deals with conflicts and maintains peace and security as the 
representative of the international community is not clearly defined and the practice as 
well as its theorizing have changed overtime.  
 
In Part II, we aim to capture the changing nature of UN's peace operations with the 
objective of setting the context for the case study to be discussed in the Part III and IV. 
We will begin by recalling the legal basis of UN’s engagement with conflicts and then 
assess the background under the Cold War bipolar structure where “peacekeeping” 
was invented and remained the main modus operandi for the first four decades of UN’s 
history. Subsequently, we shall review the developments in the post-Cold War era, 
analyzing several key policy documents produced by the United Nations that impacted 
on the fifth and sixth decade of UN’s history. Conceptual frameworks and definitions 
given to various components and modalities of UN’s engagement in conflicts will be 
discussed in this context and theoretical underpinnings of these discussions from 
various schools of International Relations will also be articulated.  
 
In addition to above, the influence of the liberal democratic peace thesis on post-
conflict peacebuilding design will be examined at the end of Part II. While an in-depth 
analysis of the theory and debate surrounding the thesis are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, a brief attempt will be made to introduce the debate over the desirability 
of liberalist suppositions in peacebuilding efforts, as they impact substantively on 
theorizing and practice of UN’s peace operations in the near future.      
 
1. MANDATE UNDER THE CHARTER AND OTHER LEGAL GROUNDS  
 
The question of how to deal with conflicts has always been one of the most central 
issues capturing the community of world nations that we refer to today as the 
“international community” 24 . Establishment of the United Nations as well as its 
predecessor the League of Nations were attempts to better address this and other 
important problems facing the community of nation states. It is natural therefore that 
the United Nations identified the question of “maintenance of international peace and 
                                                 
24 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding international conflicts (Harper Collins, 1993)  
 26
security”25 as one of the most important issues for which the world body should deal 
with.  
 
With the limitation of world order based on the “balance of power” model blatantly 
exposed by the First World War, the concept of “collective security” emerged as a basis 
for world order to avoid war and maintain peace, and became enshrined in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations26. By defining that an attack on a member state 
within the system constitutes an attack on all members of the system and that it 
legitimizes concerted action by all members of the system, the concept of collective 
security provided a logical justification required for acts of self-defense and sanctions 
endorsed through international agreement. This concept filled the normative gap 
created for these types of actions after the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 that made 
resolution of conflict through violent means illegal in principle27.        
 
In legal terms, the UN’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in general stems from the Preamble and articles 1(1), 24 (Security Council’s 
responsibility), 99 (Secretary-General’s responsibility) 28 . More specifically, the UN 
Charter Preamble begins by stating that “We the peoples of the United Nations 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... and for these 
ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good 
neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and 
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force should not be used, save in the common interest”. The Charter continues on in 
Chapter 1 “Purposes and Principles” to identify “maintenance of international peace 
and security” as the first item under the purpose of the UN in Article 1. Article 24 
states that the “Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
                                                 
25 As we shall see in the following pages, the definition of what constitutes a “threat to 
international peace and security” shifted dramatically over the past two decades to include 
various cases which would have previous not have been considered in this category.  
26 “Collective Security” by Peter J. Opitz in Helmut Volger (ed), “A concise encyclopedia of the 
Untied Nations” (Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
27 One of the many efforts made after the World War I to outlaw war, signed in Paris in August 
1929. While it failed to prevent the rise of militarism in the 1930s and eventually the Second 
World War, it remains a binding treaty under international law. 
(www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/88736.htm) Its principle denouncing aggressive war was 
confirmed in a broadened manner in the Charter of the United Nations Article 2(4).   
28 General Assembly (GA)’s responsibility in the area of peace and security is not explicit but GA 
discusses matters pertaining to peace and security based on its mandate described in Article 10 
that states “The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope 
of the present Charter… make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to 
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maintenance of international peace and security”. Beyond assigning of mandates and 
responsibilities, the key provisions of the Charter that defines “the specific powers 
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of … duties” are contained in Chapter 
VI “Pacific settlement of disputes” (Articles 33-38) and Chapter VII “Action with respect 
to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” (Articles 39-
51)29.   
 
As we shall see in detail in the subsequent chapter with reference to the development 
of the concept of “peacekeeping” during the Cold War era, the United Nations’ 
mandate to ensure international peace and security as described in the Charter is not 
matched with conditions in reality, especially concerning its capacity to enforce peace. 
Even when the Cold War bipolar structure ended and requests were made for the UN 
to make greater interventions in conflict prevention and resolution, resource provision 
to the United Nations from the Member States did not grow commensurate to the 
mandates given. This is most acutely reflected in the fact that the type of standing 
force to be made available to implement military action decided by the Security Council 
(envisaged in Articles 43-47) that should be able to act on Chapter VII provisions in the 
event that the Security Council determines the “existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (as defined in Article 39) is not established 
six decades after the adoption of the Charter and it is not expected to be so in any 
near future. This points to the fact that despite legal grounds laid out above, to this 
day, the project to concretize the system of collective security based on the United 
Nations prescribed in the Charter is incomplete. Nonetheless, this is not to imply that 
little was done by the United Nations with the aim of maintaining international peace 
and security as we shall see in the following chapters. 
 
2. ”PEACEKEEPING” DURING THE COLD WAR  
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the area of engaging with conflicts to 
maintain international peace and security, the United Nations begun with unclear 
mandate and inadequate means to meet the challenges presented. During roughly the 
first four decades of UN’s existence, the situation largely remained unquestioned, due 
                                                                                                                                               
the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.” 
29 As we shall see in Part II Chapter 2, “peacekeeping operations” have no reference in the 
Charter itself and are often dubbed as “Chapter VI ½”. 
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to the reality of world politics during the Cold War30 characterized by East-West rivalry 
based on ideological lines and proxy wars. In any event, the bipolar world structure 
that characterized this period offered little space for the world body to exercise its 
responsibility in the area of maintaining peace and security31. The most important 
development in this area during this period was the development of concept and 
practice of peacekeeping32.  
 
It is important to note that “peacekeeping” is a term not envisaged in the Charter and 
its creation is a manifestation of UN’s attempt to intervene in conflicts against the 
backdrop of the abovementioned reality during the Cold War period. While the Cold 
War bipolar structure characterized the international system framework, UN's role in 
conflict situations had to be limited in scope, centered mainly around providing buffer 
zone for separation of forces, monitoring cease-fires and observing demilitarization on 
principles of neutrality, with the consent of the parties concerned, and force was used 
only in self-defense 33 . Two analysts with long personal experience in UN’s 
peacekeeping activities, Kiyotaka Kawabata and Shigeru Mochida, analyzes as follows: 
 
“For better or for worse, Peacekeeping is a product of the dilemma of world 
politics, and therefore its existence cannot be discussed separately from the 
reality of international politics. This limitation imposed by reality gave rise to two 
seemingly contradicting traits of peacekeeping: limitless expectation it raises as 
a conflict resolution mechanism on the one hand and its actual powerlessness 
that disappoints many on the other. It is perhaps a fate prescribed at its birth 
that peacekeeping contains two distinct aspects as if it were light and shadow of 
the same concept. “Light” as it is a creation by the Member States and the 
Secretariat crystallizing the international community’s wisdom in dealing with the 
                                                 
30 The term Cold War describes the state of conflict, tension and competition that existed 
between the US and the USSR and their respective allies from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s. 
Throughout this period, the two superpowers engaged in costly defence spending including a 
nuclear arms race and numerous proxy wars. (For the origin of the term and how it became 
embraced in US foreign policy parlance, see 'Bernard Baruch coins the term "Cold War"', 
history.com entry 16 April 1947) 
31 It should be noted that during this period UN played much more expansive role in the area of 
socio-economic issues, for a good summary of accounts in these field during the first six 
decades see Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij & Thomas G. Weiss, The power of UN ideas: lessons 
from the first 60 years (United Nations Intellectual History Project, 2005) 
32 Lily Sucharipa-Behrmann, “Peacekeeping operations of the Untied Nations” in Franz Cede & 
Lily Sucharipa-Behrmann (eds) The United Nations: Law & practice (Kluwer Law International, 
2001) 
33 Based on definition of “Peacekeeping” by Brian Urquhart in Helmut Volger (ed), “A concise 
encyclopedia of the Untied Nations” (Kluwer Law International, 2002). One notable exception is 
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political limitations that are given factors in international relations, “shadow” as 
it is a makeshift concept designed to deal with crisis with immediate political 
improvisation in place of a serious response.34”                
 
It could be said that peacekeeping is a concept that deliberately resisted a fixed 
definition through institutionalization35. During the Cold War period, peacekeeping 
proved to be the most and only relevant tool at the disposal of the UN in dealing with 
conflicts and it managed to be in center stage by keeping its flexibility as a concept 
and practice.  
     Table 1: UN Peacekeeping operations during the Cold War36 
Mission Target area Mandate 
Resolution 
Duration 
UNTSO 
(United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization) 
Egypt, Lebanon, 
Israel etc 
SC R 50 05/1948 - 
present 
UNMOGIP 
(United Nations Military Observer 
Group in India and Pakistan) 
Kashmir (India-
Pakistan border) 
SC R 47 01/1949 – 
present 
UNEF I 
(United Nations Emergency Force) 
Suez Canal, 
Sinai, Gaza  
GA R 998 
GA R 1000 
11/1956 – 
06/1967 
UNOGIL 
(United Nations Observation Group 
in Lebanon) 
Lebanon-Syria 
border 
SC R 128 06/1958 – 
12/1958 
ONUC 
(United Nations Operation in the 
Congo) 
Congo SC R 143 
SC R 161 
07/1960 – 
06/1964 
UNSF 
(United Nations Security Force in 
West New Guinea) 
West New 
Guinea 
GA R 1752 10/1962 – 
04/1963 
UNYOM 
(United Nations Yemen Observation 
Mission) 
Yemen SC R 179 07/1963 – 
09/1964 
UNFICYP 
(United Nations Peacekeeping Force 
in Cyprus) 
Cyprus SC R 186 03/1964 – 
present 
DOMREP 
(Mission of the Representative of 
the SG in the Dominican Republic) 
The Dominican 
Republic 
SC R 203 05/1965 – 
10/1966 
UNIPOM 
(United Nations India-Pakistan 
Observation Mission) 
India-Pakistan 
Border 
SC R 221 09/1965 – 
03/1966 
                                                                                                                                               
the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed in the Belgian Congo 1960-64. 
34 Kiyotaka Kawabata and Shigeru Mochida, New Era of peacekeeping: testimony from the UN 
Security Council (original title: PKO shinjidai: Kokuren Anpori karano shogen) (Iwanami Shoten, 
1997), p4. This quote is a rough translation into English by Kato from the book written in 
Japanese. Responsibility for the accuracy of the translation rests with the author of this 
dissertation. 
35 A. B. Fetherston, Towards a theory of United Nations peacekeeping (Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1994), p13. 
36 For full name of missions, detailed description of mission mandate and other information, see 
source data found on the UN-DPKO homepage (http://www.un.org/depts/dpko). 
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UNEF II 
(Second United Nations Emergency 
Force) 
Suez Canal, 
Sinai 
SC R 340  
SC R 341 
06/1974 – 
07/1979 
UNDOF 
(United Nations Disengagement 
Force) 
Golan Heights, 
Syria 
SC R 350 06/1974 – 
present 
UNIFIL 
(United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon) 
Southern 
Lebanon 
SC R 425 03/1979 – 
present 
UNGOMAP 
(United Nations Good Offices 
Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan) 
Afghanistan  SC R 622 05/1988 – 
03/1990 
UNIMOG 
(United Nations Iran-Iraq Military 
Observer Group) 
Iran-Iraq border SC R 619 08/1988 – 
02/1991 
UNAVEM I 
(United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission) 
Angola SC R 626 01/1989 – 
06/1991 
 
As summarized in Table 1 above, 16 peacekeeping operations were established and 
deployed by the UN during the Cold War37. While these operations served many useful 
purposes, there were evident limitations in their ability to resolve conflicts and ensure 
international peace and security. Some missions were criticized for entrenching the 
conflict situation and not being able to bring about peace other than that defined as a 
mere absence of violent conflicts38. The outcome situation they provided was far from 
the state of peace UN was supposed to protect and ensure under the Charter and yet 
even at the face of such criticisms, there was little that the UN was able to do given 
the dynamics of Cold War politics as well as the limited means it had at its disposal.     
In the early 1990s when the post-Cold War world order begun to take place marked 
with many outbursts of internal conflicts, interest in UN peacekeeping operations 
surged.  Among various attempts to categorize its various types, the most famous one 
was that of categorizing UN peacekeeping operations into three “generations”39. First 
                                                 
37 There are different ways of categorizing Cold War peacekeeping operations but for the 
purpose of this dissertation, UNAVEM I is seen as the cut off mission for missions launched 
during the Cold War structure, as the next mission, United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) in Namibia, launched in April 1989 has some elements of a new and expanded role 
expected for United Nations characteristic of post-Cold War operations incorporated. This is not 
to say however that no missions following UNTAG were traditional peacekeeping missions, or 
that no missions before UNTAG had an expanded role beyond monitoring ascribed (as in the 
case of ONUC) as discussed elsewhere in the text.   
38 For instance, UNFICYP has been deployed in Cyprus since 1964 to present for over four 
decades with no role in bringing about resolution of the conflict, for detailed analysis see 
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making war & building peace: United Nations peace 
operations (Princeton University Press, 2006), p257-280. 
39 Doyle and Sambanis, p10-18.  
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generation was “the traditional operation” that characterized most40 of the operations 
during the Cold War period as described above based on the principles of neutrality, 
consent and non-use of force. Several of the peacekeeping operations deployed in the 
initial years after the end of the Cold War, such as the United Nations Transitional 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 
(ONUSAL), and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had 
mandates that allowed much greater intervention in the country’s domestic 
management issues but still operated on the principle of consent by the parties. These 
operations that came to be characterized as “multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations” were also referred to as the second generation of peacekeeping operations 
to be distinguished from the first generation operations. Then came the third 
generation of peacekeeping operations that included mandates for peace enforcement 
and preventive deployment such as the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNSCOM II) and 
the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR deployed in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia). Due 
to the widely-publicized failure of the operation in Somalia, operations deployed in the 
post-UNSCOM II period often had designs that the military component of the mandate 
is assumed by regional organizations which the UN operation was expected to work 
alongside with while paying focusing on the political process and state capacity 
building. As we shall explore later, in the 1990s further attempts were made to 
distinguish various types of interventions UN makes in conflict situations and in the 
following decade into the new Millennium, the discussion progressed from one 
artificially centered around peacekeeping to one comprehensively discussing various 
forms of UN’s peace operations41. 
 
3. AGENDA FOR PEACE AND THE EMERGENCE OF “PEACEBUILDING” AS THE NEW FOCUS 
 
As the Cold War bipolar structure came to an end in December 1991 with historic 
demise of the Soviet Union, a new environment has emerged in which the international 
community called upon the UN to actively deal with conflicts for their solution42. It was 
no coincidence that the same period saw the beginning of many internal conflicts that 
                                                 
40 Although not all, such as the ONUC operation in the Congo 1960-64. 
41 This “generational” categorization is confusing as the three broad categories described as 
“generations” did not appear in reality in chronological terms, as the second and the third 
generations were born within months (with the exception of the 1960 experience in the Congo 
which is indeed a Third generation operation predating the appearance of the second 
generation operation in Namibia in 1989. (Pointed out by Doyle in Otunnu and Doyle, 
Chesterman.) 
42Otunnu & Doyle, p 1-12 & 297-302. 
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were previously either contained or resolved within the context of Cold War bipolar 
rivalry. The need to have new mechanisms to deal with these new conflicts and the 
disappearance of hindrance on UN’s political activism opened new avenues for UN’s 
engagement with conflicts. Symbolical of this change, the Security Council held a 
milestone session attended by heads of states in January 1992, affirming its 
commitment to work through the UN in dealing with conflicts. The summit session 
called upon the UN secretariat to present its views on how UN's role may be stepped 
up in this area by providing “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening 
and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the 
capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping”43.  
 
Prepared in this context of unprecedented rise of demand and expectation, the Agenda 
for Peace report presented in June 1992 laid out the secretariat's view of how UN can 
best assist resolution of conflicts44. With the following working definition, the report 
gave a coherent framework to various tasks performed by the UN by separating UN's 
activities in relation to conflicts into four areas of chronological progression i.e. 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding. 
 
Preventive diplomacy: action to prevent disputes from arising between 
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to 
limit the spread of the latter when they occur. 
 
Peacemaking: action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially 
through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the 
Charter.  
 
Peacekeeping: the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military 
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a 
technique that expands the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and 
the making of peace. 
 
Post-conflict peacebuilding: action to identify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict. 
 
                                                 
43 S/23500, Statement of the President of the Council, 31 January 1992. 
44 S/24111 
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Already in 1992, it was evident that several key variables distinguished the new 
operations in the post-Cold War era from its predecessors during the first four decades 
of UN’s history. These were (i) involvement in internal issues of a state (such as 
electoral assistance, state capacity building), (ii) diversification of tasks to be 
performed which also translated to dramatic increase in scale of operations, (iii) 
preventive deployment at an early stage of conflict, not necessarily awaiting 
termination of conflict, became the norm, (iv) increase in expected tasks to be 
performed by the peacekeeping operation. 
 
Reflecting the broadening of tasks to be covered by UN peace operations, the new 
emphasis was made on the mandate of peacebuilding. This is believed to be the 
reason why the Secretary General included this concept to the three concepts pre-
determined by the Security Council’s request. While the first three concepts defined in 
the Agenda for Peace were widely used from the preceding decades under the bipolar 
structure (and therefore explicitly referred to by the Security Council), the concept of 
“peacebuilding” hitherto discussed mainly in small academic/policy circles was brought 
to the forefront of international discussion, through the articulation of the concept in 
this report. It represented an area that the UN saw itself to actively be involved in the 
post-Cold War era.  
 
Defining peacebuilding as activities conducted once peace is achieved, the report 
identified as peacebuilding, activities in wide ranging areas such as demilitarization of 
former combatants, improving security, collection and destruction of weapons, return 
of refugees, advise and training to law enforcement personnel, monitoring of elections, 
promotion of human rights protection, reform and strengthening of governmental 
institutions, promotion of political participation to be constituting peacebuilding 
support. Most of UN's peace operations after 1988 focused on this post-conflict 
peacebuilding element45. Therefore, the focus of this dissertation will center primarily 
on this concept.  
 
In a statement issued by its President in April 1993, the Security Council endorsed the 
concept of peacebuilding and expressed its support for UN to conduct peacebuilding as 
part of efforts to build strong foundation for peace. In terms of definitional 
development, following the operations in Somalia and Bosnia which were widely 
                                                 
45 Paris, p18. 
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perceived as failures, the UN issued a Supplement to the Agenda for Peace in 1995 
recognizing that a new breed of intra-state conflict characterized by failed states 
presented the UN with new challenges (reminiscent in a remote manner the 1960 
Congo operation)46. The supplementary report articulated that the collapse of state 
institutions in these countries ---especially those institutions providing law and order--- 
necessitated international interventions to go beyond the traditional military and 
humanitarian tasks to embrace “promotion of national reconciliation and re-
establishment of effective government” thereby highlighting the need for strengthened 
capacity in peacebuilding.   
 
The UN also made several amendments to the initial scheme presented in the Agenda 
for Peace in this supplement. For instance, the following six activities were identified as 
various methods in which UN tries to resolve conflicts between and within states: 
“preventive diplomacy and peacemaking”, “peacekeeping”, “peacebuilding”, 
“disarmament”, “sanctions”, and “peace enforcement”. The first three were 
characterized by having the consent of the parties to the conflict while the last two 
were exercise of Council's authority based on Chapter VII of the Charter. 
“Disarmament” was considered to be somewhere in between. It was also explained 
that the first three were still based on the notion of chronological progression. Here the 
content of “peacebuilding” was defined as activities aimed at creating “structures for 
the institutionalization of peace” which included demilitarization, control of small 
weapons, institutional reform, police and judiciary reform, monitoring of human rights, 
electoral reform, and social and economic development.   
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, there was a renewed interest on the topic, with 
particular emphasis on UN's engagement in post-conflict peacebuilding, as many saw 
the need for greater focus on the phase to consolidate peace. At the end of 1998, the 
Security Council held an open debate entitled “Maintenance of peace and security and 
post-conflict peacebuilding” and many Member States participated expressing various 
views on the subject. As Bert Theuermann points out, the Presidential Statement 
issued on this occasion47is the most comprehensive generic policy formulation of the 
Council on peacebuilding48. It affirmed the Council's recognition of the importance of 
                                                 
46 S/1995/1 
47 S/PRST/1998/38  
48 Bert Theuermann, “Peacebuilding activities of the Untied Nations” in Franz Cede & Lily 
Sucharipa-Behrmann (eds) The United Nations: Law and practice (Kluwer Law International, 
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post-conflict peacebuilding efforts of the UN system, and the value of including 
peacebuilding elements in mandates of peacekeeping operations, and emphasized the 
need for smooth transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding 
structures, while at the same time affirming the Council's commitment to the principles 
of political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. 
 
4. POST-COLD WAR PEACE OPERATIONS  
 
Turning our attention away momentarily from the development of conceptual 
framework on UN’s engagement in conflicts, this Chapter will briefly review the actual 
cases UN engaged in conflicts during the first decade after the end of the Cold War to 
assess the key results. We begin by noting that all the enthusiasm and optimism 
expressed in the Agenda for Peace was matched by a spirit of unprecedented activism 
in the Security Council that defined various issues as posing “threat to international 
peace and security” in the first half of 1990s. As the two former West-East bloc leaders 
became more willing to pull out of conflict situations in grounds where during the Cold 
War proxy wars were fought, greater role and responsibility were placed on the UN to 
bring conflicts to an end. At the same time, after the end of the Cold War, conflicts in 
question changed to be predominantly intra-state nature and many of UN's missions 
dispatched during this period required elements which went beyond peacekeeping 
mandates, with added various roles in the area of peacebuilding49.  
 
It must be assessed that UN did generally well during the initial years of the post-Cold 
War world to fulfill the new expectations placed on the world organization for the first 
time50 as seen in the four major operations during the early post-Cold War era in 
Namibia (1989-90), El Salvador (1991-96), Cambodia (1991-93), and Mozambique 
(1992-94). They followed a similar pattern where the international stakeholders 
(usually led by a key Security Council member) supported the formulation of a peace 
accord and then the Council subsequently authorized a UN mission to support and 
monitor specific elements prescribed in the peace accord51. These operations were 
deployed to countries where there was a general readiness for ending conflicts and 
                                                                                                                                               
2001) 
49 Simon Chesterman, You, the people: The United Nations, transitional administration, and 
state-building (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
50 With the exception of 1960 Belgian Congo. 
51 Usually this included inter alia monitoring of ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization of 
former combatants, holding and monitoring of an election. 
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peace agreement was in place, and the lead members of the international community 
committed resources to enable international operations. All four operations ended in a 
relatively speedy manner deemed as success after conducting the first democratic 
election. 
 
However, the relative ease with which UN conducted above operations contrasted to 
the next two operations that proved to be more difficult to manage i.e. Somalia (1992) 
and Bosnia (1995). In these two instances, the UN mission arrived in a terrain where 
there was no peace to keep. Although a peace accord was signed due to big power 
pressure, willingness among the local parties to abide by it was not as high as in the 
first four operations. Lack of resources to carry out the mandate was another problem; 
UN forces entered the ground with insufficient manpower based on best-case 
scenario52. In both cases, forces available for the UN proved to be insufficient to 
provide the necessary security and had to be supported by a larger US-led force. US 
and some other key Member States remained unwilling to provide their force to 
operate under UN’s command. In the case of Somalia, initial problem was solved with 
the reinforcement of 20,000 strong US force but it was followed with the withdrawal of 
90% of the US troops, just as the Security Council was mandating greater 
responsibility for the UN mission53. This unfortunate turn of events resulted in the 
widely televised death of 18 US solders which led to US troop’s complete withdrawal 
and the operation spread the image of UN's failure to deal effectively in conflicts. In 
Bosnia, the shocking consequence of the mismatch between robust mandate and 
insufficient manpower given to the UN took the form of the massacre of Srebrenica 
(July 1995) up to 20,000 people ---overwhelmingly Bosnian Muslims--- perished in UN 
controlled “safe zones”. Coupled with the outrageous development in Rwanda where 
despite UN's presence in the country, genocide which claimed the lives of roughly 
800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus (April-July 1994) took place unhindered54, these 
failed operations in the mid-1990s gave a strongly negative image for UN's ability to 
deal with internal conflicts.  
 
Although UN's performance in these operations left strong impression to many that UN 
                                                 
52 James Dobbins et al, The UN’s role in nation building: From the Congo to Iraq (RAND 
Corporation, 2005) 
53 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds), learning from Somalia (West View Press, 1997), p244.  
54 In the case of Rwanda, revealing of UN and the international community’s inability to 
respond to crisis even where many alerts were given from the field commander led to further 
questions as detailed in Lieutenant-General Dallaire’s important account, see Romeo Dallaire, 
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was unable to deal effectively with peace enforcement operations, records of later 
missions, in particular those in Eastern Slavonia (1995), East Timor (1999) and Kosovo 
(1999) attest otherwise. These examples seem to point out that when provided with 
sufficient resources and strong political support, UN missions are able to work 
effectively to attain the mandates given55. Especially in the case of Eastern Slavonia, 
despite the fact that the conflict occurred simultaneously and in close proximity to the 
escalation of violence in Bosnia, the peace operation concluded well. This success is 
attributable to several factors pertaining to the condition in the country at the time of 
the end of the conflict but it also has to do with the well-staffed, well-conducted 
mission that UN was able to send due to the willingness of the key Member States.  
 
Although the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace cautioned against UN assuming 
responsibility for law and order, or attempting to impose state institutions on unwilling 
combatants, the reality in fact pulled the UN to greater involvement in these areas in 
the following years. UN's mandates continued to increase and expand in the years to 
follow56. By the end of 1995, UN assumed policing responsibility in Bosnia under the 
Dayton Accord and the following year it assumed responsibility for temporary civil 
governance functions in Eastern Slavonia. In East Timor and Kosovo, UN mission's 
mandate was substantially increased reaching new heights, performing the role of 
transitional administration 57 . Beyond the parlance of Agenda for Peace, these 
operations came to be characterized as “Multi-functional/complex operations” 
characterized with a strong “peacebuilding” component.  
 
With reference to Kosovo and East Timor, the assessment of dramatic expansion in 
mandate to perform the function of a transitional administration was mixed, both 
among practitioners and theoreticians. As this debate will be explored in more detail in 
the context of the case study, here it suffices to note that it was applauded by some as 
long-awaited and appropriate response to the need for a more full scale and intrusive 
peace operations58 and others assessed that they were unsustainable as a model for 
standard peace operation by the UN59. Whatever the longer term verdict will be on 
                                                                                                                                               
Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda (Random House Canada, 2003).   
55James Dobbins et al, The UN's role in nation-building: from the Congo to Iraq (RAND 
Cooperation, 2005) 
56 Chesterman, p2. 
57 It should also be noted that these operations were not without controversy, especially as 
similarity with colonialism or military occupation was suggested. 
58 Paris, p213-221. 
59 Brahimi report (S/2000/809) 
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these wider mandate operations, the architects of the next major peace operation i.e. 
in Afghanistan chose to revert to a more limited scope of UN's involvement, explicitly 
calling for a “light footprint” as the desired model in this country's post-conflict 
peacebuilding process. Whether this model will be regarded as the norm rather than 
the exception for future major UN peace operations remains to be seen but its pros 
and cons in actual application will be assessed in greater detail in Part II.                   
 
5. 2000 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE “BRAHIMI REPORT”  
 
Reverting our attention to the development of conceptual framework and attempt at 
theorization of UN’s engagement in conflicts, almost a decade after the Agenda for 
Peace, Secretary General Kofi Annan established in 2000 a High-level Panel to review 
UN’s peacekeeping operations and mandated the Panel to draw up recommendations 
for change in UN’s practice. Hence a report was produced in August 2000, in time for 
discussion at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, titled “Report of the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations”, better known as the “Brahimi report” taking the 
name of the Chairman of the Panel Lakhdar Brahimi.   
  
The Brahimi report is based on a conceptual framework that “peace operations” of the 
UN consists of the following three “principle activities”: 
 
Conflict prevention and Peacemaking: Long-term conflict prevention 
is attained through establishment of a solid foundation for peace by 
eliminating structural causes for conflict. When there are specific factors 
and incidents threatening the maintenance of the foundation for peace, 
preventive diplomacy supports the maintenance of peace through 
diplomatic efforts. The report notes that preventive diplomacy is usually 
conducted in a low-profile manner and when successful, they are largely 
unnoticed. If the stage to engage in preventive diplomacy is missed and 
conflict erupts, diplomatic mediation takes the form of peacemaking. 
These activities could be undertaken successfully by representatives of 
governments, intergovernmental organization of regional or global 
character, NGOs or even by influential individuals, as long as there is 
recognition for legitimacy and influence to the parties to conflict.  
 
Peacekeeping: The report recognizes the dramatic shift in the concept 
and practice of peacekeeping experienced, in particular during the decade 
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after the Cold War. The “50-year-old enterprise” evolved rapidly from a 
traditional primary military model of overseeing ceasefire and force 
separation after inter-state wars to deployment in ongoing conflict 
situation in intra-state conflicts, often to provide security and to create 
space for peacemaking and peace building. 
 
Peacebuilding: Described as activities conducted to “reassemble the 
foundations of peace” and providing the tools to build on those 
foundations “something that is more than just the absence of war”. 
Includes, but not limited to: 
• Reintegrating former combatants into civilian society 
• Strengthening the rule of law (e.g. through training and restructuring 
of   local police, judicial and penal reform)   
• Improving respect for human rights (monitoring, education and 
investigation of past and existing abuses) 
• Technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral 
assistance and support for the media) 
 
While keeping the general framework of Agenda for Peace with slight modification, the 
conceptual framework presented in the Brahimi report no longer expects each activity 
to be progressing in timeframe, moving from one activity to another. It also calls for 
integrated and coordinated action by various actors/agencies engaged in different 
aspects of peace operations, not compartmentalizing them into each category, 
resulting in lack of horizontal coordination. It is interesting to note that where 
theoretical recognition for various distinct components of UN’s engagement with 
conflicts was felt necessary in 1992, by the time the new Millennium was beginning, 
the greatest need was to seek better integration of various aspects of UN’s work to 
avoid fragmentation, so that interventions can be made in a holistic manner. As the 
number of mandates and UN agencies involved in various stages of conflict increased, 
lack of coordination and duplication among them begun to emerge as a key priority 
issue in need of political attention.  
 
In terms of conceptual definition, it is in relation to the concept of peacebuilding in 
particular that the Brahimi report refined the earlier definitions offered in the Agenda 
for peace. The concept is no longer artificially limited to post-conflict situations as it is 
expected to take place at various stage of conflict. Equally important, previous 
emphasis on social-economic aspects of peacebuilding is supplemented with the 
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recognition that peacebuilding activities carry great political significance.  
 
The report takes into account the fact that complex peace operations UN engaged in 
dealing with intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War period have often been a 
combination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. It clearly defines that 
operations in these setting with “complex and risky mandates ---which have been the 
rule rather than the exception since the end of the Cold War--- calls for peacebuilding 
as the key task of “moving the ongoing conflict from the military sphere involving 
direct violence to the political sphere where differences and conflictual positions can be 
contested within the framework of rule of law”60. 
 
With the abovementioned centrality of peacebuilding in mind, we shall now move on to 
review the key attempts at theorizing the concept. 
 
6. RECENT TRENDS IN THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PEACEBUILDING  
 
Over the past two decades, the concept of peacebuilding developed in a manner where 
practice and the actual phenomena led theorization and conceptualization61. In the 
strict sense of the term, there are no theories of peacebuilding. As we have seen in the 
previous few chapters, much of what constitute our current definition of peacebuilding 
were developed by United Nations Secretary General’s reports and other policy 
documents of governmental and intergovernmental bodies. In the academic 
community, Johan Galtung has been using the concept of “peacebuilding” from an 
early stage but his use was in the context of inter-state conflicts and it will not be 
correct to consider his work as the initial attempt at theorizing the concept of 
peacebuilding as we have come to accept today62. Yet with the growing attention on 
the topic in the recent years, several important work have been put forward and we 
shall review their main contribution in this chapter.  
 
In Building Peace, John Paul Lederach identifies three levels of key actors in the 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Chesterman observes this characteristics in relation to “peacekeeping” and “UN complex 
peace operations” (Chesterman, p48) 
62  Johan Galtung, “Three approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding” in Johan Galtung (ed) Peace, war and defense: essays in peace research, 
volume II (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976) as quoted in Hideaki Shinoda, Peace-building 
and the rule of law: theoretical and functional analysis of international peace operations 
(Sobunsha, 2003) (In Japanese)   
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peacebuilding process ---Level 1 composed of top political military leadership, Level 2 
composed of mid-level leadership in various sectors, Level 3 composed of grassroots 
leadership at the local level--- and prescribes actions conducive to peacebuilding that 
can be taken at each of these levels. Lederach argues that there are pertinent issues to 
be addressed at each level and by addressing these issues which otherwise will block 
the peacebuilding process at each level, the overall process of peacebuilding will be 
expedited.63  
 
In Peacebuilding as politics, Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar argues that although 
the research on the topic has been led by drawing conclusions from analysis of cases, 
analysis of peacebuilding can also benefit from being subject to the classic scientific 
approaches of deduction and induction analysis. They emphasize the importance of 
noting the political nature of peacebuilding while utilizing the two contending analytical 
approaches.64 
 
Ho-won Jeong’s 2005 work, Peacebuilding in post-conflict societies is probably the 
most comprehensive study on peacebuilding published to date. Jeong outlines what he 
terms as a “peacebuilding design” that encompasses the principles, concept and 
expected outcomes of peacebuilding and adds reference to an evaluation process for 
peacebuilding activities. The work provides detailed analysis on the four main areas 
related to peacebuilding i.e. “security and demilitarization”, “political transition phase”, 
“development” and “reconciliation and social rehabilitation” and concludes with a 
discussion on “operational obligation and coordination”.65 
 
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis take the approach of applying theories of civil 
war in determining the strategic environment within which UN peace operations 
function in postwar transitions, defining that “peacebuilding is a key part of 
international capacities that can compensate for the lack of local capacities and mute 
residual hostilities of civil war”. Based on this assumption, they articulate what they 
term as “ecological spaces for peace” for each post-conflict situation. By “ecological 
spaces for peace”, they refer to “different opportunity structures within which actors 
involved in the peace process decide whether to support the peace or return to war” 
                                                 
63 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) 
64 Elizabeth Cousens, Chetan Kumar and Karin Wermester (eds), Peacebuilding as politics: 
cultivating peace in fragile societies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) 
65 Ho-won Jeong, Peacebuilding in post-conflict societies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005) 
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and it is determined by the combination of the three variables ---local and international 
capacities and hostilities---. They argue that strategic peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
must match means to ends and fit within the conflict’s “ecology”.66  
 
Digesting these contributions on the theorizing of peace operations, and peacebuilding 
in particular, by the academic community in the recent years, and combining them with 
the notion presented with the practitioners in mind in the Secretary General’s reports 
and other defining work reviewed earlier in this Part, following definitions are 
developed and applied in the context of this dissertation. 
 
Peace operations: Activities conducted with the aim of building a secure 
society capable of sharing and pursuing the ideal of peace, by eliminating 
violent conflicts and creating conditions conducive to peaceful settlement of 
conflicts and prospect for human development, by applying appropriate 
methods available to the international community including conflict resolution, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding. While the 
United Nations continues to possess a central role in fostering and 
coordination peace operations, increasing number of cases involve design 
where UN partners with other actors (such as regional organizations, multi-
lateral coalition forces led by a Member State of the UN) to apply the 
combination of methods required in the particular circumstance.   
 
Peacebuilding: Activities aimed at “the creation of structures for the 
institutionalization of peace67” conducted to “reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that 
is more than just the absence of war68”. Peacebuilding ---one of the main five 
main methods of peace operations---, by definition, embraces a broad range 
of activities69 that are believed to be beneficial to building a peaceful society 
where disputes are resolved through non-violent means, based on the rule of 
law. Among its core areas of intervention is reforming or strengthening of 
governmental institutions70 capable of providing citizens with physical and 
                                                 
66 Doyle and Sambanis, p27 & 63-68. 
67 Supplement to the Agenda for peace, para 49. 
68 Brahimi report, para 13.  
69 One problem of the concept of peacebuilding is that it is often used so broadly that it has no 
defining significance. As Chesterman critiques “At times being used to describe virtually all 
forms of international assistance to countries that have experience or at risk of armed conflict”. 
(Elizabeth Cousens “Introduction” in Cousens and Kumar, p-5-10.) 
70  This definition is inclined towards the rule of law approach, focused on institutional 
governance. While fully acknowledging the partial relevance of other approaches placing 
greater emphasis on the strengthening of civil society and socio-economic aspects of 
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economic security, based on respect for human rights and professional 
competence. In terms of international involvement, this includes quasi-
governmental activities such as electoral assistance, technical assistance to 
establish and promote structures and culture based on the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, security sector reform (including DDR, military and 
police reform, judicial reform) and certain forms of development assistance. 
“Effective peacebuilding is, in effect, a hybrid of political and developmental 
activities targeted at the source of conflict.”71  
 
With these theoretical underpinnings and definitions, elements required to analyze the 
case study of the Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding process are attained. However, 
before moving onto the case study, one other important policy debate on design of 
peacebuilding processes shall be examined.    
 
7. SUPPOSITION OF LIBERALISM IN POST CONFLICT GOVERNANCE DESIGN 
 
We have seen in the previous chapters how the number and scope of UN intervention 
in conflict and post-conflict situations dramatically increased in the past two decades. 
Another less noticed shift that occurred during period was related to the models and 
ideals of the end-state that are presupposed in the design of the peace agreements 
and the implementation of the post-conflict peacebuilding process. The ideological 
debate over different interpretation of democracy was one of the key sources of 
profound debate during the Cold War period between the countries of the “West” with 
its liberalist interpretation coupled with capitalist market liberalism and the countries of 
the “East” bloc espoused to the communist interpretation prescribing state-owned 
managed economy. In the post-Cold War world, this debate was dropped as a point of 
dispute, as the liberal model of democracy and market economy was seen to have won 
over its contender with the demise of the Soviet Union. While some countries (such as 
the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Libya) continue to be espoused to non-liberal 
doctrines for state and economic management, they do not constitute the contending 
bloc that the former Eastern bloc used to create72  and these countries are also 
                                                                                                                                               
development, this dissertation is written with the position that question of political legitimacy 
and institutional capacity building of governance structure are the sine qua non requirement in 
a successful peacebuilding process accomplished with international/external assistance.  
71 Brahimi report, para 44. 
72 Even under the Cold War structure, these countries disassociated themselves from either of 
the two blocs, despite their marked similarity in political ideology and economic models to the 
Eastern bloc. They have preferred to see themselves as the “Third World” not belonging to one 
camp or the other under the Cold War bipolar structure, also creating separate dynamism such 
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introducing increasing level of liberalist policies in the management of their domestic 
policies. Responding to these historical shifts73, the liberal peace thesis that argues that 
liberal democracies have less chance of going to war (at least among each other)74 
became mainstream and it also found its way into the model designs for country 
emerging from conflict75.  
 
Presupposition of liberalist political and economic principle as the correct model of 
government in post-conflict peace operations managed by the UN in the past two 
decades is a reflection of the abovementioned changes in international political norm. 
UN itself has always been the most vigorous proponent of political liberty as enshrined 
in the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, but now the ideological divide 
between its key Member States were removed so that UN could engage in promoting 
these models in practice. Indeed, many recent experiences show that the democratic 
form of government anchored with respect for human rights and civil liberties tend to 
facilitate a polity where conflicts are resolved through non-violent means. The 
economic sphere governed by market capitalism offers an avenue for non-violent 
manifestation of pursuit for power and interests. But the fact that liberalist models are 
so strongly enshrined in the designs of post-conflict peacebuilding strategy is also a 
reflection of the fact that the donor states that support these operations are firmly 
espoused to these principles. Most post-conflict operations UN managed in the past 
two decades included assistance for holding of elections as a key step in legitimizing 
the process76.  
 
Some have begun to point out that while these liberalist designs are not to be 
contested, there are some aspects of this presupposition that we should be mindful 
                                                                                                                                               
as the “Non-aligned movement”.  
73 This, of course, does not mean that there are no longer ideological battles in the UN based 
on different political ideals or that different notions of what constitutes state’s rights and 
obligations does not bloc action by the Security Council, as most recently seen in the Security 
Council’s inability to impose sanction against President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe due to veto 
by Russia and China in July 2008. (For details on the Zimbabwe case, see “The return of Mr. 
Nyet”, The Economist, 17 July 2008.)    
74 James Lee Ray “Does Democracy cause peace?” Annual Review of Political Science, 1998 Vol. 
I, p27-46. For a comprehensive summary of debate on liberal peace thesis, see Bruce Russet & 
Harvey Starr, “From democratic peace to Kantian peace: democracy and conflict in the 
international system” in Manus Midlarsky (ed.) Handbook on war studies, 2nd edition (University 
of Michigan Press, 2000).  
75 This is referred to by some scholars as the revival of Wilsonianism in post-Cold War conflict 
management. See Paris, p40-42.   
76  Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in divided societies: electoral engineering for conflict 
management (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and “Post-conflict elections: constraints and 
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of77. For instance, Roland Paris points out that there is a potential destabilizing effect in 
the course of transition into liberal political economic system in a country just emerging 
from conflict. When these factors are not duly taken into account in the post-conflict 
transition management process, and election, political liberty and other symbols of 
liberal democracy is introduced too quickly, it could have the adverse effects of 
reinforcing the very sources of conflict that ignited the conflict in the first place. In 
such cases ---which Paris concludes is more the norm than the exception among the 
13 peace operations conducted during 1989-1999 he investigates--- paradoxically the 
intended goal of lasting and self-sustaining peace became more remote after the 
introduction of political liberalism. Michael Barnett also makes similar critique of what 
he terms as “liberal peacebuilding” and argues for “republican peacebuilding” in which 
the immediate emphasis will be on creating “institutional foundations of stability and 
legitimacy” based on “the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and 
representation”.78   
 
One of the main arguments of Paris that can be summarized as the need for strong 
institutions before one can limit state power is in fact echoed in many traditional 
writings such as a statement dating back to 1788 by James Madison that reads: “In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty is this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in 
the next phase, oblige it to control itself.79” The need for dual emphasis on justice and 
domestic order is recognized by the classic liberals. They saw that liberal democracy 
and market economy presuppose a functioning government where the rule of law and 
basic security is guaranteed by the state. Therefore political thinkers such as John 
Locke, de Toqueville recognized that before limiting the power of the state institutions, 
there is a need for establishing effective/functioning state in the first place. Paris 
analyzes that modern liberals forgot to emphasize this basic premise recognized by the 
classic liberals, as the Western countries came so far in accomplishing this 
presupposition. He highlights the importance of recognizing this point in the process of 
peacebuilding in societies just emerging from conflicts.     
 
As a concrete example, Paris refers to the situation in Latin American post-conflict 
                                                                                                                                               
dangers” in International Peacekeeping, 9(2), p18f. 
77 Paris, p44-51 & 185-187. 
78 Barnett, Michael. “Building a republican peace” in International Security Vol. 30, No. 4 
(Spring 2006), p99-98.  
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countries where “recurring rounds of revolutionary violence are caused by the 
economic structure of the country charged with historical pattern of wealth 
concentration and coffee-export centered growth where development and growth at 
the aggregate level does not translate to improved condition for the majority of the 
population”. In these countries, there is little prospect that state institutions will 
function to improve people’s security or that elections will bring genuinely 
representative government into power unless the peacebuilding process gives space 
and time for changes to take place in the underlying socio-economic conditions. Paris 
advocates for what he terms as the “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” strategy 
in post-conflict peacebuilding process. This approach prescribes stronger support for 
forces available within the country that may contribute to pluralistic and democratic 
form of governance as well as capacity building both in government and the civil 
society to increase provision of basic needs (including security from intimidation), sting 
that these interventions are required before the electoral process or checks and 
balances of government can be expected to bring its intended results. 
 
This dissertation considers it a principle beyond debate that post-conflict transition 
process should include freedom of expression and choice of government through 
democratic elections as key steps designed into the process. However, as regards the 
timing and speed of introducing the symbolic steps in democratic governance, it seems 
worth taking the points raised by Paris and others into account when designing the 
roadmap and the overall plan of post-conflict peacebuilding schemes. The outcome of 
elections depends on the nature of the society and the structure of the conflict that are 
different from case to case, but in general, in countries just emerging from violent 
conflicts, sources of discontent (such as ethnic division, economic class differences etc) 
is often fanned in the course of the electoral campaign and this could make division 
wider in some cases. Even without rhetorical statements related to electoral 
campaigns, division could be fanned in the name of freedom of expression so much so 
that it creates grounds for renewed and greater violence against certain groups, as the 
tragic case of Rwanda demonstrated. In other cases, the divisions are highlighted in 
the electoral process so excessively that parties to the election will accept the result 
only if they are on the winning side, and the one fairing badly will not accept the 
results and go back into worse kind of violence. This was, for instance, the case in 
Angola under Jonas Savimbi and was likely to happen in Liberia if Charles Taylor lost in 
                                                                                                                                               
79 James Madison, Federalist no. 51, February 6, 1788 as quoted in Doyle and Sambanis, p197. 
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the 1997 election80.   
 
Yet another problem arising in the context of instruments of democratic process being 
introduced in post-conflict setting is evident when leaders elected through democratic 
process supervised by the international peace builders would change their approach 
after the election into legitimate power. Once securely in position, some heads of 
states elected through UN-sanctioned electoral process begin to use non-democratic 
means to consolidate their power in anticipation of the next election, as in the case of 
Cambodia's Hun Sen and Liberia's Charles Taylor. In the case of Cambodia, the 
problem continues to this day where the country is no longer considered to be in its 
immediate post-conflict state. Those in position of power as democratically elected 
representative of a state, the UN has very little ability to suggest different course of 
action and the international community at large finds it difficult to address these 
problems without falling into semblance with the classic big power intervention.  
 
The UN and the key players of the international community learnt some of these 
lessons from early 1990s (Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia) and tried to apply them 
in designing the Dayton Accords in 1995, dealing with the post-conflict management of 
Bosnia 81 . On the other hand, however, the actual model derived in post-conflict 
peacebuilding process holding off elections aimed at avoiding these pitfalls, such as the 
Bosnia High Representative-type takeover of authority by the international actors, is 
also assessed to be not optimal in the manner they are currently administered82. Such 
model does not foster true and lasting peace independent from outside pressure and 
the absence of violent conflicts build on such foundation is likely to disintegrate the 
moment the international forces depart83.   
 
Debate over what constitutes the best strategy for the introduction of political and 
economic liberalism is far from over and is expected to continue. But one variable that 
                                                 
80 It may be the case that Taylor was elected more out of the populations' fear that he would 
“do a Savimbi” if not elected. (Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s civil war, Nigeria, ECOMOG and 
regional security in West Africa (Lynne Rienner, 2002), p223 quoted in Chesterman, p209) 
81 Richard Holbrooke, To end a war (Random House, 1998) 
82 The Bosnia model is also more an exception where the European countries can be counted to 
provide high-level of support to the management of the process on a continuous basis, as 
shown by the fact that it is not an UN-led framework. 
83 As we shall see in greater detail in Part III, the lessons of entrenchment of divisions through 
peacebuilding design in Bosnia as well as the unsustainability of operations in Kosovo and East 
Timor ---where UN temporarily administered the territory in the transition process--- were 
applied to the design of peace accords for Afghanistan. 
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also should not be forgotten in this debate is the will (and commitment in deed) of the 
Member States that are contributing to the peacebuilding process. In particular, as 
UN’s operation in post-conflict support depends on resources made available 
voluntarily outside of the regular assessed budget of the United Nations, it is important 
for the debate to take this factor into account. It must be said that policy debate of 
this nature put forward to the decision-makers of contributing Member States is a 
useful tool in influencing the position of these countries that determines the length and 
modality of UN’s involvement. Therefore, more synergies should be explored between 
those engaged in the practice of post-conflict transition management and those leading 
theoretical debates on the desired modality of such processes to make a common case.    
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The aim of Part III and IV is to analyze the Afghan Bonn Process as a case study of a 
post-conflict peacebuilding process that the international community engaged with in 
the most recent years after the turn of the Millennium. This attempt will be made in 
two broad steps. 
 
In the first, in Part III, we shall reconstruct the Bonn Process in one coherent narrative 
bringing various developments and elements under one analytical perspective. We 
shall begin by considering the historical context of Afghanistan’s conflict, through a 
very brief review of the historical conditions leading to 2001 and reference will be 
made to the role and response of the international actors, including the UN, in the 
period preceding 2001. Subsequently, the events of September 2001 and its immediate 
repercussion on the situation in Afghanistan will be reviewed. We will assess the 
immediate response of the US administration to 9.11 and how the United Nations 
framework was engaged in legitimizing the course of action and attaining international 
support for War on Terror. By reviewing the emergence of the Bonn Process through 
description of the United Nations Secretariat’s planning and sculpting out of key 
features of the post-conflict peacebuilding phase and analyzing the Bonn Conference 
that took place in late November/early December 2001, we will arrive at a better 
comprehension of the factors and dynamics that shaped the Bonn agenda. 
  
Detailed analysis of the actual Agreement adopted will identify the characteristic of the 
Agreement ---which is not a classic peace settlement--- that had great baring on the 
four years of the immediate post-conflict peacebuilding process to follow. Descriptive 
analysis of the particular structure and modality of international assistance through 
examination of the parallel military engagements by the US-led Coalition Forces and 
the UN Security Council-mandated ISAF, as well as the mandate and structure of the 
UN’s civilian assistance mission, UNAMA, will follow.    
 
An extensive chapter will be devoted to assessing key political developments that 
occurred under the Bonn Process such as the formation of the Transitional Authority, 
the Emergency Loya Jirga and the formation of the Transitional State, the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga and the promulgation of the new Constitution and finally the 
two elections (Presidential and the lower house of the national assembly and provincial 
councils). Subsequently, particular reference and analysis will be made to identify 
several critical factors that influenced the overall the transitional process. These relate 
to developments in the “security sector reform” and the problem of warlordism, the 
52 
significance of the opium economy of Afghanistan, lack of a functioning judiciary and 
the challenges of improving people’s lives through reconstruction. 
 
Part III will concentrate on the review and analysis of the abovementioned factors and 
leave the overall assessment to be discussed in Part IV where the balance sheet for 
the accomplishment and unfinished business of the Bonn Process will be analyzed, 
together with the identification and assessment of several acute dilemmas faced during 
the post-conflict peacebuilding process.            
           
           Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
1. THE AFGHAN CONFLICT AND ITS CONTEXT  
 
1.1 Brief history of Afghanistan before 1979 
 
Afghanistan’s fate of being at the crossroads of civilizations and therefore being the 
buffer state of various powerful foreign powers over centuries is well acknowledged85. 
From the days of when Afghanistan emerged from the Turco-Mongol conquerors86 as 
an own entity under the rule of the Pashtun tribes forming the Durrani dynasty87 in the 
Eighteenth Century, through the “Great Game” between the British and Russian 
Empires in the day of imperial conquests and the British Raj88, straight through to the 
Twentieth Century “Cold War” period when the United States and the Soviet Union 
competed to bring Afghanistan into its sphere of influence, Afghanistan’s fate has been 
mainly shaped by its geopolitical significance. 
 
Managing to fend off British attempts to bring in Afghanistan into its rule from India 
during the two Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1838-1842 and 1878-80 gave Afghans the 
reputation of not wielding to foreign subjection. Britain eventually managed to bring 
Afghanistan under its influence in agreement with Russia struck against the 
background of the First World War, but as that war ended in 1919 Afghan resistance 
made Britain agree to Afghanistan’s independence, delineating its border with India89.  
 
After attaining independence in 1919, King Amanullah Khan pursued various rapid 
modernization policies but he was ousted from power in 1929. King Nadir Shah took 
over but he did not remain in power for long as he was assassinated in 1933. His son 
Zahir Shah took power in 193390 and provided a stable rule over four decades but 
                                                                                                                                               
84 Map source: UN’s cartographic unit (www.un.org/maps/afghanistan) 
85 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A history of struggle and survival (I. B. Tauris & Co, 2004), 
Mark Ewans, Afghanistan: A short history of its people and politics (Harper Perennial, 2002)  
86  “The Ottomans, the Safavids, Shaybanid Uzbeks, Mughals dominated the West Asian 
landmass and the latter three fought over the territory of today’s Afghanistan and divided it 
among themselves” (Rubin 2002, p19) 
87 Founding of the Monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani. 
88 Peter Hopkirk, The Great game: On secret service in High Asia (Oxford University Press, 
1990) 
89 King Amanullah Khan launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after he took 
power in 1919 and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of 
Rawalpindi of 9 August 1919. 
90 Although early part of King Zahir Shah’s reign was marked only by nominal power of the King 
as his uncles Mohhamad Hashim Khan and Shah Mahmood Khan (both brothers of the late King 
Nadir Khan and served as Prime Ministers until 1945 and 1952 respectively) exercised actual 
decision-making power. The King was only 19 years old at the time of enthronement due to his 
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political instability grew in the 1970s as the communist party of Afghanistan, People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)91 and the Islamic movements grew their 
influence with diametrically opposed views. On 16 July 1973, King Zahir Shah was 
displaced in by a coup d’etat while away for medical treatment in Italy. Upon taking 
power, the main protagonist of the Coup, Mohammad Daoud ---King Zahir Shah’s 
cousin as well as son-in-law and a former Prime Minister---- declared the end of 
monarchy and positioned himself as the President of the new “Republic of Afghanistan”. 
Daoud strengthened his dictatorial rule by extracting significant external assistance, 
aligning his regime initially with the Soviet Union and eventually also with the United 
States. Oppression of political liberty escalated and his cramp down on the 
communists92 led to a military coup d’etat in April 1978. Noor Mohammed Taraki of the 
Khalgh faction of the communist party was the Chairman of PDPA at the time of the 
April 1978 coup where Daoud was assassinated93 and he became the first President of 
the “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan”. By the end of 1978, an alliance treaty was 
signed with Moscow and Afghanistan became a de facto satellite state of the Soviet 
Union. However, due to internal power struggle within PDPA leadership, Taraki’s 
position became increasingly undermined by Hafizullah Amin who belonged to the 
same Khalgh faction and was made the Foreign Minister following the April 1978 coup 
and subsequently Prime Minister in March 1979. Amin rapidly gained power and 
removed Taraki from Presidential position “due to health reasons” and assassinated 
Taraki and took over the position of President in September 1979. At this stage, the 
Soviet Union grew concerned about the dynamics in Afghan leadership. Growing 
                                                                                                                                               
father’s sudden death and initially lacked political experience. It is commonly assessed that King 
Zahir Shah’s real reign begun around 1963 when Mohammad Daoud who served as Prime 
Minister from 1953 replacing Shah Mahmood Khan resigned in 1963. Despite these underlying 
currents of dissenting policy, King Zahir Shah’s continuous reign at the surface level did provide 
a great sense of stability for Afghanistan for over four decades and included many 
achievements such as the adoption of the Constitution in 1964 that gave way to move towards 
democratic governance.   
91 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 by Noor Mohammed 
Taraki and Babrak Karmal among several others, adopting the ideological standards of the 
Soviet global vision, was supported by the Soviet Union since the day of its inception in. Later 
the PDPA split into two factions broadly based on ethnic lines and a different approach to 
democratic revolution and socialism in Afghanistan: “Parchem (flag)” under Karmal’s leadership 
mainly supported by ethnic Tajiks and other minorities in the urban areas (although Karmal 
himself was originally from a renowned Pashtun family) took more collaborative stand with non-
Marxists in the course of realizing a revolution and taking power; and “Khalgh (people)” under 
Taraki mainly composed of Pashtuns advocating pure revolutionary socialism rejecting any 
collaboration with non-Marxists. (Based on analysis by Nojumi, 2002, p31-40) 
92 Daoud initially cooperated with the Communists and several were included the cabinet as the 
coup against King Zahir Shah was conducted with the cooperation from the military and the 
Pachami faction of PDPA.   
93 Nojumi argues that Amin who was the Khalqi military recruiter at the time was the major 
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tension and violent crushes between Amin with the other factions of the communist 
party as well as with the Islamic opposition gave pretext for the Soviet Union to 
directly intervene marching straight into Kabul on 27 December 1979 to assassinate 
Amin and to crush his regime. The following day on 28 December 1979, Babrak Karmal 
of the Parcham faction declared himself President of the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan and made a statement justifying USSR’s action as one being based on the 
treaty of friendship and mutual support between the two countries94. What appeared 
to the world at the time was that amidst the internal fighting within the communist 
regime between various factions95, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 
1979. This was the beginning of the conflict which continued to disrupt ordinary live for 
the Afghan population for nearly quarter of a Century. 
 
Such critical situation in Afghanistan alarmed many in the international community, not 
just the Western nations but also the group of non-aligned states and 52 countries 
jointly requested that the Security Council take up this item, assessing it as a clear 
threat to international peace and security. As a reaction to this, the Security Council did 
take up the crisis in Afghanistan during 5-9 January 1980 but the representative of 
USSR recited its position matching to Karmal’s statement and there was nothing that 
the Security Council could do under the Cold War paralysis, especially when one party 
criticized of threatening peace and security through violent means happened to be the 
veto-holding permanent member of the Council itself96. Using the provisions of Uniting 
for Peace resolution of 1950 97 , a special session of the General Assembly was 
convened on 14 January 1980 to discuss the Afghan crisis and it adopted a resolution 
strongly condemning military intervention by USSR and demanding immediate and 
complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan98. However, as with all other 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, it does not bind the Member States and 
                                                                                                                                               
architect and commander of the 1978 coup. (Nojumi, 2002, p39)  
94 Chronology and event analysis between 1973-1979 based on combination of accounts and 
analysis by Nojumi, p31-40, Maeda and Yamane, p111-126 and supplemented by oral 
interviews with Rasuly, November 2008 in Vienna. 
95 The negative effects of factionalized party politics from this period is still vividly remembered 
and referred to as the root cause of Afghan conflict among many Afghan elites and this affected 
critical decision-making on electoral systems in the Bonn period as explained in detail in Part III 
Chapter 7.3.  
96 Kawabata 2002, p22. 
97 Based on a resolution of the General Assembly (Resolution on Uniting for Peace 337 (v)) 
adopted at the time of the Korean War in 1950 that stipulates that the General Assembly is 
authorized to take certain action when the Security Council is unable to take action against 
clear acts of aggression due to difference of opinion among its Permanent Members. 
98 A/RES/35/27. 
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the Soviet Union’s position was not at all altered. The Secretary General begun to 
pursue mediation for political resolution of the crisis but this remained the extent of 
UN’s reaction to the development in 1979.     
 
1.2 Soviet occupation and the Mujahideen resistance (1979-1989) 
 
While the communists engaged in in-fighting which ultimately brought in the Soviet 
forces to effectively occupy the country, a major resistance movement was taking 
shape composed of conservative and religious elements of the Afghan society. 
Contrary to popular perception that the fabled Afghan resistance movement sprung up 
against the marching Soviet troops, their political roots must be sought in period 
preceding the Soviet invasion. As Afghanistan tried to move towards more inclusive 
democratic form of government under King Zahir Shah’s actual leadership from the 
mid-1960s, various political circles emerged in Afghanistan advocating change and 
reform of governance based on their political views. Next to the communists ---whose 
organizational development we have already reviewed---, those basing their 
perspectives on Islamic teachings were also very active and radical. When Daoud’s 
coup brought an abrupt end to the monarchy and oppression of political liberty 
escalated, some of the Islamists organized secret action against the regime. Most 
prominent among these Islamist circles was the Afghan Ikhwan-al-Muslimin (Muslim 
Brethren) whose membership included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanauddin Rabbani, 
Ahmad Shah Massoud, Maulawi Yunus Khalis, Maulawi Mansoor, Jalaladdin Haqani and 
it organized armed campaigns against the regime and assassinated a cabinet Minister 
from Daoud’s regime. Some were jailed or killed by the regime while others including 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud took refuge in Peshawar. In Pakistan, 
under the support of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s and later Zia ul Haq’s government, these 
Islamists formed Hezb-e-Islami (the Islamic Party), a Pakistan-based militant 
organization. Later, many of the Islamist activists broke away from Hezb-e-Islami, 
mainly due to differences with Hekmatyar and formed their own parties. Among them 
the most notable party was the Jamiat-e-Islami of Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of 
Afghanistan) founded by Rabbani and Massoud joined. As the Mujahideen movement 
consisted of seven parties based in Pakistan and eight parties based in Iran, there 
were others in the movement who took less radical Islamic views such as Harakat 
Inqelabi-Islami (the Islamic Revolutionary Movement) headed by Maulana Mohammed 
Nabi Mahommedi and Hezb-e-Islami led by Maulawi Yunus Khalis, just to name two. 
These Islamic Mujahideen parties were more traditional tribal based parties, less 
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ideological and non-hierarchical compared to parties of Hekmatyar or Rabbani99.  
   
In exile, these groups were already engaged in conflict with first Daoud’s, then 
successive communist regimes, waging battles against the dictatorial state but with the 
direct invasion of the Soviet Union in December 1979, their political struggle became 
transformed into a much larger movement that came to be called as the “Mujahideens” 
(defenders of Islam, freedom fighters) fighting a “Jihad” (holy war to protect Islam) 
from the unjust advances of the atheist, communist USSR. Mujahideens fought on two 
fronts: the “external front” composed of exiled party leaders based in Pakistan and 
Iran, and the “internal front” led by commanders fighting with local population waging 
armed resistance against the Soviet army and the communist regime’s army100. As the 
Afghan puppet regime’s military force was unsubstantive, direct battle between the 
Mujahideens and the Soviet force were waged and continued for nearly a decade until 
the final withdrawal of USSR.  
 
The United Nations made attempts to mediate an agreement from the early 1980 but 
had little luck in a situation where one party to the conflict was a member of the 
Security Council. Settlement of this chapter of the conflict had to wait for a major shift 
of priority within the Soviet Union under Gorbachov in the context of the crumbling 
Soviet empire. Following substantive agreements reflecting renewed position of the 
Soviet Union, a peace agreement was signed in Geneva in April 1988, agreeing to (i) 
mutual respect for non-intervention between Afghanistan and Pakistan, (ii) on the 
timetable of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan territory, (iii) safe voluntary 
repatriation of refugees from Pakistan, and (iv) US and USSR providing international 
guarantee for independence of Afghanistan101. As referred to in the Geneva Agreement, 
                                                 
99 However, according to analysis of Ahmed Rashid, due to CIA-ISI preferential support to the 
radical Islamists, vast majority of the aid was channeled to the radical parties and that 
marginalized the moderate Islamists among the resistance movement. (Rashid 2001, p85.) 
100 Nojumi’s insightful analysis on the process of mass mobilization and dynamics within the 
Mujahideen movement illustrates that the two fronts were far from being unified and that great 
deal of frustration of those engaged in the armed resistance remaining in the country (such as 
Massoud, Ismail Khan, Maulawi Haghani, Abdul Haq etc.) came also from the inability of the 
leaders of the external front (Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Sayyaf etc.) to come to agreement to form a 
unified opposition towards the Soviet Union and the communist regime. According to Nojumi, 
the external front created or contributed to the difficulty in accessing funds and armaments by 
the internal front which also disadvantaged their position vis-à-vis the Soviet forces and the 
communist regime.     
101 Formally the “Agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating 
to Afghanistan”, commonly known as the “Geneva Accords”, signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988. 
(For detailed reference on the Geneva Accord and its limited scope and effectiveness, being 
focused on Soviet withdrawal and not addressing the resolution of the Afghan conflict per se ---
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the United Nations established in May 1988 the United Nations Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). A classic example of traditional peacekeeping 
mission, UNGOMAP monitored the implementation of the agreement and completed its 
work in March 1990, as the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan begun in 
May 1988 and was completed in February 1989. By the end of the occupation-
resistance war, both sides suffered great damage: official causality announced by the 
USSR numbered 13,833 dead and 49,985 wounded by March 1989 102  and an 
estimated 876,825 Afghans lost their life103, 1.5 million people were physically disabled, 
6 million displaced from their land of origin as refugees in neighbouring countries and 
countless more were displaced internally104.  
 
The sheer fact that the medievally-attired Mujahideens sustained without surrender 
(and causing bitter damage) to the one of the world superpower over nearly a decade 
based on their fierce sense of independence did add significantly to the fame of the 
“Afghan resistance freedom fighters”. But Mujahideens were far from being alone in 
sustaining this battle against the Soviet Union. It was able to do so only with great 
foreign support, motivated by various political considerations on the part of the 
supporters. Significant amount of weapons and operating cash was transferred to 
various factions of the Mujahideen forces from external supporters 105 , most 
significantly (in financial terms) the United States provided US$ 3 - 3.3 billion to the 
resistance movement during the 1980s in a classic proxy war scenario under the Cold 
War paradigm 106 . These resources were channeled through Pakistan ---more 
                                                                                                                                               
the most obvious one being the exclusion of the Mujahideen parties---, see William Maley, The 
Afghanistan Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p134-142 as well as Saikal, p200-204) 
102 Figures based on Liakhovskii and Zabrodin “Tainy afganskoi voiny” p213 quoted in Saikal. 
Beyond these quantifiable direct loss, unwise policy resulting in protracted engagement in 
Afghanistan severely discredited USSR both internationally and more importantly vis-à-vis its 
own public. Some cite engagement in Afghanistan as one of the direct cause of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Maley 2002, p159-166).    
103  Noor Ahmad Khalidi, “Afghanistan: Demographic consequences of war, 1978-1987” in 
Central Asian Survey, 1991, p107 quoted in Maley 2002. This figure only covers until 1987 and 
the figure for the entire duration until complete Soviet withdrawal is estimated to be around 1 
million dead (based on interview with Vladimir Fenopetov, December 2008, Vienna). 
104 Maley 2002, p154. 
105 According to Steve Coll’s research, combined aid from US, Saudi Arabia and China for 
military equipment to the Mujahideen movement during the 1980s is estimated to have been 
between US$ 6-12 billion while Soviet Union’s spending for military equipment of the 
communist regime in Afghanistan is estimated at US$ 36-48 billion. This amounts to 
tremendous concentration of weapons in the country and the surrounding area, leading Steve 
Coll to observe: “By 1992, there were more personal weapons in Afghanistan than in India and 
Pakistan combined. By some estimates more such weapons had been shipped to Afghanistan 
during the previous decade than to any other country in the world.” (Coll 2004, p238.)    
106 Samuel P. Huntington, The clashes of civilizations and the remarking of world order (Simon 
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specifically through its military intelligence agency, Inter State Service (ISI)--- as 
Pakistan had vested interest in intervening in the political scene of Afghanistan. As 
ever occupied with its existential fear of a united front between India and the Pashtun 
population across the Durrant-line borders, Pakistan’s main objective was to establish a 
pro-Pakistani central government in Kabul, one that it can exert influence over, 
defining Afghanistan as a “strategic depth” of its foreign policy 107.  
 
Another major actor that played the role of the financer of the Mujahideens was Saudi 
Arabia that ascribed its obligation in supporting those fighting a “jihad” to save Islam 
against communism, and also saw it as an opportunity to spread the influence of its 
version of Islam, Wahabbism, which is known for its inclination towards fundamentalist 
interpretation of the religion108. In 1980, Saudi Arabia agreed to match US support for 
the Mujahideen dollar for a dollar and by 1989 they agreed with the Americans to 
supply 61% of the two country’s total assistance of US$ 436 million. While Saudi 
spending is difficult to trace, based on these arrangements with the US, it is estimated 
that they spent at minimum exceeding US$ 3 –3.3 billion109. In additions to supplying 
weapons and ammunitions, Saudi Arabia also contributed by way of extending major 
financial support to “Madrassas” (religious schools) in Pakistan where Afghans in 
exile/refugees, as well as Pakistanis, were educated in strict Islam teachings and 
served as recruiting ground for fighters to continue staffing the jihad operations. At the 
same time, significant number of individuals from the Arab states ---and later all over 
the Muslim world (including Muslim communities in Western countries) as the 
resistance movement gained international acclaim--- directly joined the Mujahideen as 
voluntary conscripts during this period110. As we shall revisit later, personal ties and 
shared experiences cultivated during this period ---together with heavy supply of arms 
and the fundamentalist ideas--- will come to form the basis for critical relationship 
                                                                                                                                               
& Schuster, 1996), p247.  
107 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm, 2nd Edition (Yale Nota Bene, 2002), Mary 
Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2002) 
108 Rashid writes of Wahabbism and its place in Saudi foreign policy: “Within the Sunni tradition 
were the Wahabbis, the followers of the strict and austere Wahabbi creed of Saudi Arabia. 
Begun by Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) as a movement to cleanse the Arab Bedouin from Sufism, 
the spread of Wahabbism became a major plank of Saudi foreign policy after the oil boom of 
the 1970s.” (Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: the story of the Afghan warlords (Pan Macmillan, 2001), 
p85.)   
109 Samuel P. Huntington, The clashes of civilizations and the remarking of world order (Simon 
& Schuster, 1996) 
110  Among them were key figures that would be later linked to fundamentalist Islamic 
movements, such as Osama bin Laden. For detailed reference, see Rashid 2001 and Coll 2004.  
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between Afghanistan and individuals with ties to entities that will later be classified as 
terrorist organizations. Various previously classified government documents that came 
under public scrutiny after 9.11 testify that the US government actively supported the 
Mujahideen movement in its entirety as part of anti-Soviet covert operations of CIA111. 
In this perspective, understanding and analyzing of the roots and impact of the Afghan 
conflict as well as how the country came to harbour Al-Qaida requires attention to this 
early phase of conflict, especially the dynamics of the role played by external actors112.  
 
1.3 Mujahideens’ internal conflicts and the rise of the Taliban (1989-1996) 
 
As so commonly seen in the history of human civilization, departure of the common 
enemy brings to surface the internal differences. The dynamics of how this expected 
phenomena is handled by the decision-makers is decisive to the course of a country 
emerging from resistance to foreign occupation. Also critical is the external 
interference that affects internal decisions among various groups. In many respects, 
continuation and worsening of Afghanistan’s conflict after the departure of the Soviet 
troops was a classic case where internal and external actors failed to capture the 
possibility of peace, as if they rather wished that the conflict would never end.    
 
After the completion of departure of the Soviet troops in February 1989, arms 
struggles continued first between the puppet communist regime of Najibullah113 and 
the “Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen” that established itself in February 1989 as 
an interim administration based in Peshawar. Subsequently, when Najibullah ---
weakened fatally with the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991--- was forced 
                                                 
111 While “The 9/11 Commission report” gave great overview of official accounts, Pulitzer-prize 
winning journalist Steve Coll’s work based on extensive and authoritative research gives in-
depth account of the engagement throughout the 1980s and 90s. See The Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (W.W. Norton & Company, 
2004) and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, 
from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004). 
112 How many among the general public of countries supporting Afghanistan in the Bonn Period 
expressing views on Afghanistan ---and thereby influencing donor government’s behaviour--- is 
accurately aware of this historical perspective is a sobering question. 
113 Najibullah belonged to the Parcham faction of PDPA and was promoted to head the secret 
police under Karmal’s regime since 1980. Having established a reputation for his ruthless 
administration of power, with Soviet approval he headed the puppet regime since May 1986. 
Najibullah took refuge in the UN compound as the Mujaheddin forces captured Kabul in April 
1992 and remained in confinement under UN protection until 1996 when Taliban captured the 
city on 26 September 1996. The following morning, Kabuli found the bodies of Najibullah and 
his brother hanging from a traffic light in the center of the city with Afghani notes stuck into 
their mouths. (Accounts of Najibullah’s death based on newspaper articles at the time and on 
narrative in Kawabata 2002, p82-84.)      
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out of power and the interim Mujahideen government was established in April 1992114, 
the struggle shifted to inter-factional fights between the Mujahideen groups115. As the 
transitional Mujahideen government led by Rabbani based on the Peshawar Agreement 
of 26 April 1992116 was unable to resolve differences with a key Mujahideen party led 
by Hekmatyar that refused to join the regime, armed conflict continued and escalated 
since this year117.  
 
Against such background of an anarchical state of conflict, where armed forces of 
various kinds did whatever they wanted to do with no state institutions to control or 
order the power structure, a new group of actors emerged as ones offering solutions to 
end the chaos. This was the “Taliban” –students of Islam- rising to power through near 
mythical incidents in Kandahar in 1994 and conquering one armed force after another, 
regardless of whether they were Mujahideen groups or simply thugs taking advantage 
of disorder and lawlessness in the failed state118. Taliban continued their advances for 
the next two years and managed to take control of Kabul in September 1996 and 
                                                 
114 In continuation of its peacemaking efforts since the 80s, the UN, under its Representative 
Benon Sevan, was engaged with all relevant parties to bring a peaceful solution. UN tried to 
broker a transitional government representing all parties under its auspices and by March 1992 
convinced Najibullah to resign peacefully and be evacuated. But due to clear advantage of the 
Mujaheddin forces in the battle field, as well as various other factors that tipped the dynamics -
--such as switching side of an influential government force of the northern region, General 
Abdul Rashid Dostum from government forces to the Mujaheddins in March 1992--- Mujaheddin 
forces decided to take the capital by power and it forms its transitional government without 
power-sharing with the communists. (As accounted by Kawabata 2002, p39-46.)  
115 Despite efforts of negotiation among the Mujaheddin groups to make a joint entry into 
Kabul leading to a united transition government, Hezb-e-Islami led by Hekmatyar (backed by 
the Pakistani ISI) showed strong intension to go its own way in taking Kabul. Assessing the 
impossibility to persuade Hekmatyar, Massoud’s forces joined by government rebel forces of 
Dostum and others launched an attack on Kabul on 25 April 1992 and Hekmatyar’s forces 
began attacking from the other end of the city and this was the beginning of the bloody internal 
fighting among the groups that formerly fought together against the Russians under the same 
Mujahideen movement (Based on accounts from Kawabata 2002 and Coll 2004). The internal 
divide within the Mujahideen movement was a characteristic even before the fall of the 
Communist regime and some of the causes were structurally created due to the way strategic 
aid resources from US were channeled by the government of Pakistan. For detailed and 
insightful analysis of internal dynamics within the Mujaheddin movement and how it weakened 
their ability to win over the communist regime, see Nojumi 2002, p84-104.     
116 The agreement stipulated that Sebghatullah Mojadedi (leader of a smaller Pashtun group 
Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli (National Salvation Front)) would serve as the President for the first two 
months and then Rabbani would serve for four months and a new government would be 
formed following a Loya Jirga and general elections.   
117 Many Afghans ---and Kabulis in particular--- will recount that the battles of the internal 
fighting that begun in 1992 were far more devastating than the battles with the Soviets, 
destructing many city centers but affecting Kabul in particular beyond comparison. 
118 For detailed accounts of the rise and rule of Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: the story 
of the Afghan warlords (Pan Macmillan, 2001) and Neamatollah Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war and the future of the region (Palgrave, 2002).   
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claimed the establishment of the new regime. Although they struggled in the Panjshir 
Valley and suffered humiliation in their initial attempt at capturing Mazar-i-Sharif in 
1997, they eventually took over Mazar-i-Sharif the following year. By 2000, the Taliban 
managed to bring nearly 90% of the Afghan territory under its control, with the 
exception of the area in the Northeast where the non-Taliban opposition that did not 
flee the country concentrated in and barely kept the flag up for the Northern Alliance119.  
 
1.4 International isolation under the Taliban regime (1996-2001) 
 
During the initial period after Taliban’s appearance on the Afghan political scene, 
action by the Taliban to restore order amidst chaos generated limited but genuine 
support among parts of the local population who were tired of chaos and lack of 
minimal security. During the same initial period, key international supporters of 
Afghanistan also saw potential benefit in a force that would be able to bring some 
order to Afghanistan120. But two factors made the Taliban regime unpopular both to 
the population of Afghanistan and the international community (except Pakistan that 
supported the Taliban). 
 
First related to Taliban’s rule based on fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Once a 
territory was occupied, no formal state structure was established and the Taliban’s 
actions were based on orders of its religious leaders ---with Mullah Mohammad Omar 
at its pinnacle and acting as the supreme authority--- and legitimized its decisions 
through traditional councils of Pashtun communities called Shuras. Many of the 
decisions imposed by the Taliban regime were based on particular interpretation of 
Islam taught at Madrassas influenced by the Deobandi school of Islam121 as well as on 
Pashtunwali, codes of conduct and punishments used in very traditional Pashtun 
                                                 
119 While there are many important developments related to the Taliban’s military advances and 
administration of territory they conquered, as well as those relating to the former Mujaheddin 
groups opposing the Taliban, they will not be elaborated here as it digresses from the theme of 
the dissertation. Some of the key developments related to the Northern Alliance are provided 
with reference to Massoud Ahmed Shah in footnote 127 on page 65.  
120 US governments pursued negotiation with the Taliban in the initial stage hoping they may 
be able to offer an alternative to the warring former Mujaheddins and later putting hopes that 
Taliban may agree to handing Osama bin Laden over through diplomatic pressure. Their 
position changed decisively following the bombings of US Embassies in East Africa and led to 
retaliatory bombing in Eastern Afghanistan in August 1998.  
121 Deobandism is a branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam originating in British India in the mid 19th 
Century following the Indian Mutiny of 1857 where Indian Muslims were severely defeated in an 
anti-British revolt. For more detail see Rashid 2001, p88-90, where Rashid concludes “The 
Deobandis … has had a history in Afghanistan, but the Taliban’s interpretation of the creed has 
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communities. They were largely inconsistent with the values of most Afghans including 
those who were espoused to Islam principles122. Some of these rules ---especially those 
relating to restriction of women’s rights and actions, but also other particular 
restrictions of personal freedom ranging from prohibition to listen to music or to fly 
kites, or for men to not grow beard--- and the harsh way they were enforced were 
peculiarly distinct from the social norms of the Afghan people. Such restrictions on 
individual freedom not only alienated the majority of the population under Taliban rule 
but also gave grounds for intense criticism from influential parts of the international 
community that may have otherwise cautiously welcomed some level of stability and 
order in this country after two decades of conflicts.     
 
Another factor that led to the international isolation of the Taliban regime was its close 
ties with those suspected of committing terrorist activities, most notably the Al Qaida 
group led by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden has been in on the radar of CIA being 
suspected of involvement in attacks against US interests starting from the 1993 New 
York World Trade Center bombing. CIA believed that his group was conducting training 
for terrorist attacks in camps built in Afghanistan and pressure mounted from the 
international community for the Taliban to take measures to close down terrorist 
camps in Afghanistan and to hand-over bin Laden. Why the Taliban regime did not 
yield to pressure and calls from the international community also expressed through 
formal mechanisms such as a series of Security Council resolutions123 passed since 
1999, supplying seemingly unbelievable argument of the need to be hospitable to 
guests (as they replied even after the final calls in the post-9.11 phase) is a subject of 
interesting analysis. Was it their defiance to external influence and polemical excuse? 
Or was it illustrative of their lack of comprehension of the norms and practices of the 
international community? Many speculations were made at the time while the Taliban 
hid behind the veil of mysticism. In hindsight, it seems most logical to assess that they 
did not grasp the magnitude of the threat and the opponent they were facing beyond 
the confines of the Afghan border, lacking basic knowledge of the world and 
misreading/underestimating the significance of their action in the context of 
international relations. Furthermore, there is an additional reason for Taliban’s 
perplexing position towards Al Qaida. Taliban leadership, not having clear direction or 
principles to base running of a country, may have needed to depend on the absolutist 
                                                                                                                                               
no parallel anywhere in the Muslim world.” 
122 Rashid 2001, p87-88. 
123 S/RES/1267 (1999), S/RES/1333(2000), S/RES/1363(2001). 
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and fundamentalist logic imported by the Arab fundamentalist groups to claim 
legitimacy and difference to other forces within Afghanistan. This question of providing 
political legitimacy (at least in the eyes of the Taliban themselves) is believed to have 
been as important a factor as the financial contribution by Al-Qaida that Taliban could 
not dispose of even at the immense pressure from the international community124.    
 
While the regime became increasingly unpopular from the Western countries and drew 
criticism from the wider international community as Taliban escalated their action as 
seen in their destruction of the Buddha statutes in Bamyan in late February 2001125, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to support the Taliban regime. This support, 
coupled with the lack of willingness among the international community to commit in 
bringing about a change in Afghanistan left the country in isolation progressing deeper 
and deeper as a failed state126.  
 
During this period of Mujahideen internal fighting and continued battle with the 
emerging Taliban forces, referred to by some as “the second phase of the civil war”, 
the United Nations response was based on aim to bring together all warring parties 
around a negotiation table to agree on a power-sharing arrangement. Following a 
resolution passed by the General Assembly in December 1993 requesting the 
Secretary-General to engage in peacemaking activities, the United Nations Special 
Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) was established in early 1994 with a modest presence 
in Islamabad. UNSMA engaged with various Mujahideen parties and also established 
                                                 
124 There are many accounts that the Taliban leadership (Mullah Omar) radicalized in the later 
1990s in a manner inconsistent from the behavior of the group at its formative stage in the 
early/mid-90s. This coincides with the relocation of Osama bin Laden as an official guest of the 
Taliban regime in May 1996, the issuance of manifesto by the newly formed International 
Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders containing a fatwa for jihad against the US 
and Israel issued on 23 February 1998 which was his “first explicit attempt to lead an 
international coalition of Islamic radicals in violent attacks against the United States (Coll, p380). 
Bin Laden on his part made several statements legitimizing Mullah Omar and the Taliban in 
international setting, for instance in his statement to the International Conference of the 
Deobandis held near Peshawar on 9 April 2001 organized by the Pakistani JUI. (Detailed in 
Bruce Lawrence (ed.), Messages to the world: The statements of Osama bin Laden (Verso 
Publishing, 2005)  
125 Destruction of the statutes begun on 28 Feb 2001 and continued to mid-March despite calls 
of opposition from various parts of the world. See Barry Bearak, “Over world protests, Taliban 
are destroying ancient Buddhas” in New York Times, 4 March 2001.    
126 “Failed state” –a concept and phenomena which became widespread after the end of the 
Cold War- is defined as a state where basic state institutions seizes to function in providing 
basic services to its citizens and allows space for chaos and disorder where criminal activities 
take place rampantly with no sanction. In the case of Afghanistan, the description would fit for 
the entire period after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 with varying degree, also 
including periods prior to Taliban control.    
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channel of communication with the Taliban since spring of 1995 but its approach of 
relaying on cooperation among warring parties was not leading to any results. As Kofi 
Annan was appointed as the new Secretary General ---moving on from the position of 
head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations--- in 1997, he appointed Lakhdar 
Brahimi as his Special Representative on Afghanistan in July 1997 and mandated 
Brahimi to review the policy of UN engagement in Afghanistan. As a result of this, the 
UN’s approach changed drastically, recognizing publicly that in addition to the internal 
dimension of conflict among Afghan parties, there was an extensive external dimension 
to the Afghan conflict involving neighbours and other foreign parties significantly 
contributing to the continuation of the conflict that had to be addressed. Brahimi went 
on to create mechanisms to coordinate position among the external actors such as the 
“6+2” group composed of Afghanistan’s six neighbours with USA and Russia and 
navigated through to getting agreements of non-interference. But the fact that the 
agreements were merely on paper was bitterly exposed when the Taliban forces ---
clearly supported by elements of the Pakistani government--- begun a major offensive 
in the summer of 1999, only days after the signing by senior representatives of the 
6+2 countries of the Tashkent Declaration on 19 July 1999 agreeing to the contrary127. 
This marked the effective end of UN’s renewed peacemaking efforts ---Brahimi 
resigned from the post in frustration by end 1999--- and from this point, UN action on 
Afghanistan moved to the Security Council which introduced various sanctions and 
arms embargo against the Taliban regime128.        
 
1.5 Historical pattern of dependence on foreign aid leading to fragmentation 
of the state 
 
Before moving onto the next chapter that brings us to the beginning of the history-
altering events of autumn 2001, in completing a brief historical background analysis of 
Afghanistan, it is important to highlight a structural pattern inherent in its engagement 
with the external world that seriously affected Afghanistan in its path to becoming a 
failed state or a “fragmented state”.  
 
                                                 
127 “Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in 
Afghanistan” (S/1999/812). Observers from the Taliban regime as well as the Northern Alliance 
were present in the Tashkent meeting. Among the 6+2 countries, only Turkmenistan declined 
to sign (understood to be due to their wish to collaborate with the Taliban regime in a pipeline 
project to connect Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to South Asia). (Based on accounts by 
Kawabata 2002, Rashid 2001). 
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Afghanistan’s fate stemming from its geopolitical position and the turbulent recent 
history is relatively well known. Less widely acknowledged is the implication of this to 
the structural conditions in which Afghanistan became and remains highly fragmented. 
Being surrounded by foreign powers competing to influence Afghanistan, the Afghan 
rulers managed to extract significant amount of foreign aid of one sort or another 
through all phases of its recent history, not just in the Cold War context. From the days 
of King Amanullah who won independence in 1919, and under successive ruler of the 
Musahiban dynasty (Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah and for that matter Daoud as well) steady 
flow of foreign aid was required, expected and provided. This created a situation 
where the central government in Kabul could finance all basic state expenses without 
taxing the rural power holders. As Barnett Rubin describes in his seminal work The 
Fragmentation of Afghanistan as a key characteristic of Afghanistan, “this aid enabled 
the rulers to build an army, schools, roads, and bureaucracy without directly 
confronting resistance from rural power-holders.” 129  In such a situation, political 
dialogue and pressure of civil society gained no significance and Afghanistan had no 
pressure to gradually move the social debate and power structure to more equitable 
forms. This also created power-bases in peripheral zones, accumulating resources 
independent from the central government in Kabul. Impact of such conditions on long-
term political and societal unity was not questioned as long as aid continued to flow. 
Great powers, competing to win influence in this strategic area of the Eurasian 
continent, also disregarded long-term destabilizing effects to the country and the 
region. It is important to recognize this structural context under which Afghan conflict 
occurred and from which point the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts needed to begin 
working with. We shall look at this issue in more detail in later chapters; for now, a 
perspective on the beginning of a change is in order.  
 
2.  9.11 AND ITS IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES FOR AFGHANISTAN  
 
In the history of International Relations there are defining moments when the old 
paradigm is abruptly demolished by a shocking event that changes the frame of 
reference from that point onwards. Such events occurred in September 2001 and 
forcefully reshaped the agenda of the “post post-Cold War period” at the dawn of the 
new Millennium. On 11 September 2001, a series of terrorist attacks took place in New 
                                                                                                                                               
128 S/RES/1267 (1999), S/RES/1333(2000), S/RES/1363(2001).  
129 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan 2nd edition (Yale University Press, 2002), 
p20. 
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York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania in a near simultaneous manner, killing 
thousands of civilians and sent the United States ---the sole superpower in the post-
Cold War world--- into chaos and confusion130. Although the number of casualty in 
itself was not higher than casualty dying on ordinary basis due to other preventable 
causes around the world, a hit of this magnitude to the nerve center of the United 
States symbolizing the Western world was unprecedented and truly shocked the world. 
It was also seen to be the beginning of an era where non-state actors, in form of 
terrorist organizations such as the Al-Qaida in relation to the 9.11 attacks, can cause 
fatal attack to the citizens of powerful states, in manner which traditional state security 
apparatus was not well-prepared to defend131. This recognition eventually led to the 
logic of US waging a “War on Terror” which included “pre-emptive” military action 
against states believed to be harbouring suspects of terrorism. This signaled a 
profound change in the paradigm of “security” analysis, as the non-state actors were 
now deemed legitimate targets for state-actors to wage a war against. While we shall 
examine in closer detail how such process was legitimized domestically and 
internationally through UN resolutions, it is important to note here that the tragic 
events of 9.11 and the extension of logic of self-defense in a war against terror 
brought to the population of Afghanistan international attention and a chance for 
support in resolving the deadlock, unwitnessed in the decades of conflict since the late 
1970s.    
 
But hidden behind the sensational events of 9.11 attacks in the United States was 
another shocking attack that took place several days before 11 September in 
Afghanistan which was a part of the beginning of a profound change in Afghanistan. 
On 9 September 2001, Ahmed Shah Massoud, the charismatic leader of the Northern 
Alliance132, was assassinated by suicide bombers pausing to be Arab journalists. The 
                                                 
130 Officially recorded fatalities were 2,974 (excluding the 19 hijackers) of which 246 were on 
the four planes, 2,603 in New York in the towers and on the ground (including 411 rescue 
workers) and 125 at the Pentagon. Reflecting the diversity characteristic of the city, more than 
90 countries lost citizens in the World Trade Center. (Sources: Wikipedia entry “September 11 
attacks” quoting various public sources and secondary information such as “September 11: 
Chronology of terror” (http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/index.html)) 
131 Attack on US citizens and strategic interests abroad were already happening in large scale --
-such as the attack on US military presence in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, and most recent 
to 2001, an attack on US Navy destroyer USS Cole on 12 October 2000--- that increased US 
government’s sense of vulnerability, but they were occurring in foreign lands. Mounting of such 
attack on US soil was unprecedented and suddenly brought the threat to a different level for 
ordinary Americans.    
132 Massoud was an Afghan of Tajik ethnicity, born in 1952 in Jangalak in the Panjshir Valley as 
a son of a military colonel, which made him live in Helmand, Herat and then in Kabul as a child. 
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Arab origin of the assassins and the resemblance of the tactics to those of Muslim 
fundamentalists in the Middle East, it is generally believed that this assassination was 
orchestrated by Al-Qaida that was supporting Taliban and some speculated that it also 
served as a precursor signal to the attacks in the United States133. General Massoud ---
known by the population with awe as “the Lion of Panjshir”--- was one of the most 
respected Mujahideen fighters of Afghanistan that constantly led operations in large 
parts of northern Afghanistan from the days of the resistance against the Russian 
invasion, through the days of internal strife between different factions of Mujahideens 
after Soviet withdrawal. He became the military leader of the Northern Alliance when 
                                                                                                                                               
Massoud studied in Kabul Polytechnic Institute in late 1960s. (For detailed account of Massoud’s 
early life based on interview with Massoud’s brother, see Coll 2004, p107-110. Another valuable 
account of Massoud’s life based on interview with Massoud himself in 1980s and 90s confirms 
these points, and additionally sheds light on many other interesting aspects of this charismatic 
leader, see Hiromi Nagakura, Battles of Massoud (Kawade-Shobo, 2001).) Massoud’s political 
activities begun in the late 1960s in student organizations affiliated with the Afghan Ikhwan-al-
Muslimin (Muslim Brethren). After the military coup of Daoud in June 1973, Massoud took 
refuge in Pakistan and joined Pakistan-based militant organizations, initially belonging to Hezb-
e-Islami (the Islamic Party) led by Hekmatyar but moved with Rabbani to form Jamiat-e-Islami 
of Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan). While the external front leaders remained 
in Pakistan (and Iran) and played their politics, Massoud returned to Afghanistan and grew in 
importance as a key internal front commander for the northern region based in the Panjshir 
Valley. Knowing that Mujaheddin forces’ internal incoherence was a great weakness in winning 
over the opponents, he managed to convince various internal front commanders of the north 
and northeast area to form the Supervisory Council of the North (SCN) in 1984, unifying the 
military and civilian administration in the north for effective resistance operation. While he 
remained loyal to Rabbani and was positioned as the military leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami 
Massoud maintained his own independent, moderate approach already from the early 1990s. 
Nojumi assesses that by the time that the Soviet forces withdrew, Massoud “moved from a self-
centered organizational structure and fanatic political ideology to a more realistic and moderate 
position. Politically speaking, Massoud moved from the far right of political extremism to the 
center, which was based on a mixture of traditional and modern political views.” After the fall of 
Kabul to Taliban in 1996, Massoud retreated to his native Panjshir Valley, established the 
Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland (later recast as the “United Front”) and 
fought several successful battles against the Taliban. In spring of 1997 after fending off 
Taliban’s initial, unsuccessful attempt at capturing Mazar-i-Sharif, Massoud joined forces with 
the wider anti-Taliban groupings through formation of the National Islamic Front for the 
Deliverance of Afghanistan (NIFDA). This alliance, commonly referred to as the “Northern 
Alliance”, consisted of Massoud’s Panjshiri-Tajik forces, Dostum’s Uzbek Army, Wahdat Hazara 
forces led by Karim Khalili and Ismaeli Shia forces led by Sayed Nader Kiani but Massoud was 
clearly taking the lead, both in military and political terms. Despite his acclaimed military 
command and skillful public management, Northern Alliance forces were pushed into ever 
smaller corner of the country in the course of the 1990s. Many observers attribute this to the 
fact that his opponents (initially Hekmatyar’s forces and later the Taliban) received 
disproportionately larger material assistances from Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia. (Accounts 
based on Nojumi 2002, Rashid 2001 and Coll 2004.)    
133 Although another account based on interrogation reports of 9.11 flight hijackers recounts 
this as a concession that Al-Qaida gave to Taliban leadership who initially opposed to attacking 
targets in the US and prioritized attaining victory over Northern Alliance. The fact that Taliban 
offensive against Northern Alliance was delayed until the day after the assassination of Massoud 
seem to substantiate this link. (“Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks 
upon the United States” p250-253)   
69 
there was a need to join forces against the Taliban. He was unquestionably one of the 
top leaders of Afghanistan and it is fair to assume that if he had survived for a further 
few months to see the defeat of Taliban he would have been a central figure in any 
interim government of Afghanistan. The quiet and unaccounted elimination of this 
central figure from Afghan politics only few months from a new beginning after 
decades of survival was ironic and regretful. How Massoud’s name and image was 
used in the years that followed to portray national unity134 is an interesting topic but 
for now we shall return to September 2001 to assess the immediate consequences of 
9.11 that forced the world attention back to Afghanistan.                        
 
A day after the attacks in the United States that took everyone by surprise and 
shock135, the US government was still in a highly confused state, also unable to 
determine if the chained attacks were finished or if there was still more to come136. 
Considering this state of affairs, it is remarkable how a Security Council resolution was 
immediately prepared and adopted on the following day. But it was important for the 
steps to follow that these attacks are recognized as “terrorist attacks” and that the 
highest authority of inter-state politics give grounds for action against Afghanistan and 
Al-Qaida which the United States believed to be behind the attacks. Echoing the 
statement of US President George Bush delivered on the same day declaring that the 
United States “will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts 
and those who harbour them”, Security Council resolution of 12 September 2001137 
“unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which 
took place in New York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like 
any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security” and 
“calls on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible 
for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these 
                                                 
134 Pictures of Massoud and President Karzai were found in major squares and government 
buildings even in the remotest locations as national heroes. For many who suffered under 
attack from Massoud’s forces during the internal strife among Mujahideen factions –and any 
outside observer aware of such recent historical facts-, the placement of Massoud as a national 
hero next to a legitimately chosen President was an odd reality. But behind these posters were 
the artificial and intentional message of national unity with a Pashtun President paying respect 
to war hero of Tajik origin. One example of many subtle ways of promoting national 
reconciliation in Afghanistan. 
135 According to accounts in the “Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks 
upon the United States”, there was intelligence/information available to the US government 
decision makers but this did not lead to decisive preventive action. (p212-214) 
136 Ibid, p326. 
137 S/RES/1368 (2001) 
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acts will be held accountable”.  
 
This provision gave important initial grounds for United States government to begin 
preparing for military action in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaida. 
Domestically, the new legal authorities for covert action in Afghanistan was provided 
by National Security Presidential Directive titled “Defeating the terrorist threat to the 
United States”. On 20 September 2001, addressing the nation before a joint session of 
Congress, President Bush publicized the issuance of the Directive138 and an ultimatum 
to the Taliban139: “hand over Bin Laden and his deputies and shut down Al-Qaida 
camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to 
destroy the terrorist infrastructure.” As expected, the Taliban regime did not meet 
these demands140 and therefore a four-phased plan, as summarized below141, for 
Operation Enduring Freedom was set in motion: 
 
      Table 2: Four phased approach of Operation Enduring Freedom 
Phase 
one 
The United States and its allies would move forces into the region and 
arrange to operate from or over neighbouring countries such as 
Uzbekistan and Pakistan. 
Phase 
two 
Air strikes and Special Operations attacks would hit key Al-Qaida and 
Taliban targets. In an innovative joint effort, CIA and Special Operations 
forces would be deployed to work together with each major Afghan 
faction opposed to the Taliban.  
Phase 
three 
The United States would carry out decisive operations using all elements 
of national power, including ground troops, to topple the Taliban regime 
and eliminate Al-Qaida’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. 
Phase 
four 
Civilian and military operations turned into the indefinite task of what 
the armed forces call “security and stability operations”. 
 
While preparations for military action progressed, a further resolution of the Security 
Council was adopted on 28 September 2001 establishing various sanctions “acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”142. The Counter-Terrorism 
Committee was established to review implementation of the resolution that decided 
that all state shall “prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts” by freezing of 
                                                 
138 The directive was formally signed on 20 October 2001. 
139  “Transcript of President Bush’s address” (http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen. 
bush.transc ript/). At the request of the Bush Administration, this ultimatum was already 
conveyed privately by the head of Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) Mahmud Ahmed to Mullah 
Omar some time between 14-17 September. (“Final report of the National Commission on 
terrorist attacks upon the United States”, p331-333)  
140  “Taliban rejects President Bush’s demands” (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/ 
september01/Taliban_9-21.html) 
141 Wording adopted from “Final report of the National Commission on terrorist attacks upon 
the United States”, p337-338.  
142 S/RES/1373 (2001) 
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assets and denying free havens143.  
 
In relation to combat operations, the preparatory positioning phase (phase one) begun 
in the weeks following 9.11 and the base arrangements were largely secured by the 
end of October. Air strikes and raids (phase two) by United States military forces 
begun on 7 October 2001144. Operation moved seamlessly into phase three and by 9 
November, Mazar-i-Sharif ---where the Taliban was cornered in the North--- fell to a 
coalition assault by Afghan and US forces led by General Dostum. On 12 November, 
Afghan and US coalition forces led by Ismail Khan captured Herat. On 13 November 
2001, Taliban fled from Kabul and by early December all major cities had fallen to the 
coalition. The symbolic end of Taliban’s political and military life came on 7 December 
2001 with the fall of Kandahar, the city of its original stronghold and the last remaining 
capital under Taliban control.   
 
3. EMERGENCE OF THE BONN PROCESS145  
 
Against such military campaign progress in the background, preparation and 
negotiation leading to Bonn talks took place in the UN headquarters in a “fight against 
time” manner between September and November 2001.   
 
As the military campaign in Afghanistan progressed with quicker-than-expected 
success, pressure mounted from the governments, of the United States and the United 
Kingdom in particular, towards the United Nations Secretariat to prepare a post-Taliban 
peace settlement designing a plan to establish an interim government, so as to avoid a 
political vacuum. Already in the second week of November 2001, serious warning was 
communicated from senior level representative of the UK government to the UN 
Secretariat regarding the quick dissolving of the Taliban regime and the political chaos 
anticipated to follow. It was feared that if the military objective of defeating the 
Taliban regime were attained without prospect for political resolution of internal 
                                                 
143 This was further reinforced by resolution S/RES/1377 (2001) adopted on 12 November 2001 
containing “declaration on the global effort to combat terrorism” adopted at the ministerial level 
meeting.  
144 United States Department of Defense (http://defeselink.mil/home/features/1092004a.html) 
145 This and the subsequent chapter on the process leading to and in Bonn draws heavily on 
account provided from an insider perspective by Kiyotaka Kawabata detailed in Kawabata, 
Afghanistan: UN Peacekeeping activities and regional conflict (Misuzu Shobo, 2002). Kawabata 
served as the desk officer for Afghanistan in the Department of Political Affairs of the United 
Nations and was a Special Assistant to the SRSG, Lakhdar Brahimi. 
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conflict among various warring parties along ethnic lines, the scene would revert to the 
early 1990s where factional fighting between Mujahideens after the withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops did tremendous damage to the Afghan people. This task had to be 
performed by the United Nations, aside from the coalition activities.       
 
The enormous impact of the 9.11 attacks dramatically shifted the gear of the United 
States government to prioritize resolution of the Afghan conflict and lawlessness. In 
face of United State’s vocal resolve and unquestionable pressure, the neighbouring 
countries of Afghanistan that fueled the continuation of conflict for two decades had no 
choice but to cooperate in letting the conflict be resolved146. In a twist of fate, the 
attacks attempted to damage the United States orchestrated by those based in 
Afghanistan resulted in setting in motion an unprecedented level of determination by 
the international community to resolve the Afghan conflict that has been largely 
ignored over the past two decades even at the great suffering of its population. After a 
long period of United Nations’ engagement with the Afghan conflict not leading to any 
resolution, suddenly there was an opening for real progress and change in Afghanistan. 
The question was how to capture these in a viable political framework acceptable to all 
concerned parties but strong enough to bring real peace to the troubled country.  
 
Initially, the Secretariat was hoping to take the necessary time to forge a new 
governing structure, seeking qualified interlocutors from the Afghan society at large, 
not replying on existing political figures. But the unexpectedly rapid fall of Kabul and 
the Taliban regime necessitated this vision to be adjusted to pragmatic considerations. 
In view of the fact that the Northern Alliance moved into Kabul and occupied the city 
as a fait acompli ---contrary to prior agreement with the US forces--- and the 
dissatisfaction this would bring to the Pashtuns which could be the source of next 
conflict, the United Nations had to focus its efforts to realistic targets. Under these 
circumstances, the immediate objective was defined as the establishment of an interim 
administration in Kabul as soon as possible ---even if not perfect in its scope and 
composition--- and to put an end to 23 years of internal conflict.     
 
                                                 
146 Part of the quick demise of the Taliban was due to halting of Pakistani support to the 
Taliban regime as a consequence of US government’s seven-point ultimatum to the Pakistani 
government. According to New York Times, final supply of resources to the Taliban from 
Pakistan was made on 8 October 2001, one day after the commencement of the air strikes. 
(Douglas Frantz, “Supplying the Taliban: Pakistan ended aid to Taliban only reluctantly” in New 
York Times, 8 December 2001)  
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Leading these efforts in the United Nations Secretariat was Lakhdar Brahimi. As 
reviewed earlier, Brahimi served as the Secretary General’s Special Representative 
(SRSG) to resolve the Afghan conflict for two years from July 1997. After resigning 
from the SRSG post by the end of 1999 as a demonstration of his frustration with lack 
of cooperation from certain parties to the conflict and a key neighbouring state, he had 
spent a year as a head of the high-level panel to review UN’s peacekeeping activities 
that produced the 2000 report on Peace Operations, reviewed earlier in Chapter 5 of 
Part II. He was reappointed as the SRSG for Afghanistan following the 9.11 incidents. 
Brahimi invited various experts ---also many from outside UN--- and begun to sculpt 
out the key elements of the peace agreement and embarked on a two week mission 
beginning in late October 2001 to Islamabad, Teheran and Rome. In these three 
capitals, Brahimi discussed with the top officials of the two key neighbouring states of 
Afghanistan as well as with the former King Zahir Shah and formulated consensus on 
how to proceed with the finalization of the peace process. As a result of these 
discussions, Brahimi presented by the end of November the following as guiding 
elements for the peace settlement: 
 
1. The United Nations would focus on the mediation of various Afghan groups in 
the post-Taliban interim regime formulation, drawing a clear line from the US-
led war on terror. 
2. The composition of the interim administration will be, in principle, left to the 
Afghans to agree on, but the United Nations will ensure that the opinion of the 
Pashtuns, constituting the majority population, will also be sufficiently reflected 
in the outcome. 
3. As the internal conflict is not resolved, sufficient time will be allocated before 
attempting to establish a democratically elected government based on 
principles of national reconciliation, putting off UN-monitored elections for the 
immediate period. 
4. To gradually increase level of reflection of democratic principles during the 
interim transitional period, by utilizing traditional Afghan political mechanisms 
such as the Loya Jirga. 
5. To support the creation of a new broad based national army and police force as 
a key pillar of the peace process, so as to ensure security and political stability. 
6. To consider deploying international military presence to ensure security in 
Kabul for the immediate future. In view of the volatile security situation in the 
country, this military presence should be armed multilateral force rather than 
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lightly armed peacekeeping force.   
7. Regarding the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance that will be 
conducted after the peace settlement, UN staff to be placed in Afghanistan will 
be kept at minimum and planning and implementation by the Afghans will be 
encouraged.  
     
Satisfied with these developments behind the scenes, the Security Council issued 
another resolution on 14 November 2001 “condemning Taliban for allowing 
Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by Al-Qaida network and 
other terrorist groups … and in this context supporting the efforts of the Afghan people 
to replace the Taliban regime”147. It endorsed the ongoing efforts of the United Nations 
led by SRSG Brahimi and called on the Secretariat to take active steps in organizing the 
peace settlement. The stage was set for the official negotiation involving the Afghan 
parties to the conflict.     
 
4. THE BONN TALKS  
 
Germany was among one of the countries indicating its willingness to host the peace 
talks for the settlement of the Afghan conflict148. The rapid turn of events worked in 
their favour and the venue of the peace talks was decided to be in Bonn.    
 
The next difficult step was to determine the participants to the peace talk. Aside from 
the Northern Alliance that fought the frontline battles to defeat the Taliban and had 
effective control of over 50% of the national territory including Kabul, it was difficult to 
identify groups that were legitimate and representative of the Afghan population. But it 
was very important to have delegates representing various ethnicities and regional 
groupings to take part in the peace talks so that the agreement reached will be 
realistic and hold legitimacy required to build a broad based government. After much 
deliberation, the following composition carefully balancing ethnic and various grouping 
was agreed: 
 
 
 
                                                 
147 S/RES/1378 (2001) 
148 Among other offers available/options considered were Saudi Arabia, UAE, Tokyo, Geneva, 
Vienna and Kabul itself. (Source: Kawabata) 
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     Table 3: Composition of Afghan participants to the Bonn Talks149  
Representing Characteristics of the 
group 
# 
 
Name of individuals 
Northern 
Alliance 
Defeated Taliban and had 
over half of national 
territory (including Kabul) 
under control 
11 Mr. Yonus Qanooni 
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah 
Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud 
Mr. Humayun Tandar 
Mr. Mustafa Kazimi 
Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq 
Ms. Amena Afzali 
Mr. S. Hussain Anwari 
Mr. Abbas Karimi 
Mr. Mohammad Natiqi 
Eng. Abdul Hakim  
Rome Group Associated with the former 
King Zahir Shah, pushing 
for a formation of new 
government through 
convening of Loya Jirga 
8 Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat 
Dr. Zalmai Rassoul 
Ms. Sema Wali 
Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri 
Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala 
Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak 
Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran 
Hamid Karzai (not present, 
through satellite phone) 
Cyprus 
Group 
Supported by Iran, 
pushing for formation of a 
new government through 
convening of Loya Jirga 
3 Mr. Houmayoun Jareer 
Dr. Azizullah Ludin 
Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams 
 
Peshawar 
Group 
Formed in late-October by 
pro-Pakistani Pashtuns 
3 Mr. Sayed Hamed Pir Gailani 
Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni 
Mr. Rahmatullah Musa Ghazi 
 
 
The peace talks begun in Bonn on 27 November 2001 in an environment secluded from 
external interference but great attention of the world to this event was testified by the 
presence of observer delegations from 20 countries and 900 journalists. Although the 
process started in a smooth manner and ended well, attaining much of the objectives 
initially set out, there were dramatic disagreements and negotiations behind the scene 
that could have derailed the whole peace process150. In order to illustrate international 
peace negotiation in practice, below excerpt is provided in full detail as a rare first-
hand account of a United Nations Secretariat officer that accompanied the whole 
process151: 
                                                 
149 Names of participants taken from signatories of the Bonn Agreement, placement into the 
four groups made based on various public sources and with advice from Ludmilla Dadrass. 
150 Maley writes: “Zahir Shah was not present, and neither was Burhanuddin Rabbani, still 
formerly President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Dostam did not take part, and Haji Abdul 
Qadir and Karim Khalili left, protesting what they saw as lack fo representation for their 
particular interests. Still, the participants were a stellar group by Afghan standards, with women 
as well as men taking part.” (Quote from William Maley, The Afghan Wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002) p269.)  
151 With the kind permission of Kiyotaka Kawabata, this detailed day-by-day account of the 
negotiation in Bonn with valuable analysis is reproduced here from his work in Japanese, 
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On the initial day of the talks (27 November), the United Nations put 
forward its initial proposal of a new administration consisting of an interim 
national council (200-300 representatives) and an interim administrative 
authority (20-30 ministerial level members). No major opposition was 
expressed to this proposal and pledges were made by participants to put 
aside their own group interests for the benefit of a united Afghan 
government. In particular, statement by the representative of the Northern 
Alliance Yunus Qanuni’s declaring to hand over authority to the new 
government was promising. Hamid Karzai ---who was already identified to 
be the hope of the new government, especially by the Americans, as one of 
the few Pashtun leaders that continued to engage actively in operations 
against the Taliban without going into exile in Europe or in the United 
States--- was not present in Bonn as he was pursuing military operations in 
Kandahar but connected via satellite phone, he read out statements fully 
supporting the establishment of a new interim regime in Kabul. Things 
seem to progress smoothly in the eyes of the coordinators.  
 
However, despite the hopeful beginning, between second and fourth day of 
the talks progress was slow to come. The general direction and framework 
was endorsed but many of the key details were being agreed. Especially 
contentious was the composition of the list of cabinet members of the 
interim administration. Initially the reasons were not apparent but it boiled 
down to the fact that the Northern Alliance felt it was unreasonable to 
make large concessions to other groups when they were the defeaters of 
the Taliban and only they had real control of the territory. Their 
uncompromising attitude was initially regarded as “excessive demands” but 
eventually other groups, especially the Rome Group participant who initially 
had a strong stance owing to the moral authority and legitimacy of the King, 
begun to weaken their position. There was also dissatisfaction among the 
smaller groups within the Northern Alliance –Uzbeks and Hazaras- to the 
line Qanooni was taking to prioritize Tajik component of the Alliance. The 
United Nations and other observer delegations kept a keen eye to make 
                                                                                                                                               
translated by Kato to English with Kawabata’s consent. (For reference on the Japanese work 
and Kawabata’s affiliation, see footnote 141 on page 69. Responsibility for the accuracy of the 
translation rests with the author of this dissertation.) 
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sure that the dynamics of the negotiation would not lead to agreements 
disproportionately disadvantageous for particular groups. As seen often in 
peace settlements, if the agreement is disproportionately advantageous to 
one group only, it will not hold in its application, as dissatisfaction would 
mount and lead to next conflict. 
 
By the fourth day, the real reason behind Northern Alliance’s 
uncompromising position became obvious to the coordinators through 
numerous rounds of informal consultations with Qanuni. Principally it 
relates to internal power relations within the leading Tajik group. There 
was pressure towards Qanuni and other younger leaders of the Tajik group 
belonging to the Massoud faction, from the old time veteran Tajik leaders 
such as President Burhanauddin Rabbani and leaders of “Hezb-e-Jabha-e-
Milli Islami (Islamic United Front)” Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf. The influence of 
these older generation leaders were marginal under Massoud’s charismatic 
leadership but with his sudden death in September 2001, these figures 
were trying to regain influence within the Northern Alliance, making full use 
of their international celebrity and personal ties with Arab leaders. They 
had no interest in letting Bonn talks a success, as this would strengthen the 
power of Qanuni and the younger leaders. These leaders therefore 
pressured Qanuni not to come to any concrete agreement in Bonn and to 
delay the actual power-allocation decisions for them to decide in Kabul. 
 
Against this background, diplomatic delegation of Russia and Iran 
approached the United Nations mediators with advice that rather than rush 
to push through with hasty decisions on power-sharing that is unlikely to 
come through, the conference should be put on hold and that will give time 
for Russia and Iran to persuade Rabbani and others representing the older 
generation of Northern Alliance and to work out a solution. It was clear 
that these countries, wiry of a US-led peace process were trying to delay 
the conclusion of the process in Bonn, and were beginning to dance to the 
same tone with their old ally Rabbani.  
 
On the evening of the fourth day, Qanuni openly maintained that he had 
no authority to agree to any decisions beyond agreeing to general 
principles without consulting Rabbani and Sayyaf. He proposed that 
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compromise be struck with one of the following scenario that either (1) the 
talks be closed for the time being and be reconvened in Kabul or another 
country at a later date to agree to a list of Cabinet members, or (2) Qanuni 
will fly with SRSG Brahimi to Kabul and discuss the list of Cabinet members 
with Rabbani and Sayyaf and return with results. The United Nations 
mediators seriously considered these two proposals but neither was 
acceptable. That the objective of the talks in Bonn was to come to 
agreement on immediately establishing an interim administration structure 
in Kabul was well understood by all parties prior to the convening of the 
conference and clear agreement on this line was given from Northern 
Alliance leaders in Kabul to the local United Nations representative. Brahimi 
communicated this position and urged Qanuni and the leaders in Kabul to 
come up with sincere position to allow a comprehensive peace agreement 
by the following morning. Internally, the United Nations mediators decided 
that agreement to the list of cabinet members, essential for the 
establishment of the interim administration, was the minimum line required 
outcome of the Bonn conference and that if this had to be compromised or 
delayed, Brahimi will call for closing of the talks.           
 
Accumulation of these factors put the peace talks at the edge of 
breakdown. With this situation, concerned Member States discarded their 
position as “observers” and actively moved to rescue the peace talks along 
the lines proposed by the United Nations. Between late evening of 30 
November and the morning of 1 December, intensive and complex 
diplomatic negotiations involving various capitals took place with telephone 
and satellite phones. President Rabbani himself was persuaded in no 
unclear terms not only by the United Nations but also by US, UK and 
Germany. United Nations also tried to persuade Qanuni by urging him to 
take the Northern Alliance beyond the past limitations by choosing the 
route of peace and stability cooperating with the international community 
instead of pursuing narrow interest of the group, referring to the bitter past 
where the Mujahideen coalition government ended up breaking down in 
face of internal conflicts. It also made it clear to other participants that this 
is the first and last chance for peace settlement and that nominal 
agreement to principles and postponement of real decisions was not an 
option. This message was communicated not only to the Afghan parties but 
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also to countries supporting the Northern Alliance, asking for their support. 
United States and Germany made foreign ministerial level demarche to 
Russia and Iran and their position initially supportive of Rabbani’s 
sentiment has begun to show flexibility as a result of these consultations. 
 
As a result of these intense negotiations overnight, Qanuni returned to the 
United Nations mediators with the following position on the morning of 1 
December 2001, opening a real prospect for agreement: the Northern 
Alliance will agree to (1) preparing a list of cabinet members, limited to the 
interim administration, (2) allowing the former King to appoint the 
chairman of the interim administration (implying acceptance of a Pashtun, 
Hamid Karzai belonging to the Rome Group, to be nominated for the post), 
(3) inviting the former King to Kabul for convening of the emergency Loya 
Jirga. This was the moment when prospects opened for real peace in 
Afghanistan putting an end to the 23 years of conflict.     
 
Following this breakthrough, draft text of the agreement was prepared by 
the United Nations and the Afghan parties were asked to submit a list of 
their candidates for the cabinet positions by 3 December 2001. The 
selection of members of the 29 cabinet posts (including a chairperson and 
two vice-chairperson) proved to be a very difficult process. Each group was 
asked to present 10-15 names of individual with high competence and 
integrity but all parties come up with candidates based on individual 
factional lines and the 150 names presented included some with corruption 
charges and some suspected for gross violation of human rights.       
 
As a result of intense negotiation where a full day of 4 December 2001 had 
to be dedicated, the composition of the cabinet was agreed as follows: 17 
seats for the Northern Alliance (including the three key ministries of 
Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs to be continuously occupied by Fahim, 
Qanooni and Abdullah-Abdullah, respectively), 11 seats for the Rome Group 
(including the post of the Chairman) and 2 seats to the Peshawar Group152. 
In terms of ethnic distribution, this translated in to: 11 seats for the 
Pashtuns, 8 seats for the Tajiks, 5 seats for the Hazaras, 3 seats for the 
                                                 
152  Cypress Group was allocated 2 seats but decided to decline joining the interim 
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Uzbeks and 2 seats for other minorities. Even after this agreement, 
participant continued to show mixed signals whether they will be a part of 
this process and this continued until the early hours of the day of the 
signing ceremony153. Many felt and expressed that the agreement was not 
perfect but that they agreed to nonetheless be a part of it so as to allow 
the process to move forward, putting an end to conflict.        
 
On the morning of 5 December 2001, all key participants, together with the 
SRSG Brahimi, signed the Bonn agreement together with the list of the 
cabinet members of the interim administration.  
        
5. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BONN AGREEMENT 
 
Hence we have seen with which enormous diplomatic maneuver the agreement that 
came into being in early December 2001. We shall now review the characteristics of 
the agreement. The “Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending 
the re-establishment of permanent government institutions”154 ---commonly referred to 
as the “Bonn Agreement” and hereafter so referred in this dissertation--- is not a peace 
accord in the general sense of the term155. Unlike the peace accord such as the Dayton 
Accords for Bosnia, Arusha Accords for Rwanda, or Paris Peace Agreement for 
Cambodia, the Bonn Agreement does not specify the final state of the settlement. 
Rather, it prescribes certain time-bound steps to move from termination of violent 
                                                                                                                                               
administration.  
153 According to press reports, one of the final contentious point was the number of posts to be 
allocated to the Northern Alliance. While those negotiating on behalf of NA in Bonn agreed to 
17, Rabbani, Sayyaf and other senior/older generation of NA leaders in Kabul asserted for 20 
posts (out of 29) and only gave into the final distribution in the final hours after much external 
pressuring, reminding them that while they were in control of 90% of the territory by this time, 
the situation changed dramatically from them being in control of  only 10% of the Afghan 
territory two months ago and this was only made possible and will remain so with external 
backing. Two other key concessions made to NA’s leadership in Kabul were the removal of two 
draft clauses that said (1) the international security assistance force would help in “voluntary 
disarmament of former combatants”, (2) the interim authority was prohibited from granting 
amnesty to those who committed crimes against humanity or serious violation of human rights. 
(All these insights in this footnote based on reporting from Bonn based on quotes from 
international negotiators by Steven Erlanger “After arm-twisting, Afghan factions pick interim 
government and leader”, New York Times, 6 December 2001)    
154 Official document submitted to UN on 5 December 2001 as an annex to a letter addressed 
to the Secretary General (S/2001/1154). The full text can be found at http://www.unama-
afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm 
155 For detailed discussion and definition on “peace accords” see Stephen J. Stedman, Donal 
Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens, (eds), Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace 
agreements (Lynne Rienner, 2002)  
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conflict to setting up of a governance structure with increasing level of legitimacy. It 
does not guarantee in any way the eventual establishment of a democratic and stable 
government. What has been agreed is how Afghanistan should proceed in attaining the 
ultimate goal of peace and stability, through holding of two national-level consultations 
based on traditional models available in the country (Loya Jirga) with the assistance of 
the international community. Establishment of an interim administration and a 
transitional administration are steps along this process to increasingly reflect greater 
amount of popular will. It is a roadmap that would require wise and sincere action by 
various Afghan parties and international community’s continuous support, if it were to 
succeed and lead to a stable and representative government structure providing peace 
and stability. Unlike the peace processes mediated by the United Nations for countries 
such as Cambodia, Kosovo, or East Timor, the Afghan peace process is designed to 
leave the shaping of the political process to the Afghans themselves. Reasons for this 
design can be attributed to two factors: (1) lack of time to broker a comprehensive 
peace accord like the Paris Agreement for the resolution of conflict in Cambodia, due to 
sudden progress in the military front following the events of 9.11, necessitating 
immediate interim scenario to avoid political vacuum, (2) vast national territory of 
Afghanistan, with still ongoing internal conflict, did not leave a possibility for interim 
administration structure administered by the United Nations, seen in earlier post-
conflict engagement in Kosovo or East Timor.    
 
5.1 Structure of the agreement 
 
As the Agreement formed the legal basis of the peacebuilding process that spanned 
over the following four years, the centrality of the Agreement warrants a content 
analysis focusing on each of the ten segments.  
  
(1) The preamble segment consisting of ten paragraphs, outlines the context in which 
the talks were held and agreement was made; expression the determination to end the 
conflict; making references to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan and that the people of Afghanistan will be freely choosing their own future 
in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice; also 
makes reference to the role of the Mujahideens. 
 
(2) “General provisions” consisting of six paragraphs, outline the roadmap for the 
transition with timelines beginning from the establishment of the Interim Authority (as 
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of 22 December 2001); describe that composition of the Interim Authority (Interim 
Administration, Commissions, Supreme Court) that will be the repository of Afghan 
sovereignty, tasked to convene the Emergency Loya Jirga (within six month) that 
would decide on the Transitional Authority; stating that free and fair elections to elect 
a fully representative government should take place within two years from the 
Emergency Loya Jirga; also specifying that a Constitutional Loya Jirga should take 
place within 18 months from the establishment of the Transitional Authority.   
 
(3) “Legal framework and judicial system” segment consisting of two paragraphs, 
stipulates the interim legal basis preceding the adoption of the new constitution and 
places the judicial power on the independent Supreme Court; state that a Judicial 
Commission would be established by the interim Administration to rebuild the domestic 
justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of 
law and Afghan legal traditions.   
 
(4) “Interim Administration” segment consisting of nine paragraphs contains the 
resultant agreement most contentiously debated stating the practical aspects. It 
defines the composition, procedures and functions of the Interim Administration. 
Composition is set as: one Chairman, five Vice Chairmen and 24 other members, of 
which all (except the Chairman) would head a department of the Interim 
Administration. It is stated rhetorically stated that the former King was offered by the 
participant to head the Interim Administration but that he preferred selection of other 
suitable candidate; it further states the criteria the selected individuals for the new 
Administration is annexed to the Agreement. It defined basic procedural arrangements 
such as on decision-making by the Interim Administration and suspension of 
membership for individual serving in the Interim Administration. It also defines certain 
key functions of the Interim Administration including: representation, national currency 
management, establishment of key institutions such as the Central Bank, an 
independent Civil Service Commission, and an independent Human Rights Commission. 
Naturally, the list of functions are not exhaustive and room is left for various other 
provisions concerning the functions and the powers of the members of the Interim 
Administration to be further elaborated.           
 
(5) “The Special Independent Commission for the convening of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga” consisting of five paragraphs, requires the Interim Administration to establish 
this body within one month of establishing of the Administration itself, and outlines 
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basic composition and functions of the body to lead to process to the holding of the 
Emergency Loya Jirga within six months time. It is defined that this Emergency Jirga is 
defined as the first most significant step in the transitional process that involves 
expression of the will of the Afghan population -albeit in a limited manner- and elect 
the head of the state for the Transitional Administration.   
 
(6) “Final provisions” consisting of six paragraphs are composed of various other 
crosscutting issues such as: the principle that all armed forces and groups come under 
the command of the Interim Authority upon the official transfer of power; adherence to 
international human rights instruments; cooperation with the international community 
in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime and respect for international 
law; ensuring equitable representation of women and minority groups in the Interim 
Administration and the Emergency Loya Jirga; requiring consistency with all Security 
Council Resolutions on Afghanistan; provision for elaboration of rules of procedure for 
organs established under the Interim Authority.   
 
(7) “Annex I” contains reference to the premise that the Afghans themselves are 
responsible for providing security, law and order but request the international 
community’s assistance in providing a UN-mandated force during the transitional 
period as well as establishing and training of new Afghans security and armed forces. 
It also contains, in the final paragraph, a pledge to withdraw all military units from 
Kabul and other urban areas which UN-mandated forces is deployed156.   
 
(8) “Annex II” defines some basic provisions for the role of the UN during the interim 
period including: SRSG’s responsibility to be accountable for all aspects of the work of 
the UN, monitoring and assessing implementation of the Agreement; facilitating 
resolution of impasse, if they occur, and decision-making. It also contains a paragraph 
that gives UN the right to investigate human rights violations and to recommend 
corrective action  
 
(9) “Annex III” contains requests to the UN and the international community to 
guarantee sovereignty; to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to 
assist with rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan; to assist with the 
                                                 
156 This pledge is probably the most blatantly disrespected provision of the Agreement ---which 
illustrates the difficulty in actual implementation--- as discussed later with reference to 
prevalence of warlordism in Chapter 2 of Part IV.  
84 
reintegration of the Mujahideen into the new Afghan security and armed forces; to 
create a fund to support victims of the war; and to cooperate in combating 
international terrorism, cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and to provide 
alternative livelihoods. It also requests UN to conduct voter registration and census in 
view of the Emergency Loya Jirga and the elections. 
 
(10) “Annex IV” contains the list of names indicating the composition of the Interim 
Administration157.   
     
Figure 2: Process of the Bonn Agreement158 
 
      
 
5.2 Observation and notable aspects of the Agreement 
 
It can be discerned that some of the elements contained in the Agreement are 
products of compromise or delaying of clear-cut decisions, delicately balancing 
concurring positions. For instance, it can be seen in the premise that Afghans are free 
to choose their political future but that it must be based on specific ---and often 
mutually contending--- principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice (in 
preamble paragraph 4). Another example is seen in the description of the judicial 
                                                 
157 As reproduced on Table 3 on page 75. 
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power of Afghanistan where the Judicial Commission is mandated to rebuild the 
domestic justice system “in accordance with the Islamic principles, international 
standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions”. These are sets of distinct 
principles which are not necessarily mutually exclusive or impossible to be reconciled in 
a single system, at least in theory, but a difficult mix which even countries with more 
developed state of judicial system may be struggling with, as attested by the fact that 
reform of the judicial system was one of the areas that saw the greatest lack of 
progress by the end of the Bonn Process, as we shall examine in detail in Chapter 8. 
And yet it is assessed that these formulations had to be included in the Agreement, as 
it had to be a combination of reality and ideals.    
       
Furthermore, it can also be observed that some provisions were included to give 
recognition to claims of some parties to the Bonn Agreement, even if it indicated an 
understanding that many Afghans, and international partners, may not agree with. This 
category of references include a paragraph dedicated to praising the role of the 
Mujahideens as “heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction” 
(in preamble paragraph 5). This is not an accurate description of the Mujahideens 
which includes those responsible for much of the destruction experienced during the 
last 10 years of conflict due to factional fighting and power struggle. Nonetheless, it is 
understandable that some ---especially those representing the Northern Alliance in 
particular--- needed this blanket reference of affirmation to set the tone for the 
transitional period ahead and fending off any possibility of being accused for the 
destructive actions committed during the internal war period. It could also be argued 
that this minimized the possibility for truth and reconciliation commission type of 
activity in the style of South African post-conflict management of the issue to take 
place in Afghanistan. It was indicative of the stance of those who run the post-conflict 
transition process under the Bonn Agreement, as we shall discuss later. Nonetheless, 
assessing the fact that such treatment of the Mujahideens avoided the alienation of the 
former Mujahideens (whether their status is widely accepted or merely through self-
proclamation) and this should be assessed as an important achievement. In addition, 
although critical comments may be heard from the better-educated, city-dwelling159 
segments of the Afghan population, for the vast majority, the Mujahideens still 
represent their national pride, tied to the courageous resistance to the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                               
158 Figure created by the author based on the content of the Bonn Agreement. 
159 Especially residents of Kabul which saw greatest destruction in the period following the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops and under Mujahideen coalition regime in the early 1990s.  
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occupation and fighting in the name of jihad160. Therefore, it is possible to assess that 
inclusion of these references in the Agreement and positioning of the Mujahideens in 
such context were appropriate on overall account.    
             
The Agreement also makes clear reference to respect for human rights and the rule of 
law as the basis of the transitional process ahead and the establishment of 
independent commissions on human rights and judicial reform under the interim and 
transitional authorities are mandated. As we shall see later in the analysis of the 
implementation of the transitional period covered under this Agreement, in reality 
these idealistic aspects became largely eclipsed by the difficulties encountered on other 
more realistic aspects of the Agreement such as provision of security, meeting the 
political timeline in moving towards a progressively more democratic governance 
structure and the fight against the illicit activities such as opium production and 
trafficking. Nonetheless, it was of necessity and of significance that the key segments 
of the society warring for over a decade has been able to produce an Agreement that 
broadly reflects the commitment for a peaceful future ahead161. It is only natural that 
the resulting text bore some conflictual or loosely defined elements which would not 
withstand rigorous analysis as some observers criticized. It was, and should be, seen 
first and foremost as a signal to end the conflict and a first attempt to design the initial 
stages of the transition. It was an effort to strike a fine balance between what is (and 
likely to continue to be, at least for a while) and what ought to be, and this premise 
should be correctly remembered when making assessment of the implementation of 
the Agreement, as we shall explore later in Chapter 1 of Part IV. 
                                                                   
6. STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE  
 
6.1 Immediate steps after the conclusion of the agreement 
 
Eagerly awaiting for the outcome of the Bonn talks, upon its conclusion, the Security 
Council immediately issued a resolution on 6 December 2001 “welcoming” the outcome 
of Bonn talks, stating that it “endorses the agreement on provisional arrangements” 
which are “intended as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender 
                                                 
160 Interview with Sayed Hassan, Kabul, July 2004. 
161 Although it was critically excluding one major party to the conflict ---the Taliban---, an 
aspect we will examine in detail in Chapter 2 of Part IV. 
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sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government”162.  
 
Only a day later on 7 December 2001, the Taliban fled from their original stronghold 
and last remaining capital city under their control, Kandarhar. Among those present on 
the ground winning over the city was Hamid Karzai who has been named as the 
Chairman of the Interim Administration in Bonn. Son to a powerful Pashtun family from 
Kandarhar power-base, Karzai was one of the few Pashtun leaders that remained 
engaged in Afghanistan (based in Peshawar) and fought actively with the Taliban163. 
Well versed in English, educated and comfortable dealing with both the international 
interlocutors and the tribal community, Karzai was seen as a natural candidate for 
Afghanistan’s future government leadership. Although his nomination for chairmanship 
of the interim administration was not uncontested164, the consensus was that there is 
no better figure to lead the country at this stage. On 22 December 2001, Karzai was 
installed as the chairman of Afghanistan’s Interim Administration. 101 days after the 
9.11 attacks and 71 days from the commencement of US military strikes, Afghanistan 
had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban and was set for a new statehood with 
heavy international presence. 
 
Military operations classified under phase three continued into 2002, as seen from the 
fact that the largest battle of the war in Afghanistan since October 2001 was fought in 
March 2002 in the mountainous Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez against a larger-than-
expected force of Taliban/Al-Qaida in a three week battle165 . However, after the 
conclusion of the Bonn Agreement and the inauguration of the Interim Administration 
on 22 December 2001, the military operations focused on War on Terror and 
systematically separated from the nation-building activities centered around the Afghan 
Interim Administration with international support led by the United Nations. As we shall 
see in greater detail in the following chapters, this dichotomy provided many 
complications to Afghanistan’s fragile new statehood. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
                                                 
162 S/RES/1383 (2001) 
163 Initially cooperated with the Taliban at the inception of the movement as a prominent 
Pashtun and served at one point as the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime but 
differences grew and Karzai became a clear anti-Taliban force after the assassination of his 
father allegedly by the Taliban.  
164 When the Rome Group was given the right to nominate the chairman post, leader of the 
group Abdul Shirat, a long time advisor to the former King, insisted on being nominated himself. 
However, as the views of the mediators was that the Chair post had to be allocated to a 
Pashtun from the Southern region, Shirat was convinced –though with bitter remarks- to 
support Karzai.   
165 “Battle of Anaconda” detailed reference found at www.wikipedia.org under heading “War on 
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dispute the fact that the continued engagement of the US military in the country 
provided the sine qua non condition for the new statehood to take shape, not allowing 
the spoilers to derailed the process166.     
 
6.2 Designing the framework of international assistance 
 
Against these developments, the immediate response United Nations had to take was 
to authorize and provide a United Nations-mandated international security force ---
separate from the Coalition Forces led by the United States with the primary objective 
of waging a War on Terror--- as requested in Annex 1 paragraph 2 of the Bonn 
Agreement. This process proved difficult, partly as the United States made it clear that 
it would not take part in this effort and also expressed preference to limit this 
operation to Kabul and its surrounding areas which was seen by many to be 
inadequate in meeting the needs on the ground. However, as with all other decisions 
by the United Nations ---but particularly true for matters relating to military 
deployment---, where there is no support from Member States, the United Nations 
Secretariat as such does not have the means to take the course of action it assesses as 
required167. Therefore the resultant UN-mandated force was restricted in a manner 
envisioned by the United States and other key Member States contributing to UN’s 
engagement in Afghanistan.    
 
Security Council resolution of 20 December 2001 “authorizes” the establishment of 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for 6 months duration, under Chapter 
VII mandates of the United Nations Charter, “as envisaged in Annex I to the Bonn 
Agreement” “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in 
Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority, as well as 
personnel of the United Nations can operate in secure environment”168. The United 
Kingdom offered to take the lead of IASF at its inception169. ISAF’s mandate was 
thereafter extended for another six months in May 2002170 and for further twelve 
                                                                                                                                               
Afghanistan”. 
166 At least not from those who signed up to the Bonn Process. The fact that the Taliban was 
excluded in the first place is analyzed in detail in Chapter 2 of Part IV.  
167 Phenomena discussed in detail in Part II and V. 
168 S/RES/1386 (2001) 
169 Warren Hoge, “Afghan peacekeeping: Britain to send up to 1,500 for security force” in New 
York Times, 18 December 2001. 
170 S/RES/1413 (2002) 
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months in November 2002171 but without extending its scope or coverage until 2003. 
 
In the meantime, UN provided emergency assistance to the newly established Interim 
Administration, centered around the following areas of immediate needs172: 
 
1. Salary provision to national and provincial civil servants (excluding military and 
police) estimated to be roughly 210,000, covering for the unpaid 5 months 
and the next 6 months 
2. Establishment of and support to Civil Service Commission, to enable the 
government’s recruitment of capable staff based on merit 
3. Basic infrastructural support to new Ministries (including provision of office 
equipment and vehicles as well as refurbishment of governmental compounds)  
 
Also established during this period was the Loya Jirga Preparatory Commission 
composed of 21 Commissioners, carefully selected jointly by the Interim Administration 
and the United Nations selecting individuals commanding respect and influence but not 
politicized by specific groups.  
 
As for the international community’s initial consolidated response on the reconstruction 
and aid aspects, an International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance for 
Afghanistan was held in Tokyo in January 2002. Over US$ 4.5 billion was pledged 
through 2005 by the international community173. There was a whole new dynamics in 
place for a new Afghanistan, to which the UN Secretary General needed to devise a 
new support structure coordinated by the UN as requested in Annex II of the Bonn 
Agreement. This resulted in recommending the establishment of a new integrated 
presence for the United Nations to be headed by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG), bringing together the political components from the United 
Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) and various agencies working on 
humanitarian and reconstruction sectors174. A Security Council resolution adopted on 
28 March 2002 “endorses” the establishment of United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) for initial duration of 6 months, “as outlined in SG report dated 
                                                 
171 S/RES/1444(2002) 
172 Kawabata, p 216-217. 
173 Of the total pledge, US$ 1.8 billion was for the first year. (“Afghan aid meeting ends” in New 
York Times, 23 January 2002) 
174 Proposed structure of the new UN presence presented in detail in the SG report dated 18 
March 2002 (S/2002/278). 
90 
18 March 2002 (S/2002/278)”175. The mandate of UNAMA, the new integrated mission 
of the United Nations to assist Afghanistan, was to be reviewed and extended, every 
twelve months from thereafter throughout and beyond the Bonn Process. 
 
6.3 Structure of the United Nations mission 
 
Based on requests made in the Bonn Agreement, Security Council Resolution 
S/RES/1401(2002) and subsequent consultations with the Afghan counterparts, 
UNAMA defined its overall function as being one “to promote peace and stability in 
Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the 
Government of Afghanistan in rebuilding the country and strengthening the 
foundations of peace and constitutional democracy”176.  
 
            Figure 3: UNAMA structure177 
           
UNAMA is categorized technically as a political mission (as opposed to a peacekeeping 
mission) but from this point, it was directed and supported by the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in UN Headquarters in New York178 . As the first 
experiment of an ‘integrated’ mission, UNAMA was composed of two main pillars: the 
“Political Affairs Pillar” handling political matters and the “Relief, Recovery and 
                                                 
175 S/RES/1401 (2002) 
176 UNAMA homepage (www.unama-afg.org/about/overview.htm) 
177 Figure created by the author based on SG reports on Afghanistan. 
178 Until spring 2002, Department for Political Affairs (DPA) was primarily in charge of the 
mission in Afghanistan.  
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Reconstruction Pillar” dealing with development and humanitarian issues, each headed 
by one Deputy SRSG (at the rank of ASG) reporting directly to the SRSG. Through this 
structure, various components of UN’s engagement in the country, especially the 
political wing carried out formerly by UNSMA and humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction wing operated by various specialized agencies were brought under one 
architecture.   
       
The mission started out with provision for 244 staffing in 2002 and towards the end of 
the Bonn process the number increased to 1,128, of which the vast majority (around 
80 percent) were Afghan nationals179. One of the central philosophies of the mission’s 
engagement was depicted as the “light (expatriate) footprint” as outlined in paragraph 
98 (d) of SG report S/2002/278 defining that “UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan 
capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an international presence 
and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using common support services where possible, 
thereby leaving a light expatriate “footprint”. After the massive post-conflict operations in 
Kosovo and East Timor in the immediate recent history of UN peace operations, 
UNAMA’s modest size and lean structure based on such guiding philosophy presented a 
stark contrast in terms of modality of UN’s engagement. This approach and its 
consequences will be assessed in closer detail in Chapter 2.2 of Part IV as part of the 
assessment of the overall process of post-conflict peacebuilding.  
 
6.4 The military aspect: Parallel engagements by CFC & ISAF 
 
Throughout the duration of the Bonn Process and beyond, international military 
presence was a central element of the transition process. Continued deployment of 
international military forces was widely recognized as a requirement for the country to 
remain on track of the peace process, not falling back into conflict as many believed 
that only the deterrence effect created by credible foreign military presence prevented 
some of the parties to the Bonn Agreement ---with various degree of loyalty to the 
process--- from turning into a spoiler. What complicated the situation profoundly and 
characterised the process, however, was the fact that there were two distinct 
“international military presences” pursuing different objectives at the same time with 
                                                 
179 The 2002 figures are cumulative of UNSMA and UNAMA and of the 244 total, 95 were 
international staff and 149 were national staff. In 2005, of the total 1,128 staff, 251 were 
international staff, 877 were national staff and 43 were UN Volunteers. These figures are 
calculated based on authorized budgetary provisions for UNAMA civilian staff and were provided 
with the kind support of DPKO Afghan desk, Giuditta Scordino and Radha Day.     
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limited coordination, at least in the initial stage.  
 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” of the Coalition Forces ---led by the United States 
Central Command with marginal contribution from its allied nations---180 made it clear 
that its objective was to prevail over the remnants of the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida 
elements present in Afghanistan. Its mandate was strictly limited to the global War on 
Terror which was the central theme of US foreign policy after 9.11. While its sheer 
presence contributed in some cases to act as deterrent for violent conflicts and it 
would occasionally align its posture to the needs of the political process, this was not 
the norm and on many occasions its need for local allies in the provinces made them 
take action contrary to the objective of the political goals set out in the Bonn 
Agreement.  
 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was the UN-mandated international 
military presence whose main mandate was to assists the Afghan interim and 
transitional authority in maintaining security for the reconstruction process to be able 
to take place. Although the aspirations of the drafters of the initial proposal was to 
have a strong ISAF deployed throughout the country, with the strong objection of the 
United States, its mandate was limited to cover only “Kabul and its surrounding areas” 
from the point of its inception181. Despite being pointed out on numerous occasions by 
the UN and the Afghan government that the fact that instability in areas outside Kabul 
is unattended by international military presence with a view to rebuilding of the 
country is a serious weakness threatening the viability of the Bonn Process, 182 this 
limitation remained unchanged for almost two years at the critical initial stage.  
 
Finally, in October 2003, the Security Council authorized the expansion of the mandate 
                                                 
180 The first waves of attack beginning in October 2001 were conducted solely by US and UK 
forces. From early 2002, several countries deployed special forces to work alongside. Since the 
initial invasion period, these forces were augmented at different times by troops supporting OEF 
and/or ISAF. These forces were supported by main battle tanks (Canadian and Danish), artillery 
(British, Canadian, Dutch), ground-attach aircraft (French, Italian, Dutch, Norwegian and 
British) and transport aircraft from several nations. (Wikipedia entry on “War in Afghanistan” 
p16 reference “Operation Enduring Freedom”)    
181 S/RES/1386(2001) 
182 Earliest request to the Security Council was made in Hamid Karzai’s first address as the 
Chairman of the Interim Administration on 30 January 2002 (SC/PV.4461, SC/7284). For many 
recommendations and requests that followed, see records of Security Council meetings such as 
SC/PV.4750, SC/7751 of 6 May 2003) and the for the official request for ISAF expansion beyond 
Kabul that finally was met with Security Council action, see letter from the Afghan 
representative to the Secretary-General dated 10 October 2003 (S/2003/986).  
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of ISAF to areas beyond Kabul and its surrounding areas responding to strong calls by 
the UN183. SRSG Brahimi, in particular, has repeatedly alerted that without bringing 
basic level of security to the provinces, aid and reconstruction work suffered and this 
lead to disappointment by local population who could not see the peace dividend. Also 
stressed was the fact that in the absence of international forces to bring security to the 
provinces, there was no way to proceed in a meaningful way with the much-needed 
demilitarization of former combatants and local commanders through DDR 
programmes. This continued arbitrary use of power by localized armed groups left 
much of the Afghan population outside of the rule of law and protection by national 
authority as before the Bonn Process. Addressing this problem was identified as a 
precondition for the political process anticipated to unfold such as the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga and elections184. 
   
Unfortunately, by this time ---almost two years since the fall of the Taliban---, the local 
power holders were given sufficient time to entrench their power base, many of them 
claiming quasi-official status by functioning as self-appointed “police chiefs” of districts 
and the like, and some through active or passive engagement with the illicit opium 
industry. Therefore the challenge that the ISAF had to deal with after the mandate 
expansion was much greater than it would have been at the outset of the Bonn 
Process. In addition ---as it is the case with all such mandates given by Security 
Council resolutions--- the increase in the size of the forces required to carry out the 
vastly expanded mandate depended on voluntary contribution from individual Member 
States and was not guaranteed by the adoption of this resolution. Although this 
expanded mandate was given based on the offer provided from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) to lead the operation and to contribute significant forces 
from its Member States185, full deployment did not take place on the ground until the 
end of the Bonn Process186. The delay in dealing with the security threats beyond Kabul 
                                                 
183 S/RES/1510(2003) adopted on 13 October 2003, for detail of actual deployment envisaged, 
mainly based on offer from the Secretary-General of NATO regarding ISAF, see the record of 
Security Council deliberation reproduced in S/PV.4840 and SC/7894.   
184  SRSG Brahimi’s briefing to the Security Council on 15 January 2004 (S/PV.4893 and 
SC/7977), Security Council’s deliberation acknowledging the delaying of the Parleamentary 
election, holding it separately from the Presidential election on 15 July 2004 (Presidential 
Statement S/PRST/2004/25, S/PV.5004, SC/8149) referred explicitly to this posint. Furthermore, 
the Secretariat’s briefing to the Security Council following the Presidential election reiterated the 
need for improvement in security situation, DDR and rule of law as key preconditions for 
successful conduct of parliamentary elections (S/PV.5073, SC/8240).   
185 S/2003/970 
186 Authorized staffing of ISAF was 20,000 in 2001, while actual deployment was below 5,000 in 
2002.  
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was one of the most regrettable aspects of the international community’s engagement 
in the Bonn Process and one that would have profound implications, as we shall 
examine later in Part IV as a part of the assessment of the overall process.        
     
         Table 4: Summary comparison of the two international military presences187 
Coalition Forces Description ISAF 
 
Oct. 2001 Deployed 
since 
Jan. 2002 
US Lead by 12/2001-06/2002: UK 
07/2002-01/2003: Turkey 
02/-07/2003: Germany & NL 
08/2003-09/2004: NATO (lead: Canada)  
10/2004-09/2005: NATO (lead: Turkey) 
10/2005-9/2006: NATO (lead: Italy) 
USA, UK, Canada, 
Australia, France 
Key 
contributors
UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, France, NL 
2002: 7,000 
2005:19,000 US 
Size  2002: 4,650 from 20 countries    
2003: 5,000 by the end of 2003 from 
more than 30 countries 
2004: 6,800 (1st Stage: Northward 
expansion completed) 
2005: 9,200 NATO (2nd stage: expansion 
westward begun) 
Counter-terrorism 
(capturing and  
destroying Taliban 
& Al Qaida 
members) 
Mandate 
 
 
Assisting the Afghan government in 
providing security in Kabul & its environs; 
providing security for UN personnel 
2002: In Kabul as 
well as eastern and 
southern part of 
the country 
Areas 
covered 
2002-2003: Kabul and its vicinities 
10/2003-: gradual increase, first to North 
Eastern, then Western and Central 
regions 
2005-: take over of PRTs in the South 
from US (Kandahar by Canada, Helmand 
by UK etc) 
 
Although the resentment from the local population is not at all comparable to that in 
Iraq, it would be difficult to deny the fact that there was a sense among the Afghan 
population in the provinces that the Coalition Forces were de facto “occupying force”. 
And this sentiment, initially held mainly by the insurgents and those not party to the 
Bonn Agreement, grew by the year among ordinary Afghans. Contributing factors to 
this were the behaviours in which some of the Coalition Force solders acted towards 
                                                 
187 Table created by the author. Information regarding ISAF taken from SRSG brief to the 
Security Council (e.g. S/PV.5347), successive SG reports and NATO website. Information 
regarding the Coalition Forces taken from Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for 
Congress: Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support and 
announcement made by the US government on 20 December 2005 stating their intention to 
withdraw 2,500 American forces from Operation Enduring Freedom in March 2006 which would 
“reduce the current level of 19,000 troops to 16,500”. 
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the Afghan people, perceived to be a typical occupying force manner. With the broad 
pretext of searching for insurgents and the remnant of the Taliban, people’s houses 
were searched by armed Coalition Force solders, under authority not given by any 
Afghan or international institutional framework. At least in the first few years of the 
Bonn Process, such house-searches or random “checks” were conducted by the 
Coalition forces even in Kabul, some in a manner not giving the impression that these 
foreign forces were there to help Afghanistan at its request188. This sentiment present 
from the early stages of the Bonn Process grew more intense as the legality and 
appropriateness of treatment of detainees in the Guantanamo detention center came 
into public scrutiny as early as in 2002189. Lack of control over the procedure and 
criteria of how the Coalition Forces detained suspects in informal detention centers also 
within Afghanistan, as well as the way the detainees were reported to be treated, not 
only raised discomfort among the Afghans but also from various parts of the 
international community190. The incidents of prisoner abuse by US solders in the Abu 
Ghraib jail in Iraq publicized by the New Yorker Report in April 2004 were also widely 
reported in Afghanistan and critics of the counter-insurgency operations fanned public 
outrage 191. In addition, the mistake or unjustifiable bombings by the Coalition Forces 
killing civilians continued to occur and statements made on these occasions by the 
Coalition Forces calling these “unfortunate” incidents and never offering apology ---
giving the impression that they considered these as collateral damage within 
acceptable range---, all contributed to growing discomfort with the presence of the 
Coalition Forces. But problematic above all was the fact that the counter-insurgency 
operations did not produce the result they were designed to attain. Although some of 
the key figures of the Taliban and the Al-Qaida were reported dead or captured, Mullah 
Omar and Osama bin Laden remained at large and the Taliban movement itself was 
growing in strength as the Bonn Process progressed. While at the political level the 
                                                 
188 Craig S. Smith, “The intimidating face of America” in New York Times, 13 October 2004; The 
author witnessed firsthand several incidents where the Coalition solders blocked roads in Kabul 
and stopped all passing Afghan cars for highly intimidating search operations (even UN-labeled 
cars if there were Afghans on board). The manner in which the Afghan’s ID documents were 
taken and questions were asked to Afghan citizens were highly militarized and some were taken 
away from their vehicles on the spot for further interrogation for “signs” possible sympathy to 
Taliban. (This particular incident occurred in July 2004 in Shahr-i-Naw road, Kabul)  
189 David Rohde, “The detainees: Afghans freed from Guantanamo speak of heat and isolation” 
in New York Times, 20 October 2002, Anthony Lewis, “Guantanamo’s long shadow” in New York 
Times, 21 June 2005. 
190 The Bush Administration maintained the position that as those captured in the fight in terror 
were not conventional military combatants, the Geneva Convention regulating the treatment of 
prisoners of war do not apply.  
191 Interview with Sayed Hassan, July 2004, Kabul. 
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awareness was there that the fragile peace process depended on the continued 
presence of the US force and that this could only be justified with their focus on 
counter-insurgency, criticism towards the Coalition Forces mounted among the public.      
 
This placed difficulties for the ISAF forces, when their mandate was finally expanded in 
October 2003 to provide security as a part of the nation building process in areas 
beyond the capital. One of the problems of this dual military engagement was that 
despite the fact that they were deployed for distinct purposes ---one for counter-
terrorism and the other to support the process of nation building--- Afghans affected 
by or opposed to the counter-insurgency operations of the Coalition Forces could not 
distinguish between the two. First, from its own security point of view, it presented 
challenges as the ISAF was much less numbered than the Coalition Forces and their 
mandate was limited. Therefore should hostilities occur with the local armed groups, it 
would have been much more difficult for ISAF to respond to it in accordance to its 
mandate. Partly in response to this dilemma, a new concept referred to as the 
“Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)” was favoured by the contributors to ISAF192. 
Under this concept, the military personnel were deployed ---with a small number of 
civilian personnel component built in--- to support post-conflict reconstruction functions 
(or “nation building” functions, as would be referred to in US literature) with minimal 
amount of patrol and other tasks related to ensuring security. The concept and 
practice of PRTs became subject to criticism from some engaged in reconstruction 
work on the grounds that this blurs the line between civilian support activities and 
military engagement, thus causing danger to the unarmed civilians. Nonetheless, in 
post-conflict situations where security is not guaranteed by the central government in 
many parts of the country and where these spots are largely inaccessible for civilian 
aid workers, this concept to deploy military personnel to aid in key reconstruction work 
proved to be a useful model. It at least created a framework under which some 
international presence were secured in the provincial areas and in a manner that 
acquired local support193.     
                                                 
192 The concept was devised in late 2002 by the Americans operating in the South but it was 
adopted by various countries sending contingents to ISAF as well. The PRT concept evolved as 
different troop contributing nations in charge of different regions employed different approach 
in the application of the PRT concept.  
193 Although it should be noted that the concept of PRTs is not a set doctrine and thus various 
countries providing assistance either as part of ISAF or the Coalition Force to be responsible for 
a PRT in a specific location determined the actual implementation modality. Therefore the 
functions of the German PRT in Badakshan would be different from that of the New Zealander 
PRT in Bamyan, and much more different still from the US–run PRT in Kandarhar, for instance.   
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7. KEY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE BONN PROCESS  
 
Having reviewed the structure of international assistance provided through the 
integrated mission of UNAMA and the two international military presences, we shall 
now examine the key political developments prescribed in the Bonn Agreement. 
Reconstructing a coherent narrative through chronological review of key events, this 
dissertation intends to generate better understanding of how the Afghan government 
and its international partners dealt with cornerstone events that shaped the post-
conflict peacebuilding process. 
 
7.1 Emergency Loya Jirga 
 
The first hurdle of the Bonn Process was the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga 
within six months from the establishment of the Interim Authority. This was conducted 
on schedule as the Emergency Loya Jirga was held from 11 June 2002 for nine days 
and the Transitional Administration was established on 22 June 2002, exactly six 
months after the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Security Council endorsed 
this by issuing a resolution “welcome(ing)” and “not(ing) with satisfaction” the results 
of this process194.     
 
Based on the 1964 Constitution which was determined in the Bonn Agreement to serve 
as the legal basis for the Interim and Transitional Authorities, there were separate 
provisions for a ordinary Loya Jirga and an Emergency Loya Jirga session. The latter 
required less formalities and representation and therefore 500-600 representatives 
would have sufficed for this occasion. However, the Afghan Interim Administration 
decided to have a full-scale representation in the selection of the actual delegates for 
the Emergency Loya Jirga. A remarkable 1656 participants gathered for the 
Emergency195 Loya Jirga, composed of delegates from all over Afghanistan as well as 
from the Diaspora and refugee communities abroad. 1050 delegates were selected in 
an indirect election under United Nations monitoring and the remaining 606 delegates 
were selected by the Preparatory Commission from among special and/or minority 
groups such as women, religious leaders, refugees and nomads.  
 
                                                 
194 S/RES/1419(2002) 
195 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report 
of the Secretary General (S/2002/737), 11 July 2002, p5-8. 
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Former King Zahir Shah inaugurated the Emergency Loya Jirga on 11 June 2002, 
clearly stating that he returned to his homeland to be of service to the people of 
Afghanistan but not to revive royal rule196. He further declared his support for Karzai as 
a candidate for the position of the President of the Transitional Administration.  
 
On the third day of the Emergency Loya Jirga (13 June 2002) election for the 
presidency was conducted and Karzai won a clear majority obtaining 1295 votes. 
Karzai assumed the post of the President and announced the cabinet Ministers of the 
Transitional Administration on 19 June 2002 and closed the emergency Loya Jirga. 
While all necessary outcomes were produced in the Emergency Loya Jirga, and 
therefore the event was hailed as a success, the process was not as open and 
democratic as it was hoped to have been. In addition to widespread manipulation and 
intimidation by armed commanders and warlords in the selection of the delegates 
(which led to many warlords and their proxies being present as delegates), the 
intimidation factor remained during the Jirga itself in manner that some delegates felt 
that they could not freely express their views. Minister of Defense Fahim himself, 
despite being a cabinet member led this by insisting on having the secret service he 
controlled being present during the Jirga proceedings. Also critical was the fact that the 
expected role and power of the delegates were not specified for a large part of the 
deliberation. Election of the President was conducted in a secret ballot and the 
selection of cabinet ministers were read out by the President and the delegates of the 
Jirga was not asked to take any part in its selection or approval. Another important 
conscious omission was the creation of the Advisory Council, of which provisions were 
provided in the Bonn Agreement to serve alongside the transitional administration. The 
reason was the fear that such a parallel entity may be dominated by potential spoilers 
and create obstacles for progress. Open election of the President and the cabinet 
members of the Transitional Administration and creation of the Advisory Council would 
have increased legitimacy of the transitional arrangements by increasing democratic 
choice and pluralism. But these options were not chosen mainly due to a strong fear 
held by President Karzai, shared by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad that warlord and other 
spoilers will take center stage if given a chance.   
 
                                                 
196 This conclusion was not solid until the beginning of the Emergency Loya Jirga, as the Rome 
Group continued to push for the former King to assume Presidency of the Transitional 
Administration. This position was retracted only with strong persuasion from the United States 
and the United Nations, as such scenario will create dual power structure as the Tajiks in 
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While these considerations are understandable and their appropriateness is difficult to 
judge objectively, it must be noted that the overriding concern for avoiding spoilers 
compromised democratic proceedings. This had two effects for longer-term 
consequences: Firstly, although the Emergency Loya Jirga was intended to increase 
the administration’s legitimacy, it failed to do so in the mind of many involved in the 
process due to the way things were decided without genuine consultations and debate. 
This severely disillusioned some delegates who believed in democratic practices and 
rather the Emergency Loya Jirga served to discredit the legitimacy of the main 
protagonists of the Transitional Administration, as the process was seen to be a 
legitimization of those in power backed by the United States with the acquiescence of 
the United Nations. Secondly, with the presence of many armed commanders and 
intimidation by armed militias de facto being tolerated, the Jirga impressed to the 
Afghans gathered from various corners that the two most important external partners 
in supporting the transition process were taking an accommodationist position to 
warlords and local strongmen. As we shall examine in Part IV, these two factors had 
tremendous consequences in setting the tone for the rules of engagement in the 
subsequent stages of the Bonn Process.      
 
On a brighter note against the backdrop of General Fahim’s behaviours making 
mockery of the spirit of a unified transitional administration, Yonous Qanooni ---
another key figure in the former-Northern Alliance, Panjshiri-Tajik group was 
cooperative in opening a prospect for more ethnically balanced administration by 
declaring that he will not insist on remaining in his position as the Minister of Interior197. 
This gave Karzai an opportunity to correct the imbalance seen in the Interim 
Administration where three key posts were held by the Panjshiri-Tajiks.  
 
In closing the Emergency Loya Jirga, the newly appointed President made a speech 
that foreshadowed the process ahead: After stressing the importance he attaches to 
the establishment of a new, ethnically-balanced national army and other key 
institutions of the central government, Karzai also stated that “Great if (stability and) 
peace can be attained simultaneously as justice (democratic values and human rights), 
                                                                                                                                               
control of Kabul will not agree to the return to Royal rule. (Kawabata, p217-220) 
197 Qanooni ended up being the Minister of Education and the Presidential Advisor on Internal 
Security Affairs under the administration announced at the end of the Emergency Loya Jirga. He 
failed to obtain the position of being one of the three Vice-Presidents, losing in an internal 
struggle among the Panjshiri-Tajiks against Fahim, who remained the Minister of Defense and 
also became one of the Vice-Presidents. (Kawabata p219, Maley) 
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but if that’s not possible, we will have to try to attain these objectives in a gradual 
manner (prioritizing stability and peace).”  In hindsight, this speech contained the 
essence of the Karzai’s rule under the reminder of the Bonn Process and beyond.   
 
7.2 Constitutional Loya Jirga and the adoption of the new Constitution198 
 
Among the mounting priorities the Transitional Administration had to deal with, one of 
the most important was to manage the process of designing and adopting a new 
national constitution with some degree of national consensus. This was the next official 
hurdle set out in the Bonn Agreement that had to occur within 18 months from the 
establishment of the Transitional Authority. While a constitution of a state is often 
attributed mainly symbolic value, in the stage of state development Afghanistan was in, 
the task of defining the actors and institutions of a state governed by the rule of law, 
establishing their relationship to one another as well as the limits of their power, is an 
important and delicate process that has vast implications beyond its symbolic value.  
 
Under Section I (6) of the Bonn Agreement, a special commission was to be appointed 
by the Transitional Administration to convene a Constitutional Loya Jirga. To engage in 
the above task, a Drafting Committee of the constitutional commission composed of 
nine members was established by the Transitional Authority, with formal inauguration 
by the former King Zahir Shah on 3 November 2002. Its members included two women 
judges and legal scholars and jurists drawn from across the major ethnic groups and 
regions and received international technical support199. The draft prepared by the 
Drafting Committee was vetted by a Constitution Commission composed of 35 
members and the National Security Council. While much technical assistance and 
expert advice was given by the international community regarding institutional design, 
the strong presidential system it came to embody in the final text reflected strong 
pressure coming directly from President Karzai200.  
 
Constitutional Loya Jirga was convened from 14 December 2003 to 4 January 2004 
chaired by Sebghatullah Mojadiddi. It constituted of 502 members, most elected 
                                                 
198 Facts and accounts contained in this chapter relies heavily on information and analysis from 
Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan: towards a new constitution (New York, Center on International 
Cooperation, New York University, 2003) 
199 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report 
of the Secretary General (S/2003/333), 18 March 2003, p5. 
200 On the constitutional design process, see Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a constitution for 
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through an indirect but lively process and some appointed by President Karzai. Fierce 
debate took place among the members, especially regarding contentious questions of 
(1) Islam versus modern secularism and (2) balance of power between the President 
and the parliament 201 . Balance among ethnic groups played a large role in the 
negotiations where Pashtuns were dissatisfied with the dominance of the Panshiri-
Tajiks while the minority groups feared renewed Pashtun dominance. In the end a 
modified version of the final draft was agreed reflecting strong Presidential power but 
with added weight to the parliament, strengthened role of Islam, coupled with added 
acknowledgement of women’s rights. The Constitutional Loya Jirga concluded on 4 
January 2004 with the adoption of the new Constitution that had the following notable 
features: 
 
• A strong presidential system202, with a degree of parliamentary oversight from 
the bicameral national assembly comprised of a lower house (Wolesi 
Jirga/House of People) and upper house (Meshrano Jirga/House of Elders)203. 
The President and the members of the lower house are directly elected 
whereas the upper house will be a mix of indirectly elected and appointed 
members. The lower house has the authority to approve the President’s 
appointment of the Attorney General, Governor of the central and ministers and 
has the power to impeach ministers204. 
 
• The constitution defines Afghanistan as an Islamic republic where Islam 
provides a framework for the establishment of the rule of law. (sharp contrast 
to the 1964 constitution) 
 
• It enshrines respect for human rights and equality among men and women. 
Promoting women’s political participation by guaranteeing 25% of the 
representative of the lower house would be female. 
 
The constitution, as it turned out, “represented considerable victory for the centrist 
approach and for secular modernism” but it also demonstrated how the process ---
                                                                                                                                               
Afghanistan”, Journal of democracy, vol15, no 3, January 2004, p5-19. 
201 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report 
of the Secretary General (S/2004/230), 19 March 2004, p3. 
202 Article 60 of the Afghan Constitution 
203 Article 82 of the Afghan Constitution 
204 Article 90 of the Afghan Constitution 
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which included genuine parliamentary aspects of debating, lobbying, bargaining and 
forming coalitions--- was nonetheless guided through with a strong influence of the 
United States. As a commentary points out, “as if to underline the point, the American 
ambassador was actively ‘working the floor’ during the proceedings.205”      
 
Some elements for possible contradiction are contained, as seen in the tension 
between Article 7 that provides the state “shall observe the United Nations Charter, 
international treaties and conventions that Afghanistan has ratified, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” and Article 3 that provides that in Afghanistan no law 
shall contravene the “beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam”. Combined 
together with Article 121 which states “the Supreme Court, on request of the 
Government or the courts can review laws, legislative decrees, and conventions on 
their compliance with the constitution and their interpretation, in accordance with the 
law” may open possibilities for highly conservative jurists to neglect Article 3206.  
 
Another criticism that was drawn on the Constitutional Loya Jirga was the way in which 
decisions were made, preceding and during the Jirga. The draft prepared by the 
Commission originally envisioned provisions for a robust check and balance mechanism 
with a Prime Minister and a strong legislative authority, to provide accountability of the 
executive decisions made by the President. There were also provisions for a 
Constitutional Court to check on the Supreme Court (which at the time was dominated 
by Muslim clerics)207.  But this draft was substantially changed to reflect a strong 
presidential system through processes that did not ensure democratic discussion. 
Principle of democratic participation and norms, which is the guiding spirit behind the 
Bonn Agreement, was not reflected in the process as important as deciding on the 
content of the constitution. This was largely attributed to the fear that the President’s 
office had –--shared by the United States Envoy Khalilzad and SRSG Brahimi--- that 
open debates on the principles of the constitution will give occasion for Jihadist groups 
to hijack the debate regarding the relationship between the state and religion208. This 
trend for lack of genuine democratic consultations continued into the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga itself where the provisions for strong presidential system was forced through 
                                                 
205 Analysis and quotation from Astri Suhrke et al, “Conflictual peacebuilding: Afghanistan two 
years after Bonn” (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 2004), p 32.  
206 Tension between article 3 and 7 explained in William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan (London, 
Hurst & Company, 2006), p45-46. 
207 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The constitutional Loya Jirga”, 12 December 2003. 
208 Astri Suhrke et al, “Conflictual peacebuilding: Afghanistan two years after Bonn” (Oslo, 
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by non-elected members appointed by the President that formed a bloc to lobby and 
insist on what some saw as a Pashtun agenda. As a result, aggravated tensions based 
on ethnic line were reported209 and together with the widely publicized “scene” that 
depicted the tension between a modern female delegate and the former 
Mujahideens210, the Constitutional Loya Jirga left the impression of a country still 
heavily divided and governed by a rule other than one of democratic participation and 
dialogue. Nonetheless, considering the state Afghanistan is in, the Constitutional Loya 
Jirga’s accomplishments were regarded as a success and an acceptable foundation on 
which a state governed by the rule of law can be created in the long run.  
 
7.3 Elections 
 
Original timetable set in the Bonn Agreement envisaged the first democratic elections 
based on the new constitution to be held in June 2004, within 24 months from the 
Emergency Loya Jirga’s establishment of the Transitional Administration. However, 
several compromises had to be made to accommodate reality. Due to legal and 
technical difficulties (such as delay in voter registration) and security considerations 
(including delay in DDR efforts)211, the presidential election was delayed for several 
months and held in October 2004212. The general election was conducted separately 
from the presidential election, initially delayed to May 2005 and further postponed and 
finally conducted in September 2005 due to security concern213, logistical challenges 
and bureaucratic change. The scope was also limited to parliamentary election of the 
lower house and the provincial councils, leaving the planned district council elections to 
an undefined later date. As fair and competitive election of those who represent the 
population constitute a major requirement of a democratic state, these step were the 
most important steps of the political transition process. It was also the most 
                                                                                                                                               
International Peace Research Institute, 2004), p 30-31.  
209 Carlotta Gall “Afghan talks adjourn, deeply divided on ethnic lines”, New York Times, 2 
January 2004 
210 Amy Waldman and Carlotta Gall “A young Afghan dares to mention the unmentionable”, 
New York Times, 18 December 2003 reports of the Chair attempting to eject a female delegate 
who seized the opportunity to question the validity of treating some among the former 
Mujahideens who committed atrocities as rightful members in the democratic rule-setting 
process. 
211 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report 
of the Secretary General (S/2003/333), 18 March 2003, p5-7. 
212 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report 
of the Secretary General (S/2004/925), 26 November 2004, p4. 
213 Carlotta Gall and David Rohde “ Afghan President describes militias as the top threat” in 
New York Times, 12 July 2004. 
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challenging hurdles prescribed in the Bonn Agreement, the successful conclusion of 
which were to signal the end of the transitional process covered in the Bonn 
Agreement. In this Chapter, we shall review these two landmark elections in close 
detail. 
 
7.3.1 Presidential election (9 Oct 2004) 
 
As the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) composing local and international 
staff214 began the preparations, with the assistance of the international community ---
most notably the Electoral Assistance Unit of UNAMA---, many difficulties related 
mainly to logistical inadequacies of a country emerging from nearly a quarter of a 
Century of internal conflict were identified and they had to be tackled one by one. 
These included lack of census information, identification document of the electorate, 
setting guidelines and implementing voter registration not only across the country 
where large areas remain inaccessible by transport, but also in refugee camps and 
Diaspora communities outside of the Afghan border. As the deadline for the elections 
approached in spring of 2004, it was clear that timing and scope of the elections 
envisaged in the Bonn Agreement had to be accommodated to the reality the country 
faced.  
 
As the decision was made to conduct the Presidential elections first, administering of 
this election became a first testing ground for conducting a nation-wide election 
meeting all the requirements of a modern, free and fair election. The process for the 
presidential election was relatively easier than the general election that conducted in 
the following year, as the voting system ordained by the constitution allowed the same 
ballot paper to be used throughout the country. While 18 candidates stood for the post 
from throughout the country, the main contenders were the incumbent President 
Hamid Karzai and his chief rival from the Panjshiri-Tajik group, Yonous Qanooni.   
 
Partly due to high-level security provided with international support, days leading to 
the election as well as the actual polling day went free of any large-scale violence. 
Over 8.1 million ballots were cast, representing almost 70% of the voters registered. 
Enjoying all advantages of incumbency and the unquestionable support of the 
                                                 
214 Its secretary was Dr. Faruq Wardak (former head of the secretariat for the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga) and its principal technical advisor was Professor Reginald Austin (former chief 
electoral officer for the 1993 elections in Cambodia). 
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international community, Karzai won 55.4% of the vote ---even avoiding the need for a 
run-off election--- ahead by almost 40% to Qanooni who came in second with 16.3%. 
It was a clear victory for Karzai and those who supported Karzai’s administration that 
was equated by some to the confidence shown to the Bonn Process. Voter turnout of 
69.2%215 was remarkably high and showed the strong involvement and interest of the 
Afghan population in the process of the first democratic election in over 30 years. 
While some irregularities were found and much attention was paid by the media to the 
problems with the application of indelible ink used to prevent multiple voting, 
international monitors of the election certified it as being satisfactory in terms of 
process216.     
 
      Table 5: Key contenders for the Presidential election 
name ethnicity background Place of 
origin/ 
influence 
Received 
votes 
Hamid Karzai 
 
 
Pashtun Transitional 
Administration 
Kandarhar 55.4% 
 
Yunus Qanuni 
 
 
Tajik Close aid of Ahmad 
Shah Massoud 
Panjshir/ 
Northeast 
16.3% 
Haji Mohammad  
Mohaqeq  
 
Hazara Leader of Hazara-
Mujahideen group 
Central 
region 
11.6% 
Abdul Rashid 
Dostum 
 
Uzbek Communist? 
Northern Alliance? 
“warlord” 
Mazar-i-
sharif 
10% 
 
 
Although it took several weeks to ascertain legitimacy of the process, President Karzai 
emerged from this election with a strengthened position bestowed with popular 
mandate and he went on to restructure his cabinet. The new cabinet he formed in 
December 2004 was a stark contrast to the previous cabinets he headed. First and 
foremost, the Northern Alliance strongmen Fahim was removed from the powerful 
position of the Defense Minister ---which many saw as a major obstacle to 
peacebuilding as Fahim was seen to be pushing his personal agenda more than that of 
a new Afghan government. Although this cabinet reshuffle also saw Ashraf Ghani’s 
departure, in general it was seen that Karzai supplemented Western-educated 
                                                 
215 Although some observers believed that the turnout rate was in fact much higher, as there 
seem to have been many double counting of voters and the number of voter base may have 
been inflated.   
216 UN expressed its overall endorcement of the process by reporting to the Security Council 
that “Afghanistan’s first Presidential election not perfect, but sets stage for journey towards 
vigourous democracy” in a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi on 12 
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technocrats in place of former Mujaheddins. The fact that most of them came from the 
Pashtun ethnic group was interpreted by some as Karzai’s gesture to pursue his ethnic 
agenda. Nonetheless, Karzai’s secure position as the popularly elected President was of 
vital importance to the forwarding of the transition process and it was hoped that with 
increased legitimacy, Karzai would be able to begin tackling more effectively with the 
problem of accommodationist approach to potential spoilers ---an aspect which we will 
examine in detail in Chapter 2 of Part IV---.         
 
      Table 6: Comparison of cabinet composition (key posts) 2001, 2002 and 2004217  
 
 
 
Dec. 2001 
As agreed in the 
Bonn Conference 
June 2002 
After the Emergency 
Loya Jirga/ as the first 
Transitional Authority 
Dec. 2004 
After Karzai 
winning the 
Presidential election 
Chairman/  
President 
Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai Hamid Karzai 
Defense Muhammad 
Qassem Fahim 
Muhammad Qassem 
Fahim 
Abdul Rahim 
Wardak  
Interior Yunus Qanuni Taj Mohammad Khan 
Wardak 
Ali Ahmad Jalali 
Justice Abdul Rahim Karimi Abbas Karimi Mohammad Sarwar 
Danish 
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah 
 
Abdullah Abdullah Rangin Dadfar 
Spanta 
Finance Hedayat Amin 
Arsala 
Ashraf Ghani Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi
Reconstruction Sardar Muhammad 
Roshan 
Hanif Atmar --- (merged with 
Finance) 
Economy Hedayat Arsala Ashraf Ghani Jalil Shams 
 
Public Health Sohaila Seddiqi Sohaila Seddiqi Mohammad Amin 
Fatimie 
Education Abdul Salam Azimi 
 
Yunus Qanuni Hanif Atmar 
Higher 
Education 
Sharif Faez Sharif Faez Ahzam Dadfar 
Culture and 
Youth Affairs 
Raheen Makhdoom 
(at this stage it was 
called “information 
and culture”) 
Raheen Makhdoom Abdul Karim 
Khuram 
Women’s 
Affairs 
Sima Samar Rahilla Sarabi Hosn Bano 
Ghazanfar 
Water and 
Energy 
(“To be named”) Ahmad Shaker Kargar Ismail Khan 
Mines Alim Razim Juma Mohammad 
Mohammedi 
Ibrahim Adel 
 
Observations/ 
characteristics 
 
 
 
Pashtun chairman; 
critical political and 
military positions 
held by Panjshiri 
Tajiks and other 
Critical political and 
military positions still 
held by Panjshiri Tajiks 
& other former 
Mujahiddens; Pashtuns 
Former Northern 
Alliance significantly 
diminished; further 
increase in Pashtun 
returnee 
                                                                                                                                               
October 2004 (S/PV.5055, SC/8216)  
217 Based on various public sources and with advice from Ludmilla Dadrass. 
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former 
Mujahiddens. 
returnees posted in 
key economic & 
financial ministries. 
technocrats; Ismail 
Khan brought to 
Kabul; Ghani depart 
cabinet. 
 
 
7.3.2 Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections (18 Sept 2005) 
 
For the Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections held on 18 Sept 2005, 
approximately 5,800 candidates (including 580 female candidates) were registered and 
2,707 candidates stood for the 249 seats in the lower house, the Wolesi Jirga. The 
electoral system adopted was an unusual 218  Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) 
system where candidates all register as individuals and the notion of political parties 
does not feature219. Each of the 34 provinces form an electoral constituency and the 
voters received two separate ballot papers to choose a single candidate in both the 
Wolesi Jirga and the provincial council. The provincial councils have between 9-29 
seats, depending on the size of the population of the particular province and a total of 
3,025 candidates stood for the 420 seats in the provincial councils.  
 
12.4 million people registered to vote and roughly 6.8 million voted, therefore making 
the voter turnout to be 49.4%. Kabul’s voter turnout was particularly low at 33%. This 
was a near 20% drop from the turnout for the presidential election the previous year 
and some attributed this to the growing disillusionment with the government, it was 
but still higher than in many Western countries. Seven candidates and a number of 
election workers were killed during the campaign and several others survived 
assassination attempts. Scattered violence occurred on the day of the election, 
resulting in death of at least 12 people. 19 polling stations were attacked and a rocket 
attack was made to the United Nations compound in Kabul but worse that was 
expected did not happen and the first general elections were completed with the 
approval of international monitors. Some irregularities were found but not deemed 
systematic or widespread and at a level that monitors considered not affecting the 
integrity of the elections.   
 
                                                 
218 SNTV electoral system is used only in Jordan, Vanuatu, and the Pitcairn Islands (according 
to Mark Sedra & Peter Middlebrook, “Beyond Bonn: Revisioning the international compact for 
Afghanistan” in Foreign Policy in Focus, November 2005)   
219 This reflected a strong and deep-rooted distrust for party systems shared by the President 
and other key policymakers in the administration. 
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As the result of this day’s election, members were elected for the 249 seats in the 
Wolesi Jirga ( Lower House) out of which 68 were female220 and for the Provincial 
Councils which has total of 420 delegates, 29 female candidates won their seats221.  A 
detailed study of the composition of the first elected members of the Wolesi Jirga 
published by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit in Kabul222 describes a 
highly fragmented Wolesi Jirga, detailing the following distribution of affiliations: 
                 
                 Table 7: Orientation of elect Parliamentarians  
 
      Stance towards government 
Pro-government 81 
Pro-opposition 84 
Non-aligned 84 
                 
                   Ideological orientation 
Conservative/ Fundamentalist 66 
Moderate/ Traditionalist 47 
Liberal/Left 43 
Independent 93 
 
                   Ethnicity 
Pashtuns 118 47.4% 
Tajiks/Aimaqs 53 21.3% 
Hazaras 30 12.0% 
Uzbeks 20 8.0% 
Others 28  
 
 
Of particular concern was that the result of the election sent a mix of individuals to the 
Wolesi Jirga and the provincial councils, including many well-known warlords and 
jihadists still relying heavily on the power of the gun and several with past human 
rights abuse allegations, guaranteeing their robust presence in the legislative 
presence223. This happened despite many provisions to prevent this and efforts made 
by the election monitoring body and therefore attracted criticism and concern 
especially from observers abroad. However, it could also be said that such composition 
is representative of Afghanistan as it stands today and the challenge is intensified to 
face this democratically elected legislature. This had a large impact on the 
government’s ability to guide through reform and enact laws in this critical phase of 
                                                 
220 Of which 19 were elected without the benefit of the quota for female. 
221  Andrew Wilder, “A house divided?: Analysing the 2005 Afghan elections” (Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005), p. 12. 
222 Ibid, p5-14. 
223 Report of the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit quotes an analysis saying that the 
National Assembly “will include 40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 members 
who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers, and 19 members who face serious 
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national framework formulation. But after almost a year that the executive branch of 
the government operated by passing presidential decrees, it was a necessary step to 
move to parliamentary check and balance, even if this slowed down the process of 
reform and brought in its own complication. 
  
8. KEY AREAS OF INTERVENTION 
 
As the landmark political events moved the country step by step towards full statehood 
with increasing level of legitimacy, several factors impacted the process in particular as 
they were underpinning the success or failure of the transition process. In this Chapter, 
we shall examine three key areas of intervention that ran through the Bonn Process as 
a background to the political developments we reviewed in the previous Chapter: (i) 
strengthening the rule of law (security sector reform & judicial reform); (ii) countering 
the opium cultivation and production; and (iii) reconstruction and development224. 
Examination of developments in these inter-related and mutually influencing factors 
will further elaborate the narrative reconstruction of the Bonn Process, and prepare us 
to proceed to the next Part where the results of Process will be assessed.  
  
               Figure 4: Key areas of intervention225 
 
             
                                                                                                                                               
allegations of war crimes and human rights violations.” (Ibid.) 
224  These three particular areas are chosen ---from many other important areas of 
interventions--- for analysis for the purpose of this dissertation on the grounds that the result of 
interventions in these areas ---whether adequate or inadequate--- had great baring on the 
relative success and failure of the Bonn Process assessed in Part IV. By referring to them as 
“key” areas, it is not meant to signify that these were identified as three areas of the highest 
priority ---whether in terms of conceptualization or in terms of resource allocation--- although 
they have featured in various statements made by the Afghan government and international 
community as key priorities.      
225 Figure conceptualized and created by the author. 
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8.1 Strengthening the Rule of Law  
 
8.1.1 Security sector reform226 
 
Of the various key areas discussed in Bonn and built into the resultant Agreement, 
matters related to security was arguably the weakest in terms of having clear vision 
and outlining concrete steps. Other than general reference of determination to the 
termination of conflict outlined in the Preamble227, the Agreement prescribed little on 
how a country emerging from quarter of a Century of conflict was going to make a 
transformation from a land governed by arbitrary use of force to a society based on 
the rule of law and non-violent means of resolving differences. This was largely due to 
the fact that combat operation with the Taliban was still ongoing at the time of the 
“peace talks” and the fact that one side of the warring party (the Northern Alliance) 
was able to come onto the negotiating table without clarifying what steps it will take to 
disarm as the combat was still continuing. Another factor that contributed to this was 
that the United States was determined to continue pursuing military operations in the 
context of the War on Terror with the help of certain elements in Afghanistan after the 
conclusion of the “peace talks” and the establishment of the interim governance 
structure. It is important to note that, infusing the ideal of the rule of law in the future 
state of Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement gives a timetable related to establishing the 
new constitution ---which will provide the legal framework--- but id does not command 
how the spirit of the rule of law will be respected. It does not discuss concrete ways or 
timing of the demilitarization of armed forces which is a prerequisite to the attainment 
of a society governed by the rule of law. In stark contrast to the clear vision on 
governance structure with time-bound steps described for the path to full political 
legitimacy, the agreement reached in Bonn is almost silent on the steps that would be 
                                                 
226 The term “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” in the post-Taliban Afghan context was used to 
include all major rule of law issues, therefore the sub-grouping under SSR were “Military 
reform”, “Police reform”, “Judicial reform”, “Counter-narcotics” and “DDR” and these comprised 
thematic working groups under the government. As pointed out in Albrecht Schnabel & Hans-
Georg Ehrhart (eds), Security sector reform and post conflict peace building (United Nations 
University Press, 2006), the concept and scope of activities considered to be SSR depends on 
the particular country context. In this dissertation, issues relating to security institutions (i.e. 
military and police), the opium factor, and the judicial institutions are identified separately, 
while emphasizing the inter-related nature, so as to also see the linkage of these issues with 
the other important key aspect of rebuilding people’s lives. 
227 Preamble paragraph 2 of the Bonn Agreement reads “Determined to end the tragic conflict 
in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for 
human rights in the country,” (for full reference on the Agreement, see footnote 148 on page 
77.) 
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taken for the country to reach a state where armed forces and means of legitimate 
coercion will be monopolized by the state with appropriate civilian control. 
 
This feature of the Bonn Agreement created a huge challenge in the years that 
followed when it had to be implemented. For many ordinary citizens of Afghanistan ---
especially in the troubled provinces in the South but also elsewhere in many provincial 
setting outside of Kabul--- the biggest hindrance in their pursuit for stability and 
prosperity was created by the existence of armed presence that occupied self-
appointed commander/police structure that continued to impose the rule of the gun228. 
Some of them were even officially re-appointed under the Transitional Administration, 
at least in the initial period. As SRSG Brahimi commented in his speech to the National 
Symposium on Security Sector Reform held in July 2003, uncontrolled existence of 
gunmen abusing the population ---by establishing illegal checkpoints, taxing farmers 
and traders, intimidating, robbing and raping--- most often “wielding the formal title of 
military commander or police or security chief” 229 , and the central government’s 
inability to stop this, was severely limiting the legitimacy of the central government and 
the citizen’s support for it. 
 
After over two decades of internal conflict and total lack of the appreciation for the rule 
of law, Taliban was far from being the first and only actor that imposed the rule of the 
gun in Afghanistan. There is ample documentation regarding gross abuses that 
occurred especially from 1992 onwards when Mujahideens entered internal factional 
fights and tried to undermine each other230. Also it is important to be mindful of the 
fact that a whole generation of Afghans grew up and survived in conditions where a 
Kalashnikov on the shoulder was the most common attire, and the ability to bring 
order through gunpoint was accepted as the only means of avoiding chaos. As many of 
these commanders who wielded influence in the local context in the pre-Taliban era 
were reinstalled without a clear commitment to change their style of imposing 
influence, lives of ordinary Afghans did not improve significantly in terms of security.  
                                                 
228 Important insight into Afghan citizen’s perception on matters related to security and other 
key priority topics, including one referred here in the text, can be gained from a report of a 
survey jointly made by a group of 12 Afghan and international NGO including CARE, Mercy 
Corps, Oxfam, and Save the Children called Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium 
(HRRAC) “Take the guns away: Afghan voices on security and elections” (July 2004, Kabul) 
229 http://www.unama-afg.org/ 
230 Rashid 2001, Nojumi 2002, Mark Ewans, Afghanistan: A short history of its people and 
politics (Harper Perennial, 2002). Also see brief reference provided in Chapters 1.2 and 1.3 of 
this dissertation.  
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Recognizing the paramount importance of progress in the Security Sector Reform 
where little direction was specified in the Bonn Agreement, once the implementation 
phase begun, key donors agreed to allocate lead assistance responsibility in the 
following manner231: 
 
        Table 8: “Lead nations” distribution for Security Sector Reform 
Military Police DDR Counter- 
narcotics 
Justice 
US Germany Japan UK 
 
Italy 
                                                        
 
Reform of the Security Sector in Afghanistan under the Bonn Process took place 
against above backdrop. Creation of a unified and legitimate national military and a 
proper police structure by bringing in various armed groups and individuals into these 
frameworks were very complex tasks, as seen also in other post-conflict peacebuilding 
process232. It is an enormous challenge to set up national structures, persuading 
various parts of the population while simultaneously providing basic infrastructure of 
security. But it should be noted that in the case of post-2001 Afghanistan, this difficult 
process was compounded by contradicting approach taken by the Coalition Forces in 
recognizing and providing training to certain militia forces in the context of War on 
Terror, outside of the national military or police frameworks233. Many structures were 
set up with the aim of strengthening security, some as part of the government’s official 
and permanent structure and others based on specific needs and assistance proposals 
for limited duration234 . This is well depicted in a figure prepared by the Afghan 
Research and Evaluation Unit in 2004 depicting the “security architecture” in 
                                                 
231 Distribution of responsibility was sketched out in a side-meeting among G8 countries on the 
occasion of the Reconstruction Conference held in Tokyo in January 2002 and subsequently 
formalized as a multi-sector donor support scheme in donors conference in Geneva held in May 
2002. Rubin et al attributes this to US government’s unwillingness to become involved in 
integrated multilateral “nation-building” efforts and an approach to allocate responsibility 
divided by sectors to other donors. (See Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada & Abby Stoddard, 
Afghanistan 2005 and beyond: Prospect for improved stability (Clingendael Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, 2005, p58.)  
232 Schnabel & Ehrhart 2006. 
233 Announcement by a US Military spokesman on7 February 2004 stated that “A new Afghan 
militia force” was being equipped and trained by the Coalition Forces as “temporary force” to 
help in operations against Taliban and Al-Qaida. Also see reference in Chapter 7 on dual 
international military presence.  
234 In particular, recruitment of unauthorized militia and creation/training of ad-hoc armed 
structure for provision of security to the Coalition Forces paused serious problems for 
disarmament and establishment of centrally administered rule of law, as pointed out by SRSG 
Brahimi in his briefing to the Security Council on 19 July 2002.   
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Afghanistan during (and beyond) the Bonn Process. As we shall see later in Part IV, 
Chapter 2.2, this provided grounds for some problems of duplication and gaps and 
necessitated better coordination.  
 
    Figure 5: Security architecture of Afghanistan in2004235 
 
Furthermore, in a conference held in Geneva in June 2002, the following vision of the 
Afghan armed forces was agreed, including by Defence Minister Fahim who was seen 
to be pausing serious obstacles to commencement of SSR. Although the details of the 
below plan shifted and changed over the following years, the vision of SSR aiming for 
an Afghan security sector based on respect for the rule of law and ethnic balance was 
finally agreed and the stage was set for implementation of reform in various areas.  
                                                 
235  Bhatia, Lanigan and Wilkinson, “Minimum investment, minimum results; The failure of 
security policy in Afghanistan” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul, 2004, 
reproduced in Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada & Abby Stoddard, Afghanistan 2005 and 
beyond: Prospect for improved stability (Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International 
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       Table 9:  Vision for armed forces of Afghanistan (as agreed in 2002) 
Afghan National Army 
(ANA) 
60,000 army  
(composed of 7 regional corps) 
8,000 air force 
 
Lead donor: 
US 
Afghan National Police 
(ANP) 
62,000 police 
12,000 border guards 
 
Lead donor: 
Germany 
 
Progress was slow and frustrating in all areas, although to differing degrees. The 
challenge for the army and police reform, as well as DDR, was enormous if one 
associated the end result as genuine progress on attaining a culture based on the rule 
of law. But as this was not realistic, objectives were defined in terms of setting in place 
structures and giving training as a first step in the right direction. With such qualifier, it 
can be assessed that these three inter-related areas saw measurable progress in the 
course of the Bonn Process. Furthermore, Except for assistance to rebuilding of the 
military, other security SSR areas received relatively low prioritization and suffered 
chronically from low level of fund injection that reflected donor’s preference to spend 
for humanitarian assistance or reconstruction and development-related areas rather 
than areas related to the establishment of the rule of law236. 
 
The Afghan National Army (ANA) was established through a Presidential Decree in 
2002 as a voluntary, multi-ethnic force under civilian control and a unified central 
command, aspiring to become a 70,000-strong force to be fully operational by 2011. 
By the end of 2005, projected total troop was 43,000 of which 18,300 were trained for 
combat operations and deployed through the country. While they continue to suffer 
many of the challenges of weak institutional capacity typical for a fledging army born 
out of a rescued failed state, they became operational in fighting insurgency alongside 
Coalition Force troops or bringing security and order to some provinces together with 
ISAF237.     
                                                                                                                                               
Relations, 2005)  
236 For instance, Germany’s financial contribution for 2002 and 2003 in rebuilding the Afghan 
police force (which Germany was  the lead nation) was € 33 million followed by another sum of 
€ 48 million earmarked for the following years until 2007. This amount is considerably low 
compared to the funds provided by Germany to Afghanistan for humanitarian assistance which 
stood at €  420 million between 2002 and 2005. (Figures quoted from the German Federal 
Foreign Office document “Afghanistan: Beziehungen zwischen Afghanistan und Deutschland” 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Afghanistan.html) 
237 This include lack of training for remaining troops, equipment shortage and lack of various 
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The Afghan National Police was established with a vision to have general police and 
border police totaling 62,000. As Afghanistan never had a tradition of having a police 
to serve and protect the citizens, the challenge was formidable to begin with. In 
addition, many on the national police pay-roll remained more loyal to the local 
commanders and power structures than to the centralized police structure. The 
Ministry of Interior quickly became notorious ---and remained throughout and beyond 
the Bonn Process--- for its inability to control the performance of its staff and became 
subject of popular criticism238. Ali Ahmad Jalali, who became the Minister of Interior in 
January 2003, was credited to have brought some level of improvement but he 
resigned in frustration two years later for lack of support in countering spoilers within 
the system239. Nonetheless, it can be said that at least the initial unified national 
structure was successfully set up during the Bonn Process. The unaccomplished task 
during this period was to make this structure work as it should ---and this is an 
enormous challenge--- but the level of severity of the problems that exists in the 
Afghan police system at the end of the Bonn Process is common to other developing 
countries even without a recent history of conflict. To that extent, this can be seen as 
an achievement for the initial phase of the reconstruction of the country.  
 
Conducted under such context, efforts related to disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants (DDR) under the Bonn Process had to be limited in 
scope. It should be noted that DDR was arguably much more complex to proceed than 
establishing new army and police at the national level, as this topic touched on the 
core of Afghanistan’s troubled past and many questions unresolved in the Bonn 
Agreement. In addition, it was affected by several political factors. First, the DDR 
programmes suffered initial delay caused by what appeared to many as lack of 
compliance to the provisions of the Bonn Agreement by Defense Minister Fahim. By 
filling most senior-level positions from those of the Tajik ethnic group, Defense Ministry 
under Marshal Fahim was not seen to be fit to be the custodian of an ethnically-
balanced unified national force. As donors placed improvement of the situation in the 
                                                                                                                                               
institutional structures necessary such as logistics command/support. US government estimates 
ANA to reach full operational capacity by 2011 (United States Government Accountability Office 
(US-GAO), Afghanistan Security, June 2005) 
238 Mark Sedra, “Security sector reform in Afghanistan” in DCAF-SSR Yearbook, 2004. 
239 Jalali, a Pashtun former army colonel in exile in US was brought in as the Minister of Interior 
with strong US backing and progressively pushed the police reform. Rashid writes of Jalali: “He 
persuaded Karzai to sack several corrupt police chiefs and governors and joined up with other 
Pashtun reformers in the cabinet, such as Hanif Atmar and Ashraf Ghani to put pressure on 
Karzai to sideline the warlords and drug traffickers. As a result, Jalali made many enemies, who 
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Defense Ministry as a precondition for the DDR programme’s commencement, the 
process only begun in Autumn 2003240 by which time warlords had sufficient time to 
entrench their hold on power in the local context. Furthermore, the DDR programme 
was adjusted to be very limited in scope setting moderate targets, making critical 
exceptions to place a large portion of the former combatants not to fall under DDR 
obligations if they were classified to have joined the “Afghan Militia Forces (AMF)”. By 
autumn of 2005, it was reported that all heavy weapons outside of central government 
control were collected and a total of 61,991 AMF officers and solders were demobilized 
through the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), of which 60,522 entered 
reintegration process241.  
 
The desired effect and end-result of DDR ---i.e. to decrease the existence of weapons 
and to realize a society where the power of the gun does not prevail--- was hardly 
evident at the end of the Bonn Process and beyond. In a situation where armed 
opposition continued to destabilize the country and the commitment to abandon 
weapons and to move towards a society based on the rule of law was ignored at the 
highest level in the new government apparatus ---some of which were sitting in cabinet 
posts with their own armed forces in clear violation of the Bonn Agreement242--- it was 
difficult to make a case for any serious DDR efforts. The fact that the international 
community ---especially the United States--- was tolerating the position of these 
“warlords turned public officials” by not taking any clear action to alter this was 
sending a message to the general population that despite the calls for change they 
should accept their well-known cynicism to the rhetoric of a society governed by the 
rule of law when one actually had to live with the rule of the gun. Nonetheless, the 
achievements in the DDR area were important elements in supporting the claim that 
minimal room for expression of opinion without intimidation or use of force was 
                                                                                                                                               
eventually forces his ousting from office two years later.” (Rashid 2008, p205.)   
240 Pilot operation of DDR programme begun officially in area controlled by General Mohammad 
Daud in Kunduz province. (On ceremony marking the official commencement with President 
Karzai’s attendance, see Carlotta Gall, “Disarming of Afghans called vital to security” in New 
York Times, 26 October 2003.) 
241 Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme (ANBP), Update on 12 September 2005, available 
at www.undpanbp.org/weekly.  
242 Violating not only the Bonn Agreement but a tacit agreement with the US and UN, Head of 
the Northern Alliance Fahim took control of Kabul and maintained his forces in Kabul. The fact 
that he acquired the position of the Defense Minister and claimed that these were forces under 
his Ministry did little to persuade other Afghans or international partners to accept this. In the 
early phase of the Bonn Process, in particular in the context of holding of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga, his forces stationed in Kabul created a delicate power balance, only surmounted by the 
large presence of the US troops.       
117 
secured, which were seen as a precondition for the elections. As the ANBP neared its 
end in 2005, in recognition of the remaining problems caused by armed groups, a new 
programme called the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) was launched by 
the UN in June 2005 aiming to disband smaller groups of armed men who had not 
been affected by the earlier DDR efforts. This programme continued years beyond the 
Bonn Process. 
 
As already stated, the underlying cultural change that should accompany these reforms 
in the security sector apparatus did not happen even if the benchmarks set as criteria 
of success were attained. However, moving away from a longstanding culture where 
decisions were made through the use or threat of force towards a society based on the 
rule of law was never expected to be a quick fix. With this recognition in mind, the 
achievements under the Bonn Process in putting an end to arbitrary use of force and 
reestablishing national security institutions should be acknowledged for the initial, key 
steps accomplished.  
 
8.1.2 Setting up a functioning judiciary 
 
When reflecting on the values and principles forming the basis of the Bonn Agreement, 
one encounters a long list of complex and inter-related tasks: cessation of armed 
conflict and to bring all armed segment of the society under the national security 
institution framework; resolving conflicts not through force but through political 
processes; democratic procedures forming the basis of national decision making under 
which selection of leaders are reflection of public will; creating space for relief and 
reconstruction that would evolve into sustainable development of the country; meeting 
the basic needs of the citizens such as health and education and ensuring their basic 
rights including human rights. All these values and principles are reflected in the 
agreement precisely because they were not observed in Afghanistan for at least nearly 
two decades. The participants of the Bonn Conference ---firmly guided by the 
international community personified by SRSG Brahimi-- judged these principles to be 
indispensable in ending the current armed conflict, preventing future conflicts and for 
altering the dysfunctionalized state. It was clear that implementation of the Bonn 
Agreement and the principles underpinning it require profound changes in the way the 
society and its people think and operate. But all these principles required a functioning 
judiciary that was simply not present.  
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Of all other basic institutional challenges that the government of Afghanistan and its 
international partners had to attend to under the Bonn Process, the reform of the 
judiciary made least progress. While far from being perfect, Ministries of Defense and 
Interior went through profound changes and many of the benchmarks were attained, 
as we reviewed in the previous segment. The reform of the judiciary and international 
support to it was never able to gather such momentum, despite some voices 
highlighting the need to strengthen the institutions for responsible for justice243. The 
main reason for lack of progress or interest in judicial reform can be identified as the 
controversial Head of the Supreme Court Maulawi Fazel Hadi Shinwari, or at least what 
he symbolized of Afghan judicial institutions. Shinwari ---a religious conservative with 
close ties to Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, with no training as a judge or as a recognized 
Islamic law scholar--- was appointed to the position of Chief Justice in 2001 (before 
the adoption of the Bonn Agreement in December) by Rabbani who was the nominal 
President at that time. Karzai reappointed him in the Interim Authority and Transitional 
Government and despite public criticism for corruption and nepotism in the Supreme 
Court continued to defend Shinwari in the position even after the Bonn Period, mainly 
due to his political alliance with Shinwari which would grant him a stronger position 
vis-à-vis the religious conservatives244. Under Shinwari, the Supreme Court made many 
rulings contrary to the objectives of the Bonn Agreement and the spirit of the 
Constitution, being counter-productive from a peacebuilding point of view245. Given 
these conditions, the fact that the independent Supreme Court was one of the three 
entities established from the outset of the Bonn Process as a part of the Interim 
Authority, did not produce any positive outcomes and its minimal effectiveness 
symbolized the state of the judicial system so badly needed for a society governed by 
the rule of law rather than by the rule of the gun.  
  
Substantively, the Ministry of Justice was absorbed with its first main challenge i.e. to 
produce draft elements for the Constitution for discussion and decision at the 
                                                 
243 Italy, the designated lead nation on judicial reform always deplored how little other donors 
were supporting this sector, as the resources were insufficient to meet the needs 
244 Shinwari finally was removed from the position of Chief Justice after the newly elected 
parliament rejected his nomination put forward by the President in May 2006. (Carlotta Gall, 
“Afghan lawmakers review court nominees” and “Afghan parliament rejects Chief Justice 
nominee” in New York Times, 17 & 28 October 2006 respectively.)  
245 An obvious example was widely publicized when the Supreme Court declared on 14 January 
2004 ---only several weeks after the adoption of the new Constitution--- that airing of a 
performance of a female Afghan pop singer on Kabul television was illegal, announcing that 
“the Supreme Court is opposed to women singing and dancing as a whole and it has to be 
stopped as it is contrary to Islamic law”. (For detail of this account, see Alexander Their, 
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Constitutional Loya Jirga, working together with the Constitution Drafting Committee. 
This task took up most of 2002 and 2003 and once the Constitution was adopted, 
various decrees and legislations had to be adjusted or issued to translate the spirit and 
the provisions of the Constitution into legal instruments governing specific topics. While 
these legislative drafting work received international assistance and made some 
progress, lack of capacity and inefficiency institution in the justice institutions made 
their practical application extremely difficult.    
 
As symbolized by Shinwari’s case, one of the main problem was that the courts (of all 
levels) were filled with judges appointed in the old days246 who received no formal 
legal training other than on basic Islamic law and this needed to be redressed if the 
judicial system was to dispense justice based on the principles contained in the new 
Constitution. This problem was not limited to the judges. The problem of lack of 
appropriately trained judicial professionals applied more broadly to the system 
including among prosecutors in the Attorney General’s Office, defense lawyers and the 
Ministry of Justice officials responsible for legislative work and support. Training had to 
be provided to judges and prosecutors aiming at increasing their capacity to work in 
line with the new Constitution. Furthermore, the infrastructure required for the justice 
system to operate was in such shattering condition that the work had to begin at a 
very basic level of construction or substantive refurbishment of the Ministry of Justice 
premises, courts and in particular, the correctional facilities. These had to be 
accompanied by training for court and prison officials to ensure that their practice was 
meeting the minimum required standards specified in the UN standards and norms 
pertaining to these issues. As was the case with institutional capacity building efforts in 
the security sector, the assistance to justice institutions require substantial financial 
resources and time. But the reactionary orientation of the top judicial officials coupled 
with the independent nature of the Judiciary made the challenge in this sector even 
greater.  
 
An additional aspect that complicated the creation of a functioning judiciary is the 
prevalence of non-formal, traditional justice mechanisms in the country, especially in 
the rural areas247. While law making and the rule of law may be relatively effective in 
                                                                                                                                               
“Attacking Democracy from the bench” in New York Times, 26 January 2004.) 
246 Under Shinwari’s leadership and monopoly of power for appointment of judges (and no 
turn-around rights exercised by the President), “judges” with no legal training were even 
increased after 2001.   
247 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan: Female prisoners and their social 
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the urban areas, in the rural context ---which accounts for approximately 70 percent of 
the total population in Afghanistan--- local customs and tribal law practices still 
prevail248. This creates problems, as some of the tribal and traditional codes are not in 
accordance with human rights principles249. As discussed earlier in Chapter 7.2 with 
reference to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the Constitution itself presents some 
problems. Although some aspects of the Constitution attempted to address the 
problem of traditionalism inherent in the application of conservative interpretation of 
Islamic law and tribal laws, it failed to resolve the fundamental problem as it included 
provisions stating that the courts will apply the Sharia in cases relating to personal 
matters250 and that “no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy 
religion of Islam”251 and the Supreme Court is given the ultimate authority to review 
applicability of various legal provisions. 
 
Despite above and the slow pace of real progress in judicial reform, by the end of the 
Bonn Process Afghans and their international partners had quite a list of achievements 
to be proud of, at least in terms of developing the formal legal structure. This included 
the adoption of the Constitution; passage of over 20 key legislations between 2002-
2005 governing many key areas such as taxation, customs, investment, banking, 
election, public procedures, criminal procedures, counter-narcotics, prisons and 
detention, media, telecommunication etc252 as well as fully refurbished and functional 
courts in several provinces and correctional institutions in 6 pilot provinces253. It was to 
be expected that the underlying change required in strengthening of the professional 
capacity of the judiciary would take much longer beyond the Bon Process. Nonetheless, 
it should be noted that if the commitment for changing Afghanistan into a society 
governed by the rule of law is to be translated into reality progress in this sector was 
most essential and very little was attained in this field in the initial years of the post-
2001 peacebuilding in Afghanistan mainly due to political consideration of the fragile 
administration that felt the need to keep conservative allies in the Supreme Court.    
                                                                                                                                               
reintegration (March 2007), p.15.  
248 UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: 
Rule of Law and the Search for Justice, Chapters 4 and 5. 
249 J Alexander Their, Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, 1 September 2004, 
(http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/reestablishing_the_judicial_system_in_afghanistan/) 
250 Article 131 of the Afghan Constitution 
251 Article 3 of the Afghan Constitution 
252 Afghanistan Legal Documents Exchange Center (ALDEC) provides reference to many Afghan 
legal instruments translated into English (www.afghanistantranslation.com) 
253 Information on support to the improvement of judicial institutions can be obtained from 
www.unodc.org. 
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8.2 The opium factor 
 
While the challenges described above in dealing with unauthorized armed groups and 
integrating them into legitimate national security institutions were formidable, they 
could be referred to as standard sets of very difficult challenges faced in most post-
conflict situations. What made the case of the Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding 
process under the Bonn Agreement uniquely complicated was the fact that the country 
had a major illicit economy based on the opium poppies254. This factor, carrying the 
weight of Afghanistan’s troubled past two decades of conflicts and political manoeuvres 
by external parties, will be examined in detail as the opium economy impacted on the 
very nature of Afghanistan’s state rebuilding process by generating revenue that 
helped sustain activities to destabilize the country. This included not only activities 
widely reported as acts of terrorism but also criminal behaviours conducted by figures 
(sometimes militias but some also unarmed) enriched by revenues generated from the 
drugs trade. Comment attributed to Yousuf Pashtun, the Governor of Kandahar 
illustrates the point: “Eighty percent of the crimes are being committed by local militias, 
commanders, and the police rather than criminals, so the Taliban are not to blame for 
everything.”255 
 
Although Afghans can tell you about their “traditional use” of poppy, it was by no 
means a practice explaining the place of opium in the Afghan society today256. To 
understand the way the opium economy has gained its central place in Afghanistan, 
the best place to start the analysis is in the 1980s when it was introduced as a means 
of generating resources to partially support their operations in a context where no 
legitimate economy existed. This was done by various groups of the Mujahideen with 
the aid of its external supporters257. 1988/89 increase in cultivation ---which can be 
                                                 
254 Illicit access to natural resources (such as gem stones, timber, wildlife etc) contributes in a 
similar manner to financing of continued armed conflicts. Bringing such resources under control 
is critical for the viability of the post-conflict phase. Brahimi report notes this problem as 
follows: “A growing number of reports … highlighted the fact that would-be spoilers have the 
greatest incentive to defect from the peace accords when they have an independent source of 
income that pays solders, buys guns, enriches faction leaders… where such income streams 
from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other high-value commodities cannot be 
pinched off, peace is unsustainable.” (Brahimi Report, para 22)     
255 Ahmed Rashid, “Drugs are good for war”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 October 2003. 
256 UNODC, The opium economy of Afghanistan: An international perspective (United Nations, 
2003), p81-144. 
257 Such account is given from several Afghans who dealt with the issue during the 1980s and 
1990s. While no publicly available source explicitly indicates that external governments 
supported Mujahideen factions to engage in poppy cultivation (or that the resources they 
122 
seen as the beginning of large scale cultivation (producing over 1,000 metric tons per 
year 258 ) that continued and increased for the next decade--- coincided with the 
beginning of the winding down of the resistance against Soviet occupation and the 
demise of the Soviet Union which meant decrease in financial support from external 
sources. At least from the viewpoint of one of its major ---if indirect--- financer i.e. the 
United States, the Cold War was over and there was no longer a reason for the only 
remaining world superpower to continue to subsidize the Mujahideens259. What was left 
was a country fiercely fought over by rival factions of the Mujahideen movement, 
ready to escalate into a full-scale civil war 260 . Afghans rejoiced for the Soviets 
departure but other than the joy this symbolic “victory” brought, there was little to be 
hopeful of future. The country was in a state of despair with no viable economy or 
state structure, war-torn and lacking basic infrastructure such as roads or other 
transportation networks, electricity or other power source, water irrigation or basic 
sanitation mechanism, all of which were either non-existent in large parts of the 
country even before the conflict or destroyed during the preceding decade of conflict261. 
To complement the picture, there was little to indicate the possibility for a change to 
the better ---without substantial external support at rebuilding the country---, as state 
institutions and administrative structure completely disintegrated, leaving no legal 
framework, capacity to ensure security, or providing health and education services.  
 
For an average farming family ---which constitutes a vast majority of the Afghan 
society262--- faced with lack of seed and water supply as well as viable market for the 
                                                                                                                                               
contributed were used to enable poppy cultivation and trafficking), various reports indicate that 
most external supporters were well aware of the fact that this was being done by the 
Mujahideens to generate resources to continue waging the war against USSR. Some observers 
including Ahmed Rashid goes further in his analysis to attribute active encouragement and 
engagement by ISI (Rashid 2001, 120-122 & Rashid 2008, p319). At minimum, we can say that 
external supporters were tacitly condoning this action with good knowledge of what was 
happening in Afghanistan.   
258 UNODC 2003, p81. 
259 Although there were voices within the US government objecting withdrawal of US assistance, 
warning of the consequences for walking away without finding a solution to the Afghan conflict. 
See for reference, reports by Peter Tomsen who served as the US Ambassador to the Afghan 
resistance titled “Afghanistan-US interests and US aid” dated 18 December 1992 and “Central 
Asia, Afghanistan and US policy” dated 27 February 1993 (as quoted in Coll, p219) as well as a 
cable from Edmund McWilliams in US Embassy in Islamabad to the US Secretary of State dated 
5 February 1993 (as quoted in Coll, p263). 
260  Fierce rivalry between various Mujahideen factions, especially between Hekmatyr and 
Massoud, existed already in the 1980s (Coll; Rashid 2001) but the overarching goal of fighting 
the Soviets rendered these dynamics more as under-surface power struggle within the loosely 
coordinated resistance movement. 
261Maley 2002, p85-283.   
262 Percentage is difficult to obtain during the conflict period but in the official statistics from 
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produce or functioning monetary economy, where even subsistence farming was 
difficult263, the only “helping hand” offered was from organized criminal groups or their 
local agents. The opium poppy buyers would come to the villages, provide seeds, lend 
money that the family required to sustain until next harvest to be paid back in poppy 
harvest, provide farming equipment required, come and pick up the produce in 
exchange for cash. No other produce attracted such demand and services. Also, 
though not applicable to fertile grounds in the South and South East, in some parts of 
the country the inhospitable conditions of their farming land made poppy the only plant 
that grew well. From the viewpoint of the suppliers of the global illicit drugs industry --
-where transnational organized criminal networks are working to increase both supply 
and demand---, Afghanistan’s lawlessness and destitute of its population ensured a 
great playing field for increasing cultivation and production of opium-based narcotics 
which commanded high market value especially in Europe.  
 
As a result of a combination of these conditions, opium cultivation intensified in the 
post-Soviet period, reaching a new level producing over 2,000 metric tons per year 
steadily since 1991264. This continued throughout the 1990s marking gradual increase 
and as the Taliban control grew, so did the cultivation of opium. The Taliban leadership, 
aided by the Pakistani ISI, made intensified efforts to grow this industry that was the 
only source that the regime could gain foreign currency 265 . Production doubled 
between 1996 and 1999 reaching a record amount 4,600 metric tons in 1999. This 
made Afghanistan the world’s top supply of opium accounting for 80% of the global 
opium production. 
                                                                                                                                               
the 1970s indicate that 85% of the population lived in rural areas before the war and 
agriculture accounted for 68% of all employment in the country. (Source: Afghanistan 
Rehabilitation Strategy, Volume IV, p51 quoted in UNODC 2003)   
263 A report by the World Bank assesses the rural pauperization to be one of the main factors 
that fostered the opium economy in Afghanistan: “As Afghanistan failed, cultivating opium 
became a means of survival for rural communities. In a predominantly agricultural economy 
(agriculture was 53% of the economy) the degradation of agriculture and infrastructure and the 
disappearance of viable markets led to extreme rural impoverishment. More than half 
Afghanistan’s villages were bombed. Livestock numbers dwindled to a third of pre-war levels. 
Over a third of land simply went out of production. By 1991, Afghanistan had sunk to the 3rd 
lowest GDP in the world, and Afghans had joined Haitians and the Somalis as more chronically 
hungry than any other people. Even today many Afghans are still vulnerable to famine, and 
GDP per capita (even including opium) was no more than $310 in 2003. With high 
unemployment and few non-farm jobs, rural livelihoods and markets collapsed, and a shift in 
agricultural livelihoods strategies took place. Despite widespread cultural and religious aversion, 
opium production became accepted as a livelihood strategy.” (Christopher Ward and William 
Byrd, Afghanistan’s opium economy (The World Bank, 2004), p9-10)    
264 UNODC 2003, p81. 
265 Rashid 2001, p120-122. 
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     Figure 6: Histogram of opium cultivation in Afghanistan266  
     
 
A major change occurred in 2001 when the production fell dramatically from the 
previous year (3,300 metric tons), bringing down the total to 185 metric tons. This 
sudden and dramatic decrease was the result of a new policy of total ban of opium 
cultivation (but not trade) issued on 27 July 2000 ahead of the 2001-planting season. 
The reason behind this change in policy by the Taliban was interpreted differently 
among various experts. Some believed that it was Taliban’s attempt to give into 
international pressure in this front that they had less stakes as pressures increased 
surrendering terror suspects harboured in Afghanistan267; others attributed it to their 
growing radicalization and reassertion of Islam prohibition of opium cultivation268. 
Another intriguing speculation is that they reduced production in the face of abundant 
stockpile from the previous two record damp harvests (4,600 metric tons in 1999 and 
3,300 metric tons in 2000269) and the dropping price it brought. If this interpretation is 
true, it would suggest that within Taliban were strategist aware of global trends, as 
indeed the price of opium jumped ten-fold between 2000 and 2001 and the estimated 
revenue generated in 2001 was not smaller than in the previous year. Experts 
monitoring the opium cultivation trend in Afghanistan questioned sustainability as well 
                                                 
266 Source: UNODC. 
267 Kato interview with Bernard Frahi (UNODC Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
during 1998-2002), Vienna, January 2009; and also see accounts confirming this view by Cole. 
268 Several Afghan experts made this interpretation in conversations with the author in the 
post-Taliban period. 
269 The amount was already deliberately reduced in 2000 as the Taliban ordered reduction of 
cultivation by one-third in 1999. 
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as true driving factors for the sudden reduction, but it was to be better determined 
when (and if) the Taliban regime would continue the policy of opium-ban in the 
following years270. However, this assessment became impossible to make, as the 
Taliban regime itself came to an abrupt end by the end of 2001 and left the question 
over the motivation behind the dramatic policy change in 2000 subject to debate.       
 
The impact of opium cultivation and its relation to terrorism and organized crime in 
and around Afghanistan was recognized by the international community, at least to a 
certain extent, and the topic made its way into the Bonn Agreement271. Presidential 
Decree issued as early as in January 2002 declared opium poppy cultivation as 
categorically illegal272. Nonetheless, the Afghan transitional government as well as the 
international community was unable to deal effectively with this issue and the problem 
grew as one of the greatest challenges for the new Afghanistan.   
 
As the histogram above shows, production in 2002 jumped straight back up to the 
levels of late 1990s at 3,400 metric tons, it was as if 2001 never occurred. With the 
Taliban went their ban on opium which was seen, at any rate, to be unsustainable as 
no alternative means of livelihood were offered to the farmers273. In destitute caused 
by drought and ban on opium in the previous year, against the background of 
confusion and turmoil, many farmers planted what they did before in the vacuum of 
power and enforcement of any policy 274 . In 2003, the status remained largely 
unchanged but with an increase of 6% to 3,600 metric tons. Alarm signals were made 
by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), highlighting this increasing 
cultivation as a problem not only in itself but also as a problem that deeply affects the 
country’s security condition and course of economic development275.  
 
                                                 
270 Interview with Bernard Frahi (see footnote 264 above). 
271 Paragraph V. (3) of the Bonn Agreement states: “Interim Authority shall cooperate with the 
international community in fighting terrorism, illicit drugs and organized crime.”    
272 Serge Schmemann, “Afghanistan issues order taking hardline on opium production” in New 
York Times, 17 January 2002. 
273 UNODC 2002, p93. 
274  Some observers attribute more deliberate intension of Afghan power-holders in the 
resumption of poppy cultivation in 2002: “Northern Alliance commanders taxed all opium routed 
for export through Central Asia by traffickers. After the war ended, production exploded in 
Badakhshan-to the advantage of the Northern Alliance warlords.” (Rashid 2008, p209.)  
275 In an open debate held in the Security Council on 17 June 2003 (S/PV.4774) as well as in 
Afghanistan Opium Poppy Survey 2003 published by UNODC. On the day of the open debate, 
the Security Council issued a Statement by the President (S/PRST/2003/7) highlighting the 
urgency to tackle this problem. 
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Despite the adoption of the National Drug Control Strategy by the transitional 
government in May 2003 and the introduction of the Counter-narcotics Law in October 
2004 as well as intensification of donor support to the central government in 
addressing this problem, the cultivation of opium poppy increased in 2004 by 64% 
from the previous year to 131,000 ha producing 4,200 metric tons of opium276 . 
President Karzai began to refer to the problem as a top priority and declared a new 
“jihad against opium” in December 2004 277 , upgrading the Counter Narcotics 
Directorate (CND) to a Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) in his new cabinet structure 
following the Presidential elections of 2004. He also created the post of Deputy 
Minister of Interior charged with counter narcotics enforcement and placed a renowned 
former Mujahideen commander Mohammad Daud who was believed to be effective in 
bringing some control to the problem by the central government278. But despite all the 
efforts, in 2005, situation was only slightly better than the previous year at 4,100 
metric tons (-2.4%)279. Although there was a 21% decrease in terms of area under 
poppy cultivation ---which went down to 104,000 ha from 131,000 ha in the previous 
year--- and this was highlighted as the better indicator of the will and commitment of 
the Afghan farmers280. While there was logic to this argument, it was seen more as an 
effort to mitigate the not so good news overall. 
 
Considering these developments during 2001-2005, on the whole, it is often concluded 
that counter-narcotics was one area that the Afghan government and its international 
partners could not effectively deal with under the Bonn post-conflict transitional 
process. Why was this the case and what lessons are to be drawn from it? In assessing 
the “failure” of the government in addressing this problem during the Bonn Process281 
                                                 
276 In term of opium production this was 17% increase to 2003 but the 64% increase in the 
area under cultivation was seen to be the signal of intent of the population. (UNODC, 
Afghanistan Opium poppy survey 2004) 
277 Statement by President Karzai at inauguration ceremony referring to post-election priorities.  
278 Some observers questioned the appointment, alleging possible linkages of Daud himself or 
his family/associates with the illicit drugs industry but there were no clear evidences and it was 
also understood that the policy was intended to engaging and bringing into the national 
counter-narcotics effort, one of the local leaders with the ability to yield influence and bring 
effectiveness to police performance in counter-narcotics enforcement.    
279 As the production rate depends of yield which varies from one year to another influenced by 
weather conditions etc.  
280 Preface of the UNODC, Afghanistan Opium poppy survey 2005. 
281 The problem was also not contained ---rather deteriorated--- in the several years after the 
end of the Bonn Process as well. Production continued to increase: 6,100 metric tons (mt) in 
2006; 8,200 metric tons in 2007; and 7,700 mt in 2008. (Source: UNODC Afghan Opium Survey 
of respective years) Regional concentration of production became increasingly acute, as UNODC 
writes: “Almost 98% of the potential opium production took place in the south and south-west 
of Afghanistan in 2008, reflecting the distribution of cultivation. The opium production in 
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while most other areas succeeded282, the complexity behind this issue must be taken 
into account. In order to better assess this premise, it is important to comprehend that 
the narcotics problem in Afghanistan was inextricably connected to, exacerbated by, as 
well as contributed to, several other underlying problems of Afghan socio-political 
transition.  
 
First, slow and weak progress in reconstruction and improvement in ordinary people’s 
lives meant there was a substantial part of the population, especially in rural areas out 
side of Kabul, who could not see the “peace dividend” and had to or wished to turn to 
means of sustaining livelihood by being a part of the chain of opium economy. Many 
were involved in the thriving opium economy through cultivation of poppy, processing 
it into opium, guarding the production in clandestine laboratories, or trafficking of 
opium. In the international assistance community in Kabul, some dubbed ---with great 
cynicism--- the opium economy as “the only reconstruction programme that brought 
the needed impact” under the Bonn Process. By 2004, in most provincial capitals one 
would visit in Afghanistan there were conspicuous mansions or community centers that 
local enforcement officials will indicate as belonging to shady characters linked to the 
opium economy283. This was no surprise when considering the fact that the opium 
economy was generating resources equivalent to 50-60% of the official GDP284. The 
sheer magnitude of the economy was making it a central factor in the peacebuilding 
process, as keenly observed by Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani’s famous alarm, as early 
as in 2002, for what he saw as the emergence of a “narco-state”285. 
 
Second, the opium industry was able to entrench itself in the local systems and 
structures in the absence of the rule of law, particularly in the provinces, and this in 
turn further limited the chance for the central government to control the situation in 
the provinces. In most provinces, the revenues generated from the local opium 
                                                                                                                                               
Hilmand alone (5,397 mt) was higher than Afghanistan’s total production in 2005 (4,100 mt)”  
(UNODC Afghan Opium Survey 2008) 
282  President Karzai himself expressed frustration that this was one area ---only next to 
insurgency and security threats in certain parts of the country--- that lacked progress he had 
sought. (Expressed in a meeting with UNODC representatives in August 2005)  
283 While some of these accounts by locals may not have been substantiated, quick and large 
accumulation of wealth was difficult to explain by the known economic activities available.   
284 For instance, in 2004 an estimated US$ 2.8 million was generated in Afghanistan from 
opium export to neighbouring countries and this was equivalent to roughly 60% of the official 
GDP of the country in 2003 (US$ 4.6 billion). In 2005, the figures were US$ 2.7 billion and 
52%. (Source: UNODC Afghan Opium Survey of 2004 and 2005) 
285  Ashraf Ghani, “Where democracy’s greatest enemy is a flower”, New York Times, 11 
December 2004. 
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economy was more than sufficient to influence key players in the provincial 
government and other powerbase. This meant corrupt and illegal practices could be 
the basis for reconstruction rather than good governance and fair and transparent 
efforts at rebuilding the shattered economy. It was a typical vicious circle. To the vast 
majority of the Afghan population who were aware of these practices by power holders, 
the ideals stated by the reconstruction programmes sounded dishonest and hallow. It 
also allowed some influential provinces to have its own source of finance ---at least 
from the viewpoint of its leaders--- and this meant even less obedience to the policies 
of the central government in Kabul. In this way, the opium economy also facilitated 
further fragmentation of the country between Kabul and the provinces.   
 
Third, the revenues generated by the opium economy was also used to finance 
insurgency and other activities intended to destabilize the government and its efforts in 
peacebuilding286. As stated elsewhere in this dissertation as well, security threats which 
the central government ---even with the support of the international partners--- failed 
to clamp down presented the biggest obstacle for genuine peacebuilding. This was 
made possible largely by revenues generated by the opium industry287. And the opium 
industry was able to flourish precisely because there was instability and limited 
capacity of the central government in establishing the rule of law. One side of the 
problem was the cause as well as the consequence of the other and it was difficult to 
lay an effective hand on either of these two interrelated problem which remained 
unresolved through out the Bonn Process.    
 
After reviewing the above factors and dynamics related to the Afghan opium economy, 
one is bound to ask: If the nascent Afghan government is unable to get the country 
out of the viscous circle of domination by the opium factor, why could the international 
community not help more, if they were aware of the formidable implication of the 
opium industry to the entire peacebuilding effort? We shall revert to this question in 
Chapter 2.1 of Part IV when the question of warlordism is discussed.  
 
                                                 
286 Like all efforts to prove financing of terrorism, it is difficult to find legal evidences of linkages 
to prove this point. However, this point which is clear from circumstantial evidences and broad 
range of analysis, is stated as the assessment by the Afghan government, the United Nations as 
well as by many international partners. See for instance, the Presidential Statement 
“recognizing the link between illicit drug trafficking and terrorism” (S/PRST/2003/7) following a 
briefing by the UNODC Executive Director in an open debate on the topic of the Security Council 
on 17 June 2003. (S/PV.4774, SC/7795)  
287 As well as external support. 
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8.3 Reconstruction and improving lives 
 
Although this dissertation is written with an intended focus on political and security 
aspects of the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Afghanistan, a brief reference 
must be made on reconstruction and development efforts made to improve the lives of 
ordinary Afghans. Despite all the emphasis on political and security aspects of the 
Process, it was well recognized that without the reconstruction of national economy 
and planting of seeds for sustainable development, there was no chance for the post-
conflict peacebuilding to succeed288. In this segment, a brief review will be made on 
the achievements and challenges in this area during the Bonn period, with a view to 
assessing its success both in terms of state institution building and improvement in the 
lives of ordinary Afghans. 
 
In addition to the socio-political damage that the new state had to deal with discussed 
in the previous segment, Afghanistan had to begin in 2001 to rebuild an economy 
devastated with tremendous loss generated during 1978-2001 estimated to be as high 
as US$ 240 billion in terms of destroyed infrastructure and vanished productivity289. 
The challenge was formidable in every respect; from a dysfunctional financial policy 
marked with years of hyperinflation, no functioning banking system, no taxation 
mechanism including customs, resulting in no revenue for the government. Despite all 
this, rebuilding of state institutions in the economic sector attained great success. From 
the initial stage of the Bonn Process, the Afghan government’s capacity in financial and 
reconstruction benefited tremendously from two leading figures: the Minister of 
Finance Ashraf Ghani290, and Hanif Atmar, the Minister of Reconstruction and Rural 
Development (MRRD). With education and previous professional employment in the 
West, these figures were fluent in English, highly articulate, apt in western-style policy 
formulation, and well aware of the demands of the international donor community. In 
particular, under Ghani’s leadership, impressive progress were attained such as setting 
up of the Central Bank, introduction of the new currency ---Afghani---291, formulation 
                                                 
288 Although many observed that the US administration under President Bush embraced the 
need for state building only late in the process (in 2003) after initial stage of efforts to distance 
US from anything that had to do with nation-building. (Rashid, 2008) 
289 Figure based on estimates made by the World Bank in 2002.  
290 For general background on Ghani and perception on Ghani during the initial period, see 
David Rohde, “An uphill road for Afghanistan’s money man” in New York Times, 30 June 2002. 
Rashid provides an in-depth analysis of Ghani and his mark on Afghan transition during 2001-
2004 reviewing Ghani’s achievements as well as his personal style (Rashid 2008, p178-181).  
291 John f. Burns, “For Afghan Central Bank, it’s out with the old money and in with the new” in 
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of the national development framework in 2003, and preparation of the national 
budget from 2004 based on government-led re-costing exercise that resulted in a 
public investment document entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s future”292. This document 
presented to the donors at the Berlin Conference held in April 2004, set economic 
growth targets in alignment with the Millennium Development Goals and defined 
public-sector spending priorities for the coming seven years. Donors endorsed the US$ 
27.5 million assistance package and  pledged $8.2 billion for the first three years of 
the program as requested. Afghanistan’s localized Millennium Development Goals were 
prepared and presented at the UN Millennium Summit in 2005293. Interim Afghan 
National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) was prepared just as the Bonn Process was 
coming to its designated end, clearly identifying priorities and plans for implementation. 
Significant economic growth has taken place in the urban centers, food security has 
improved and macro-economic trends were positive with an average 7% annual 
growth. The MRRD-led National Solidarity Programme and other nation-wide 
reconstruction programmes were assessed to be much more effective in accessing and 
impacting the provincial areas compared to other Ministry’s efforts in much smaller 
scale. Schools have reopened across the country providing education opportunity to 
4.3 million children. Over 3 million refugees repatriated voluntarily. These are just 
some of the major achievement made during the Bonn Process. The government 
appeared to be willing and able to make these assessments and develop coherent 
plans, at least at the top policy level. 
 
Yet there were many remaining challenges in this field as well. As the end of the Bonn 
Process neared and donors began to speak of a post-Bonn agenda, the Secretary 
General’s report of August 2005 stated: 
 
“Despite (…) achievements, the economic and development challenges facing 
Afghanistan remain daunting. In July 2005, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) reported that the economy grew at the rate of 7.5 per cent in 2004/05. 
Although IMF considers this pace to be steady, the Government has estimated 
that a minimum growth rate of 9 per cent is required to achieve recovery. 
Government revenues are expected to average less than $ 400 million per year 
                                                                                                                                               
New York Times, 7 October 2002. 
292 A Government/International Agency report prepared for International Conference, March 
2004 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the strategic path forward”  
293 UNDP, The state of human development and the Afghan Millennium Development Goals 
(http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/index.htm)  
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until 2008 – less than half of the projected expenditure for public-sector salaries 
and operations. The Government is not expected to be able to cover its 
operating costs fully before 2013. The uncertain security situation, together with 
underdeveloped legal and regulatory frameworks, continues to discourage 
private-sector investment. Every 30 minutes, a woman in Afghanistan dies of 
pregnancy-related causes. Twenty per cent of children die before the age of five. 
Life expectancy is 44.5 years, some 20 years lower than in all of the 
neighbouring countries. Only 28.7 per cent of Afghans over the age of 15 are 
literate and two million children (1.25 million girls) are still out of school. As a 
consequence of the limited access to safe drinking water and adequate 
sanitation (23 and 12 per cent of the population, respectively) preventable 
diseases remain prevalent.”    
 
It must be assessed that aside from the macro-level improvements, at the level of 
improving the lives of ordinary Afghans from their point of view, the achievement seem 
to have yet to be felt. Vast majority of the population, especially in the rural areas, 
have not experienced significant “peace dividend”. Reports indicated that many 
Afghans felt that live has not improved significantly during the first several years of the 
reconstruction process294.     
 
There are also debates among policy makers and practitioners from Afghanistan and 
its international partners, regarding how the future of Afghan economy should look like 
in order to generate growth. Some see primary focus on the agricultural sector, while 
others emphasize the possibility for Afghanistan to play a more strategic role 
emphasizing trade and customs and making full use of its position in the cross-roads of 
various trade routes in the region connecting central, south and east Asia295. Whatever 
the outcome visions would be, it is essential for the government to be able to bring 
security to all parts of the country so that security concerns do not affect negatively 
other aspects of development. Unfortunately this remains unresolved even years after 
                                                 
294 In a survey conducted in 2004 according to public opinion, at the national level, security 
(37%) and economy (29%) were identified as the “biggest problem facing Afghanistan”. At the 
local level, the first biggest problem was economy (28%), and the next issues of greater 
concern were electricity and education each 12%. (Source: The Asia Foundation: Voter 
Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections: A Report based on a Public 
Opinion Poll, July 2004, pp.17ff. http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/afghanvotered04.pdf 
) Furthermore, individual opinions indicate that many local people are still concerned about their 
security and economic problems. They feel that life has not improved as was expected in the 
beginning of the peace-building process. (Source: BBC News, Afghans speak out on NATO and 
security, February 7, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7232018.stm ) 
295 These points were discussed at the third annual Afghan Development Forum held in Kabul, 
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the end of the Bonn Process.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
4-6 April 2005.  
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1. THE BALANCE SHEET 
 
As the Bonn Process came to its prescribed end with the holding of the general 
elections in the autumn of 2005, various views were expressed regarding the 
achievements and shortcomings of the process, especially in the context of the London 
Conference held in January 2006 to determine the post-Bonn agenda296. The main 
occupation of the interlocutors at this stage was to determine what the transition 
process under the Bonn Agreement accomplished and what remained unaccomplished.  
 
The list of what was accomplished present a picture of an impressive path that this 
war-torn country emerging from 23 years of conflict has achieved in less than 4 years. 
The list would include:  
 
• Holding of two loya jirgas ---grand assembly--- that channeled views through 
traditional representation mechanism in the process of the political transition   
• Adoption of a new constitution, prepared with some level of popular 
participation  
• Holding of two, internationally-sanctioned nation-wide elections 
• Selection of the first democratically elected President 
• Setting up of the Parliament which includes 68 female members out of 249 in 
the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) and 17 female members out of 102 in the 
Meshrano Jirga (Upper House)297 
• Afghan National Army established, aiming at 70,000 by 2011 
• National Police structure established with 150.000 registered as police officers 
across the nation, with specialized units for counter narcotics and border 
police etc, with many officers received official training298   
• Over 20 key legislations passed including Police law, Criminal Law, Judicial 
                                                 
296  The conference adopted the Afghan Compact (www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/src 
Afghanistan%20Compact/The%20Afghanistan%) 
297 Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Office of the President: Composition of the 
National Assembly. (http://www.president.gov.af/english/composition.mspx) 
298 Approximately 54.000 received training from the US as patrolmen on short training basis of 
four to eight weeks. Advanced training provided by German forces for 6.300 police officers 
which include criminal, counter narcotics and management, of which 3.302 officers received 
training as Saran (commissioned) and  Satanman (non-commissioned) by December, 2005. 
Source: German Federal Foreign Office & Federal Ministry of Interior: Assistance for rebuilding 
the police force in Afghanistan (www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/Auswartigesamt-
rebuilding_the_police_in_Afghanistan-1.pdf) 
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procedural law, Counter Narcotics Law299  
• Steady rise in economic growth indicators300 
• 5.5 Million children are enrolled in school in 2004301  and many teachers 
received training302 
• Improvements in health indicators303 
 
Against the above, a list of what was unaccomplished ---or accomplished contrary to 
the objective of the Bonn Agreement--- include the following: 
 
• Prevalence of warlordism 
• Growing opium problem and the uncurtailed illicit economy 
• Rampant corruption (both at the central government level in the security 
institutions and the judiciary as well as at the local level) 
• Lack of control by the central government towards the provinces, especially 
regarding the control of revenues 
• Continued security problems and deteriorated security condition in large 
parts of the country  
• Continued culture of impunity for illegal activities, intimidation and disrespect 
for human rights and lack of rule of law in the lives of ordinary Afghans  
• Lack of prospects for viable socio-economic development for many ordinary 
Afghans throughout the country 
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the relative success and failure of the Bonn Process. 
                                                 
299  Source: Afghanistan Legal Documents Exchange Centre – Afghan Laws. http://www. 
afghanistantranslation.com/ 
300 For example, annual economic growth was reported to be 7.7% in 2004/2005. (see part 
8.3, p. 128 of this Dissertation: an extract from the Secretary General report of August 2005) 
and GDP per Capita has increased from US$ 683 in 2002 to US$ 964 in 2005. (Source: UNDP, 
Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, p.19). 
301 Source: UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, p.161. 
302 2,478 students were enrolled to complete a 2-year pre-service training programme in 2005 
to become teacher. In addition, the Ministry of Education has trained 1,646 new teachers 
through Teacher Training Centres and 23,132 teachers received pedagogical training in 8 
provinces. (Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Education (MoE): National Education Strategic Plan 
for Afghanistan 1385-1389, pp.34ff. http://www.moe.gov.af/National%20 Education %20 
Strategic%20Plan.pdf) 
303 Based on NRVA 2005 data provided in the Human Development Report of 2007, 64 per cent 
of children under 12 months of age have been immunized against measles, 73 percent were 
immunized against TB and 76 percent were immunised against polio. However, despite these 
improvements, health indicators in Afghanistan still critical and conflicting aspects have been 
reported. For example, the life expectancy at birth has been estimated 43.1 years in 2005 
which is lower than 44.5 in 2003. (UNDP: Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, p.26) 
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Indeed this was the central theme being discussed as the Bonn Process reached its 
end in 2005 to early 2006. The underlying question is, put simply, “was the Bonn 
Process a success?”. Many in Afghanistan and abroad expressed their views, and while 
most governments expressed very similar views that it was a great success albeit with 
many remaining challenges to be dealt with as priority in the post-Bonn phase, there 
were also highly divergent views, especially from within Afghanistan 304 . This is 
understood to be due to the fact that the answer to this question depends on the 
criteria that one judges the achievements and shortcomings against. If assessed for 
conducting landmark steps putting into place increasingly legitimate state structure 
within prescribed timelines, the progress under the Bonn Process can be called largely 
a success. These were remarkable steps many other post-conflict societies failed to 
navigate through so successfully and in such a short time frame. It is for having 
achieved these broad political objectives that the Bonn Process is hailed as a huge 
success by its proponents. On the other hand, if success is assessed for the progress 
made in making Afghanistan a society based on the rule of law where people can enjoy 
freedom from fear and freedom of choice, it is difficult to affirmatively answer the 
question without various qualifiers. This dissertation argues that both are factual, 
depicting different side of the same subject matter, like the people in a dark room 
touching the elephant describing it as something completely different. But it is 
necessary, then, to bring the elephant out to light without making categorical 
assessments without acknowledging the full picture. It is therefore important to assess 
the divergent criteria and their subsequent assessments. 
 
To arrive at a comprehensive assessment of the success of the Bonn Agreement, it is 
important to take into consideration its intended design. The Bonn Agreement was 
designed to have two distinct components. One, the fundamental principles expressed 
in the preamble segment; and the other, the precise roadmap of the concrete steps to 
be taken to move from termination of armed conflict to a normal governance structure, 
increasing the level of legitimacy and reflection of popular will at every benchmark 
juncture. This second component, contained in the body text of the Agreement, was 
the widely publicized sine qua non part of the Agreement, clearly defined with fixed 
timetable for attaining these sequenced steps. The first part relating to underlying 
                                                 
304  Department for International Development, Media, Public Opinion, and Peace 
Conditionalities in Post-Conflict Afghanistan: A study into local views on donor behaviour 
(December 2005) http://c4o.unitycode.org/me/PeaceConditionalities.final. 20060413.pdf 
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principles were not given any timeline for accomplishment and actual steps to be taken 
to reach these objectives were not specified. In other words, it is practical to 
understand that what could not be agreed beyond generality or envisioned to happen 
in the immediate transition phase was put into the preamble. Although they were 
reflected into the Agreement as these principles had to be the basis of the new Afghan 
state and society, they were not intended as immediate goals that could be 
implemented within a certain timeframe under which the Bon Process was operating. If 
one is mindful of this deliberate architecture of the Agreement, it becomes difficult to 
point to the failures of the Bonn Process as, in this way, it limited its immediate 
objectives to what was realistically achievable.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the expectations of ordinary Afghans, as well as the 
general public in countries supporting Afghanistan through financial or troop 
contribution, grew to assume that Afghanistan would be transformed at a more 
fundamental level into a society based on the rule of law, changing the daily lives of 
the ordinary Afghans. As the Afghan government, as well as its key supporters, was 
alerted repeatedly by the UN, as early as in 2002305, the difficulty of “managing 
expectations” was a serious problem306. As it will be discussed in more detail in the 
pages to follow, this discrepancy between what was said and what could realistically be 
done led to disenchanted assessment of the Bonn Process by many in Afghanistan.  
 
Another angle that needs to be acknowledged is whether Afghanistan managed to 
change its status as a “failed state”. One interesting reference is provided by the Fund 
for Peace, a think-tank that is annually rating the states based on indicators of 
vulnerability in the so-called “Failed States Index”307 . The states (defined by UN 
membership) are assessed against the following indicators covering social, economic 
and political vulnerability: 
 
1. Demographic pressures 
2. Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples 
3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance 
4. Chronic and sustained human flight 
                                                 
305 SRSG Brahimi’s brief to the Security Council on 6 February 2002 (S/PV.4469, SC/7295)   
306 Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan's Bonn Agreement One Year Later: A Catalog of Missed 
Opportunities, 4 December 2002. 
307 The US-based think tank, Fund for Peace, is conducting the annual rating in collaboration 
with the magazine Foreign Policy since 2005 (www.fundforpeace.org). 
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5. Uneven economic development along group lines 
6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline 
7. Criminalization and/or delegitimisation of the state 
8. Progressive deterioration of public services 
9. Widespread violation of human rights 
10. Security apparatus as ‘state within a state’ 
11. Rise of factionalised elites 
12. Intervention of other states or external factors 
 
At the end of the Bonn Process in 2005, Afghanistan was rated 11th most failed state, 
and it continues to worsen its standing every year thereafter rated as 10th in 2006, 8th 
in 2007 and 7th in 2008308. While the fact that this index started only in 2005 makes 
comparison with progress attained from the beginning of the Bonn Process or 
comparison with other countries assisted in post-conflict years difficult, the fact that 
situation is described to be worsening during and following the Bonn Process needs to 
be taken into account on the balance sheet for the process during and beyond Bonn.   
 
To the credit of the international community supporting Afghanistan, learning lessons 
from bitter experiences of post-conflict peacebuilding in the past where quick-fix 
elections were used as exit strategy and the international presence left behind a fragile 
state on its own prematurely, consensus emerged without much need for debate that 
the international support and engagement with Afghanistan needed to continue with a 
“post-Bonn agenda” beyond the initial transition process 309. There was a general 
recognition that holding of successful elections were not sufficient indicator for a 
mission completed310 and the widely reported security incidents of January 2006 ---just 
as the end of the Bonn Process was being commended--- including the detonation of a 
vehicle-borne explosive devise near a convoy of the Canadian PRT in Kandarhar that 
killed, among others, a prominent Canadian diplomat Glyn Berry, were sobering 
reminders of this fact311. In fact, the violent incidents increased after the elections and 
                                                 
308 Ibid. 
309 Such understanding was confirmed in an open debate of the Security Council held on 23 
August 2005 (S/PV.5249, SC/8478). It was also reflected in the Secretary-General’s statement 
at the London Conference (SG/SM/10331-AFG/286). Resolution endorsing the Afghan Compact 
and its annexes (S/RES/1659(2006)) was issued by the Security Council on 15 February 2006.  
310  See for instance, Security Council Presidential Statement issued on the occasion of 
confirmation of parliamentary and provincial councils election results (S/PRST/2005/56) and the  
311 The Canadian PRT incident occurred on 15 January 2006. Others included suicide bombing 
in the Spin Boldak district in Kandarhar that claimed the lives of 20 Afghans and severely 
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the inauguration of the parliament as reflected in the brief given by UN in January 
2006 stating that 13 out of the total of 19 suicide attacked over the proceeding 12 
month happened after the election between November 2005 to January 2006312. These 
all contributed to the abovementioned assessment by many governments that while 
the Bonn Process was successful, there was a great mount of work unaccomplished 
that needed to be tackled as a matter of priority. The following chapters will assess 
and analyze the dilemmas in post-conflict peacebuilding encountered during the Bonn 
Process that closely relate to the “unfinished business”.   
 
2. DILEMMA IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING  
 
Although the engagement under the Bonn Process is often referred to and commonly 
understood to be a post-conflict peacebuilding exercise, in fact it is incorrect to refer to 
the situation in the country as post-conflict in the strictest sense. Some degree of 
combat operations continued throughout the Bonn Process against the same “enemy” 
that the last tail of the “conflict” was waged against. Even at the end of the Bonn 
Process after four years since the declared end of conflict, some parts of the country 
were not effectively under government control ---even with substantial aid of the 
international military presence--- and destabilizing incidents have increased rather than 
decreased. Underlying this condition that leads many to question the success and 
viability of the Bonn Process, are several features of the process that should be 
analyzed in detail. This dissertation groups these dilemmas in two broad categories 
and this chapter will provide detailed analysis.  
 
The first strand of dilemmas are characteristic to the process in Afghanistan and it 
relates to the exclusion of the Taliban from the Bonn Process as well as the stance 
towards the warlords, both of which were affected by the primacy given to the War on 
Terror as opposed to the rebuilding of the Afghan state. This strand of dilemmas arise 
from what is referred to as conflictual peacebuilding and will include analysis on the 
perception of double standards by the Afghan administration and the international 
community as well as the difficult balance that had to be struck between the two 
distinct needs for security and justice.        
 
                                                                                                                                               
injured 20, detonation of a roadside explosive devise in Kandarhar that killed 3 Afghan National 
Army solders and 2 civilians, severely injuring 10 others.  
312 S/PV.5347, SC/8610. 
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The second strand of dilemmas relate to the involvement of the international 
community that may be also observed in other post-conflict situations. Examining the 
guiding principle such as the “light footprint” and “Afghan ownership” assessing the 
results, this dissertation will consider the impact of the demands placed by 
international donor agencies to the Afghan state institutions and its impact on the 
objective of the peacebuilding process. Looking at the issues of low capacity in the 
local state bureaucracy and lack of donor coordination, the dissertation considers the 
appropriateness of the policies pursued under the Bonn Process.    
 
             Figure 7: Key areas of “Dilemmas in peacebuilding” 
        
 
2.1 Conflictual peacebuilding313 
 
2.1.1 Exclusion of the Taliban and the supremacy of security considerations 
 
One of the characteristics of the Bonn Agreement, in contrast to other comparable 
agreements to end conflict and begin peacebuilding, was that it excluded one major 
party to the conflict ---the Taliban--- as pointed out by William J. Durch: 
 
“Afghanistan is unusual for its particular configuration of internal conflict and 
outside intervention in that conflict. In other cases, intervention may have 
                                                 
313  The term “conflictual peacebuilding” is adopted from Astri Suhrke et al, “Conflictual 
peacebuilding: Afghanistan two years after Bonn” (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 
2004) 
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focused on one of the warring parties (e.g. NATO air strikes against Serb 
forces in Bosnia and, later, Kosovo) but all parties were subsequently part of 
the peace settlement. In Afghanistan, intervention has driven one of the 
parties off the field: the Taliban and their al Qaida supporters are not part of 
the peace process initiated in Bonn, which was about allocating power 
among parties participating.314” 
  
In late 2001 when the post-conflict scenario was beginning to be sculpted out, bringing 
in Taliban onto the negotiating table was never seriously attempted315. As by not 
cooperating with the US and handing over Osama bin Laden and other extremists 
suspected of connection with 9.11 and other terrorist acts, the Taliban was considered 
the enemy US was fighting in the War on Terror. There was a brief attempt made, 
mainly at Pakistan’s request, to distinguish the “good Taliban” from the “bad Taliban” 
and to take separate action against them. But this attempt to bring in the moderate 
elements of the former Taliban regime into the peace process never materialized, 
partly due to lack of signs from among the Taliban to break off from the extremist 
movement, but also because of the policy of the government and its international 
supporters defining the Taliban as terrorists316.       
 
While it is undisputable that many atrocities were committed under the Taliban regime, 
they were not the first and only party to be blamed for such action in the recent past 
of Afghanistan. Their rule, of large part of the Afghan territory, from 1996 to 2001 
needs to be seen in the wider context of a prolonged civil war in a failed state where 
various power-holders committed atrocities and blatant human rights abuses and went 
unpunished. As reviewed in Part III, the Bonn Process allowed many individuals 
associated with these past crimes to take part in the new political process as legitimate 
actors317. It could be said that Taliban alone was excluded from this process and 
                                                 
314  Presentation by William J. Durch, Co-Director of the Project on the future of peace 
operations at the Henry L. Stimson Center titled “Peace and stability operations in Afghanistan: 
requirements and force options” (28 June 2003). 
315 Some attempts by Karzai to discuss with elements of the Taliban to defect the Taliban were 
reported around the recapturing of Kandahar in early November 2001 following US bombing 
(e.g. Jane Perlez, “Without US support, Pashtun rebel leader is finding few allies” , New York 
Times, 3 November 2001) but these were more symbolic gestures targeted at individuals to 
leave Taliban rather than to bring Taliban as a party to conflict on board.   
316 The Afghan government begun being reported to be negotiating with some elements of the 
Taliban shortly before the Presidential election (e.g. China Daily News, 26 April 2004 “Karzai 
invites Taliban to join in Afghan poll” (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
04/26/content_326254.htm) but no progress was made during the Bonn Period. 
317 For example, Abdul Rashid Dostum was a powerful militia leader, heading the Junbish-e 
Milli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), and is widely 
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although it is difficult to argue in terms of evidence-based causal relationship, it is 
highly likely that this led those associated with the Taliban to greater alienation and 
escalation of insurgency. Some counted among the Taliban movement are thought to 
be not any further from the ideals of the Bonn Process than their counterparts in other 
previously armed factions now considered to be a part of the legitimate power 
structure. Even as the Bonn Process moved from its initial shaky ground and 
proceeded to stages where wider inclusion of the society was essential, evidences 
suggest that little efforts were made to bring in the Taliban into the peacebuilding 
process, mainly due to the continuing War on Terror. Brahimi, after leaving the post of 
SRSG for Afghanistan, is quoted to have called the exclusion of the Taliban from the 
Bonn Process as “the original sin”, as reproduced below: 
 
“You also need to have a more consistent, substantive, long-term national 
reconciliation process. For example, all the Taliban should have been in Bonn. I call 
it the original sin. The absence of the Taliban was a big, big hole in the process. 
But it was not possible to have, because of September 11, because of the 
behaviour of the factions.”318   
 
The circumstances described above gave rise to two fundamental characteristics of the 
Bonn Process. The exclusion of the Taliban from the transitional process that fueled 
insurgency and the continued War on Terrorism that made the peacebuilding process 
under the Bonn Agreement a conflictual process. Due to these two characteristic 
features of the process, attaining and maintaining security had to be at the top of the 
agenda in the implementation phase of the Bonn Process, sometimes at the cost of 
other important objectives in the peacebuilding process described in the Agreement, 
such as state institution building, socio-economic development, accountability to past 
                                                                                                                                               
perceived to have committed gross violation of human rights and abuse of power in various 
capacity he served. Human Rights Watch documents Dostum and his commanders for looting 
homes, abducting and raping, acting against any existing regime. Despite these accusations, he 
was appointed as Chief of Staff to the head of the Afghan armed forces from the early stages of 
Bonn Process and was allowed to stand for the presidential election, raising questions of 
accountability to past conduct, including war crimes, by some observers. (Human Rights Watch, 
The Rule of The Gun: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to 
Afghanistan’s Presidential Election (September 2004), p4ff. 21ff.(Dostum) www.hrw.org/legacy/ 
backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0904/afghanistan0904.pdf; Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA): Corruption and Warlordism: A critical review of Corruption 
situation in Afghanistan (www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/11/27/corruption-and-warlordism-
a-critical-review-of-corruption-situation-in-afghanistan.html)  
318 Quote is Brahimi’s reply when asked by what Karzai is advised to do following his election as 
the President, from Mary Sack, “An interview with Lakhdar Brahimi” in Journal of International 
Affairs, 22 September 2004, Columbia University School of International Public Affairs. 
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action and promotion of reconciliation between different ethnic groups. This 
dissertation contends that equating the Taliban, a domestic insurgency, with 
international terrorists (Al-Qaida) in the context of the global War on Terror distorted 
the prospect for a more inclusive scenario and this had wide ramifications on the 
peacebuilding process. This framework was never altered during the Bonn Process and 
led to unignorable growth of “insurgency” movements to which some non-Taliban 
population joined due to dissatisfaction with the central government policy or 
Coalition’s military action. It should be noted that in the first place, Taliban as an 
Afghan entity is less a “supporter of terrorism” than one among various groups of 
contending warlords composed of Pashtuns albeit with extremist views. Furthermore, 
Taliban also embodied ---at least partially--- the Pashtun population’s frustration 
towards non-Pashtun attempts for political dominance after the withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops. By excluding the Taliban from the post-conflict transition process and 
not taking other measures to bring the non-Taliban conservative tribal Pashtuns solidly 
on board to the process, a sizable segment of the most numerous ethnic group of the 
country remained outside of the process they had to be a part of if post-conflict 
peacebuilding was to happen. It can be assessed that this was a situation where 
external conditions at the inter-state level (i.e. War on Terror) dictated the internal 
peace process at the intra-state level (i.e. not to include the Taliban in the peace 
process and therefore having to place security consideration above all other goals) and 
that in turn negatively affected the peace process to deliver desired result (i.e. security 
and lasting stable peace), with an impact back to both levels of analysis. 
 
2.1.2 Warlordism: power of the gun still proving supreme 
 
It goes without saying that there is a need for security and minimal order for the post-
conflict operation to be able to take place. But as is the case in most post-conflict 
situations not marked by the presence of robust international peacekeepers, in 
Afghanistan’s “post-conflict” peacebuilding phase, effective security ---where it was 
possible--- could only be provided by former combatants and warlords. This presented 
a critical dilemma as having to rely on parties to former conflict to provide security 
complicates the efforts of DDR and compromises authority of the central government. 
In the wider spectrum of the post-conflict society, such condition poses difficulty in 
relation to the accountability of the overall rule of law and the government's credibility 
in monopolizing and legalizing use of force; the basis in which the state generates 
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authority319. 
 
Earlier in Chapter 6 of Part III, references were made to the different priorities that 
existed throughout the Bonn Process held by the two distinct international military 
presences. We reviewed in that context that the objective of the US-led Coalition 
Forces was, above all, to fight the Afghanistan-front of the War on Terror i.e. capture 
and destroy Al Qaida and Taliban operatives320. And the stabilization assistance under 
ISAF was limited to Kabul for the first two critical years of the Process. This resulted in 
a huge gap in providing security to create space for reconstruction, and instead gave 
room for the warlords to entrench their influence in the provinces. Although many 
requests were made by the Afghan government and the UN to redress this situation, 
the basic strategy could not be changed without resources and commitment from key 
international contributors. Provision of security needed for reconstruction was not 
prioritized as it was seen to be too closely associated with “nation building” that was 
not favoured by the Bush Administration321. Furthermore, the Coalition Forces took the 
approach of depending on local allies in pursuing the War on Terror and this at times 
made them take actions contrary to the political objectives outlined in the Bonn 
Agreement. This had two important effects: First, the policy of the Coalition Forces that 
ranged over time from benign neglect to active support towards warlords and armed 
militias, contrary to the demobilization objectives, served to strengthen the dominance 
of the warlords in certain provinces; second, the spread of warlordism made life based 
on the rule of law illusionary for many ordinary Afghans and this in turn worked to 
undercut the legitimacy of the central government in Kabul which the international 
community was desperately trying to support.  
 
Impunity to warlordism also had tremendous effect on the growth of illegal activities 
and associated criminal and corrupt practices. We have seen in Chapter 8 of Part III 
                                                 
319 In a classic description by Max Weber which states “the claim of the modern state to 
monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of 
continuous operation”, the core function of a state is the monopoly over legitimate use of 
physical force within a particular territory. (Max Weber, Economy and society: An outline of 
interpretive sociology, (University of California Press, 1978).  
320 Although the emphasis on hunting Osama Bin Laden and key Al Qaida figures (already in 
2002, ref Ramsfeld speech in Oct 2002) to insurgents in general and with “Accelerated Success” 
strategy promoted by Khalilzad since 2003 included elements to support reconstruction, this 
came too late almost 2 years after the end of the Taliban regime and this allowed sufficient 
time for local power structure to entrench itself. 
321 Bernett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada & Abby Stoddard, Through the fog of peacebuilding: 
evaluating the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Center on International Cooperation, New York 
University, November 2003. Also see Rashid 2008, p171-195. 
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how the most notable of such illegal activities (i.e. opium poppy production) grew from 
185 metric tons in 2001 to 3,600 metric tons in 2005. The resources generated from 
this illicit industry ---equivalent to around half of the total GDP of Afghanistan (during 
the Bonn years)--- went unaccounted for by the central government, into the hands of 
those operating outside of the rule of law. Some were even contributing to insurgency 
and other destabilizing activities against the central government and the peace process. 
That this state of affairs happened and continued despite great efforts and resources 
being poured into counter-narcotics activities322 disillusioned many inside and outside 
of Afghanistan. But this factor cannot be isolated from the wider question of 
warlordism and the de facto permission for the rule of the gun to prevail. In hindsight, 
the appropriateness of the policy where War on Terror was given higher priority than 
building of a culture and system based on the rule of law, and the implication of this 
on the longer-term stability of Afghanistan and the subsequent reduction of sources of 
terror must be questioned. However, it remains a fact that this was the framework that 
the Bonn Process operated under.  
 
In addition to the problems warlordism created in decreasing legitimacy and control 
exercised by the central government as well as its impact on fostering illicit economy, 
another serious effect was related to the question of advancement of justice and 
human rights under the Bonn Process. As seen in President Karzai’s speech at the 
Emergency Loya Jirga referred to in Chapter 7 of Part III, there seem to have been a 
belief in the Afghan transitional administration ---and the international partners who 
closely supported it--- that progress on human rights (and other critical elements of 
the rule of law) and improving security could not be pursued simultaneously 323 . 
Whether these two variables are ---and should be treated as--- mutually conflicting 
objectives was one of the most critical questions that went insufficiently debated 
throughout the Bonn Process, due to the supremacy given to security considerations.  
 
                                                 
322 For instance, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office statement issued in March 2005 on the 
occasion of the launch of the Afghan Counter-narcotics Implementation Plan 2005 (1384) refers 
to an increase of USD 100 million from in counter-narcotics assistance which is in addition to 
USD 125 million already pledged for alternative livelihoods assistance that “more than doubled 
annually from 2002/03 to 2005/06”. (“Written ministerial statement by Bill Rammell regarding 
the implementation of the 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan” 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/news&id=1540892)  
323 In addition, President Karzai is quoted to have said in early 2003 to Lyse Doucet of BBC 
World News that “peace is a necessity and justice is a luxury that Afghanistan cannot afford 
right now.” as quoted by Barnett Rubin “Transitional justice and human rights in Afghanistan” in 
International Affairs  79, 3 (2003), p574. 
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A respected observer of Afghanistan throughout the decades, Barnett Rubin raises 
several important points related to the quietness of Bonn Process on the question of 
transitional justice and human rights. Rubin analyzes the problem of intimidation and 
fear dominating the implementation of the Bonn Agreement and observes that “This 
problem of intimidation is merely one manifestation of a more pervasive problem, the 
one that nearly all Afghans identify now as their primary challenge ---security. Security 
and human rights are often considered as separate problems: security as a problem for 
army and police, the ‘security forces’; human rights a problem for the judiciary, NGOs, 
and, where they exist, official human rights commissions. In fact security and human 
rights are the same problem. The main obstacle, or at least the immediate obstacle, to 
both in Afghanistan, as in other collapsed or failed states, is what Afghan call 
tufangsalari: rule by gunmen. In most of the country, regardless of the legal and 
constitutional structures established by the Bonn Agreement, effective power is in the 
hands of factional commanders who were armed by the coalition in 2001.324” Weaving 
a careful balance between the need for justice and security, Rubin concludes that while 
removal of individuals associated with tufangsalari is important, it is not the answer for 
the problem and he advocates the need to place greater emphasis on building 
structures and institutions that can hold up the rule of law and human rights standards. 
 
“It would be wrong simply to blame these individuals and think that order and 
security would return to Afghanistan if the so-called ‘warlords’ and past abusers 
were removed from power. … what will bring more peace and more justice to 
Afghanistan is not the removal of offending individuals, but the creation of a 
system of institutions to control them and make government effective and law-
bound. Ending impunity by punishing offenders is part of that process, but it is 
neither the sole part, nor necessarily the first part.”325      
 
Finally, it should be noted that careful consideration should be given to the use of the 
notion of “warlords”. While it is impossible to find a definitive description of “warlords” 
as the term is used in many conflict or post-conflict situations globally, it is often used 
to describe a wide range of individuals which may have different background and role 
in the peacebuilding process. Specifically in the case of Afghanistan, this term was 
applied to many (but not all) who had been a part of the Mujahideen movement and 
those who yielded power without democratic process legitimizing their status. While 
                                                 
324 Barnett Rubin “Transitional justice and human rights in Afghanistan” in International Affairs  
79, 3 (2003), p576. 
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some of the figures labeled as warlords were regarded by the general public as 
problematic figures that threatened their well-being, others enjoyed certain degree of 
legitimacy and exercised accepted leadership. Furthermore, the term was not used to 
many individuals who exercised arbitrary power based on the power of the gun. It was 
selectively applied. Nearly forceful removal of certain symbolic figures describing them 
as “warlords”, while at the same time leaving untouched various actors who were 
regarded as harmful and disobeying to the principle of the Bonn Agreement by the 
local population left the impression that question of warlordism was politically charged. 
This in tern created, Among some Afghans, a sense of unfairness and targeted 
campaign against certain individuals and ethnic groups; a perception that requires 
attention if the longer-term peacebuilding process is to gain legitimacy among various 
segments of the Afghan society326.  
 
2.1.3 Accommodationist stance towards potential spoilers 
 
Some maintained that the unwillingness of the Afghan transitional administration and 
the international community to confront those undermining the essential tenets of the 
peace process ---i.e. creating a coherent unified state governed by a strong central 
government in accordance with the Constitution, introducing the rule of law in the life 
of the Afghans which include promotion of respect for human rights, pluralism and 
diversity--- contributed to the declining support and confidence to the peace process 
on the part of the Afghan population, which in turn made progress additionally difficult. 
Others were of the opinion that pushing too much on principles would lead to a 
breakdown of the fragile balance on which the main actors chose to resolve differences 
without resorting to direct force. The latter was the view held more widely among the 
decision-makers both in the Afghan government and in the international community 
supporting it and therefore this policy-line prevailed327. It is impossible to assess 
whether this was the right approach and what the longer-term consequence of various 
decisions will be, but one fact to be acknowledged is that Afghanistan did manage to 
                                                                                                                                               
325 Ibid. 
326 This crucial perspective was raised to the author by a prominent ex-Mujahideen commander 
who shared his views on condition of anonymity (due to his current official position). This 
dissertation does not do justice in exploring this perspective further and making poly analysis, 
mainly due to difficulty inherent in analyzing such current political topic, but it should be 
acknowledged that it is an important topic to be explored after certain passage of time.   
327 Although not directly making this point, general orientation based on realist perspective with 
heavy consideration for local conditions and requirement of time is expressed by Brahimi in an 
interview with Mary Sack. (Sack interview, p5.) 
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navigate through the thorny first years of post-conflict peacebuilding without having all 
the parties to the peace process reverting armed conflict ---which, as we see in many 
other countries, is a real possibility---. This dissertation recognizes that even 
discounting the fact that a major party to the conflict was excluded from this picture 
and continued to destabilize parts of the country, this in itself should be considered a 
major achievement given the history of Afghanistan and the context the Process was 
set in.  
 
2.1.4 Elections legitimizing existing power holders 
 
Another important factor observed related to this strand of dilemmas is how keeping 
the timetable and benchmarks as set out in the Agreement became the overriding 
priority, even when circumstances made it evident that certain steps only brought 
nominal value for advancement of a democratic, stable society. A case in point can be 
seen in the intense debate that took place from late 2003 to mid-2004 over the holing 
of elections. Due to various factors ---including logistical constraint, security concern 
and lack of funding for the electoral operation--- it was increasingly difficult to envision 
a simultaneous holding of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and the 
target became shifted to holding of a Presidential election ahead of the general 
election. This also fitted well with the preference of the Transitional Administration and 
the US and UN that favoured a strong presidential system. But some questioned the 
utility of conducting an election when the result expected was in line with the pattern 
already observed earlier of serving to legitimize existing power holders. There was also 
fear that by holding popular election (especially the parliamentary election) before the 
establishment of properly functional state institutions would lead to an undesirable 
situation where dubious actors will be enthroned into legitimate power through 
democratic mechanisms328.  
 
These elections come at a high cost as attested by the fact that UNAMA was trying to 
raise US$ 78.2 million for the Presidential election alone. Whether such sum of funds 
could have not been better invested into other purposes that would contribute to the 
goal of bringing the country closer to a secure and democratic society could be 
                                                 
328 Indeed this happened with the parliamentary election of 2005 where some with known 
involvement in drugs trade and past records of atrocities became elected members of the lower 
house. (See Part III Chapters 7 & 8) But how to avoid this while respecting the popular will and 
securing effective rule is a difficult question to answer in practice. 
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questioned329. Astri et al wrote in spring of 2004:  
 
“Given the obvious limitations of legal-formal mechanisms for generating 
legitimacy, some observers called for a scheduled elections to be postponed 
while making more use of traditional means of establishing legitimacy 
through power-sharing and contractual compromises. … If Western formal-
legal instruments are to remain central, emphasis on substance over form 
will make them more meaningful. In this perspective it would make more 
sense to postpone elections –estimated to cost almost 80 million dollars- 
while improving the underlying conditions that affect empowerment. This 
include not only physical security in the South and Southeast, but also 
greater efforts to create a rule of law, observe human rights and facilitate 
new political associations.”  
 
Many would have agreed to above observation and yet these logical recommendations 
had no way of influencing the actual process. As the need for holding of elections 
became so central to recent peacebuilding scheme, there was little room to delay the 
process, if not only for its value as a procedure to legitimize political power but also as 
a symbolic step forward required for the donor community. If we look at the reasons 
critically with the benefit of hindsight, it could be said that a large part of what 
prevented such suggestion to be heard was the political need for the international 
community to maintain the timelines and hurdles set out in Bonn as much as possible, 
so as to be able to satisfy expectations created in the donor countries. But these 
questions needed to be asked against the actual development of Afghanistan under the 
Bonn Process. It should be noted for future design of post-conflict processes, the need 
for time-bound commitments should be weighed carefully with substantive value each 
action will bring in advancing the objective of peacebuilding.      
 
2.1.5 Role and orientation of the political elites 
 
As well documented by several researchers including Sarajuddin Rasuly and Barnett 
Rubin, Afghanistan had an active political elite class that originated in the years before 
and sustained ---in various forms--- through the quarter-of-a-Century conflict330. Some 
took refuge in Western countries and eventually established themselves in these 
                                                 
329 At least the question was paused by the Norwegian study published in spring 2004, but it 
did not to lead to influencing the international community’s approach led by the Americans.  
330 Sarajuddin Rasuly, Die politischen Eliten Afghanistans (Peter Lang, 1997); Barnett Rubin, 
The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (Yale University Press, 1995).  
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countries. Others were either operating from Peshawar on the “external front” of the 
Mujahideen movement or engaged in the actual fighting inside Afghanistan in its 
“internal front” during the 1980s. Those in the latter category returned to Afghanistan 
as the Soviet troops left, but failing to navigate the country into normalcy and 
continuing fighting in the 1990s, they went back to basing themselves again in 
Pakistan and other neighbouring countries while the Taliban took control of the 
country331.  
 
When the events following 9.11 led to the breakdown of the Taliban regime, many of 
these political elites returned to the country with their own vision of Afghanistan reborn. 
In addition to differences in personal orientations and beliefs, the vastly different 
experiences they had during the past twenty years created a complicated mix of 
different opinions among the Afghan political elite class. While the divide in the Afghan 
administration between the Pashtuns and Panjsheri Tajiks 332  were widely 
acknowledged, William Maley assesses that this is only one of the several dividing 
factors: 
 
“While post-Bonn elite conflict was sometimes painted as reflecting a 
“Pashtun-Panjsheri” schism, the reality was more complicated, and involved 
division among three distinct lines, although with significant overlap between 
them. 
(i)  Pashtun vs. Panjsheris333  
(ii)  Proponents of public law vs. Islamic law (as a basis of law and order) 
(ii)  Former Mujahideens vs. Afghan expatriates   
It was the shifting nature of these political alliances that accounted for 
Fahim’s increasing marginalization. Dropped as Karzai’s vice-presidential 
running mate on 26 July 2004, he was replaced as defence minister … 
although in a mark of the fluidity of the situation, this cabinet reshuffle also 
witnessed the replacement of finance minister Ashraf Ghani, a Taliban critic 
who had enjoyed wide support from the donor community.”    
                                                 
331 Neamatollah Nojumi, The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, civil war and 
the future of the region (Palgrave, 2002) 
332 The name deriving from Ahmad Shah Massoud’s native Panjsher valley where the Northern 
Alliance based itself.  
333 Maley cautions against simplistic application of this model pointing out that “Certainly some 
Pashtuns, mindful of the past Pashtun domination of the national political elite and alarmed by 
anti-Pashtun pogroms in northern Afghanistan in the wake of the Taliban’s removal, felt 
resentful of power exercised by some leaders of Panjsheri Tajik background, most importantly 
Fahim. But Fahim was also regarded with suspicion by some of Massoud’s closest associates, 
which points to the danger of depicting elite rivalry as a simple Pashtun-Panjsheri struggle.”  
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Maley makes another important observation on the political style of President Karzai 
and his close associates which matches with the assessment personally held by many 
international interlocutors working with the presidency.  
 
“Karzai was very much a product of the state-free “Peshawar” politics in 
which he was schooled in exile in the 1980s - politics based on networking, 
patronage, and the construction of prudential alliances. Detailed policy-
making was not his strength, and this became a problem once the adoption 
of a strong presidential constitution thrust into his hands the responsibility of 
policy leadership. (Another weakness of Karzai derived from) his inclination 
to pacify potential troublemakers … by offering them positions in the state ... 
An insidious –although not widely publicized- consequence of all this has 
been that elite politics has been marked by ferocious rivalries, competition 
for president’s attention and fovour, and denigration of opponents as a way 
of reducing their influence. As a result, very some gifted Afghans have left 
government positions in Kabul … Beyond Kabul, the results have been even 
more destructive … awarding offices to undeserving figures at provincial and 
local levels is a recipe for dramatically poor governance and the progressive 
erosion of the legitimacy of the state.334” 
 
Such observation clearly depicts the impact of a country’s political elite class structure 
and personal political style of top political elites (formed in the context of the wider 
political elite culture) on the course of political transition. Another worrisome tendency 
concerning political elites of the country is that rather than developing towards greater 
unity and collaboration required to bring about the ideal state prescribed in the Bonn 
Agreement, many seem to build their own fiefdoms in the public offices they are asked 
to head and this creates ---in many cases--- dysfunctional bureaucracies unable to 
meet the needs of the population where there should be effective and respected 
national ministries, provincial and local offices to provide needed services to the 
population. While it is difficult to address these structural issues and especially the 
issue of political styles of elites holding public offices, their enormous consequence 
should not go unaccounted for and every occasion should be used to correct and 
discourage the negative tendencies.  
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2.1.6 “Double-talk” in the eyes of the population 
 
One final factor deserving assessment is the fact that in trying to adhere to tight 
timelines and ambitious hurdles that opened up deeply divisive issues (such as in 
formulating a new constitution, redefining the power structure and bringing up 
fundamental beliefs about the state and law), the transitional administration faced 
many challenges where it imposed control in a manner conflicting with the democratic, 
open, pluralistic ideals that the Bonn Agreement sought to bring about. In the course 
of navigating through the transitional path laid out in the Bonn Agreement, the core of 
the Afghan administration ---though being reformist/modernist in their own orientation 
and being supported by the backers promoting these same values, most notably the 
United States and the United Nations--- took actions at various stages not matching to 
the stated policy of an inclusive, pluralist polity and this disillusioned many in 
Afghanistan. As early as in 2002, the way the Emergency Loya Jirga was handled 
created bitter sentiments to many of its participants and the wider public as the US 
Ambassador Zalmey Khalilzad “worked the room” to have Hamid Karzai get selected as 
the President of the Transitional Authority335. Further along the path, President Karzai’s 
strong inclination and lobbying led eventually to the adoption of a Constitution based 
on a strong presidential model with a centrist approach, while questions were raised 
whether such a centrist approach was most appropriate for a diverse state that 
Afghanistan is and will always remain. It resulted in a state political structure ---the 
chief resultant product of the Bonn Process--- that established a framework for dealing 
with diversity and conflict by means of winner-takes-it-all strategies rather than 
inclusive power-sharing mechanisms336.    
 
It could be said that this paradox is, to a certain extent, inevitable as the Afghan 
society, so divided and lacking basic capacity, is too weak as a civil society to be given 
the full scope of rights expressed in the lofty ideals of the Bonn Agreement such as the 
right of the Afghans to “freely determine their own political future in accordance with 
the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice”. And as Simon 
Chesterman contends, peacebuilding operations “combine an unusual mix of idealism 
and realism… as there is an inherent contradiction between ends and means (when 
autocratic power) is exercised with the goals of promoting legitimate and sustainable 
                                                                                                                                               
334 Maley, 2006, p34-35. 
335 Maley, 2006, p31-37. 
336 Astri, p 35. 
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national governance 337 ” and this is an inherent challenge to such processes of 
transition. While paying due acknowledgement to these preconditions, it is nonetheless 
important for the international community to encourage and support the Afghan 
government to do their best not to appear as being contrary to the democratic and 
pluralistic objectives it is meant to defend. It should be concluded that in practice this 
proved very difficult and accounted for one of the biggest reasons for disillusionment 
with the process by the Afghan population338.  
 
2.2 International involvement  
 
The second strand of dilemmas under the Bonn Process relates to the involvement of 
the international community in the effort to rebuild Afghanistan. While it is undisputed 
that the post-conflict peacebuilding phase that begun under the Bonn Process could 
have only come into being (and be sustained) with substantial international support, it 
must also be recognized that the external involvement brought with it its own sets of 
complex dilemmas impacting on the peacebuilding process. Examining the guiding 
principle such as the “light footprint” and “Afghan ownership” and assessing the results, 
this segment will consider the impact of demands placed by international donor 
agencies to the Afghan state institutions, with a view to assessing its impact on the 
result the peacebuilding process. The critical issues of low capacity in the local state 
bureaucracy and lack of donor coordination will also be assessed.  
     
2.2.1 Need for local ownership vs. requirement for international standards 
 
During the four years under the Bonn Process between December 2001 and December 
2005, the international community disbursed a total of US$ 8.3 billion in assistance to 
Afghanistan339. While the aggregate amount is much lower than the amount spent for 
                                                 
337 Chesterman’s points are more relevant to UN operations such as those in East Timor and 
Kosovo. However, it is also applicable to a limited extent for Afghanistan where there was de 
facto international command of the post conflict governance.  
338 Based on author’s interviews with educated Afghans, Kabul, 2005. 
339 At the Tokyo Conference on International Assistance to Afghanistan which was convened in 
January 2002, the international donor community agreed to provide Afghanistan with US$ 4.5 
billion for the initial years (cumulative amount of various multi-year pledges). 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf) Furthermore, at 
the Berlin Conference, which took place on 31 March – 1 April 2004, the international 
community pledged US$ 8.3 billion for the next three years. (Source: Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS): An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth 
and Poverty Reduction, Vol. 1, 2005, pp. 38f. http://www.ands.gov.af/ 
admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/Folder/IANDS20Volume20One%20%20Final20English.pdf) 
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other countries in similar post-conflict stage when calculated in per capita terms340 
which was a source of discontent, it still remains that significant amount of resources 
were poured into one of the world’s least developed country341. While the predominant 
message expressed in public was emphasizing the need for more resources, it must 
also be noted that the main preoccupation for those administering the funds was to 
find ways to spend the resources within a relatively short period, meeting not only the 
actual needs that should be addressed but also the standards required to be able to 
report accountably to the donors. Two years into the Process in November 2003, it was 
estimated that only US$ 110 million worth of reconstruction projects had actually 
completed, out of a total aid disbursement of US$ 2.9 billion342.  
 
At the philosophical level, there was no dispute that the reconstruction and overall 
peacebuilding process should be locally owned, meaning that decisions should be 
made by the Afghans themselves and not be prescribed by its international partners. 
But the very fact that many statements were issued to confirm and reaffirm this 
point343 was itself an indicator of how this was not the case in reality. Difficulty to 
balance demands for high international standards ---in diverse the areas from health 
and education to the conduct of elections--- against the need for locally sustainable 
institutions poses serious tension and it is commonly seen in many post-conflict 
settings. After the quick operations preferred in the early 1990s where the expectation 
was to “hold war crimes trial today and election tomorrow”, at the time of 
implementation of the Bonn Process, there is a growing recognition for the need to 
                                                 
340 During the first two years of the post-conflict phase, Afghanistan received US$ 57 per capita, 
in comparison to US$ 679 in Bosnia, US$ 526 in Kosovo and US$ 233 in East Timor. (See Carl 
Robichaud, “Remember Afghanistan: A glass half full on the Titanic”, World Policy Journal, 
Spring 2006) 
341 In 2002, Afghanistan ranked as 173rd out of 178 countries, being the 5th least developed 
country after Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. During the Bonn Process 
period, this ranking remained unchanged in 2004 due unavailability of updated data. 
Subsequently in 2007, Afghanistan ranked 174th out of 178 countries, indicating that from a 
human development point of view, only slight progress was made during the first five years 
after the removal of the Taliban regime during the Bonn Process. (Source: Afghanistan Human 
Development Report (2007), p.19. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/ 
asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf)  
342 Bernett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada & Abby Stoddard, “Through the fog of peacebuilding: 
evaluating the reconstruction of Afghanistan”, Center on International Cooperation, New York 
University, November 2003.  
343 For instance, Ashraf Ghani’s speech in a meeting of Western donors held in Kabul on 26 
February 2002 where he stated: “Government ownership is critical to the establishment of a 
prosperous, secure Afghanistan. We are fully committed to seeking partnership in this long-
term process, but we must demand that it be a partnership of equals.” Similar statements were 
made by Ghani as well as by President Karzai at the International Conference “Securing 
Afghanistan’s Future” held in Berlin, 31 March to 1 April 2004. 
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reassess of post-conflict institution building 344 . However, the rhetoric of “local 
ownership” is also more problematic in application in practice than said. Spending the 
resources in a timely, effective manner and complementing that with good reporting is 
not easy even in more stable developing countries. For Afghanistan that lack basic 
infrastructure and human capacity ---at least in terms of meeting administrative 
requirements of the Western countries such as being able to write proposals and 
reports, or planning and implementing activities in a publicly accountable manner--- 
this presented a formidable challenge. A large part of the problem is related to the 
limited capacity of state bureaucracy in these post-conflict countries. 
 
It must also be acknowledged that there were also dynamics on the international 
interlocutors-side that compounded the challenge as well. As Simon Chesterman 
argues, international assistance is “notoriously supply-rather than demand-driven” with 
the result that it is more responsive to the politics of donors than that of recipients. In 
addition, a sudden influx of foreign capital and personnel tends to have perverse 
economic effects. Chesterman even goes on to argue that these factors can 
“undermine the short-term political stability and medium-term economic viability of the 
territory in question345” which this dissertation assesses to be an overstatement in 
relation to Afghanistan but it is to be recognized that there are many valid elements in 
his analysis. The supply-based planning and timetable were creating unrealistic 
demands from the local viewpoint. But as Francis Fukuyama concludes, it is important 
to acknowledge and factor in the reality where “the contradiction in donor policy is that 
outside donors want both to increase the local government’s capacity to provide a 
particular service … and to actually provide services to the end users. The latter 
objective almost always wins out because of the incentives facing the donors 
themselves.”346 
 
2.2.2 Lack of state’s bureaucratic capacity and the international assistance 
undermining legitimacy of the central government 
 
As stated earlier, throughout the Bonn Process the Afghans and many of their 
international supporters continuously deplored the lack of resources necessary to bring 
                                                 
344 Chesterman, p204-210, see also Paddy Ashdown “What I learnt in Bosnia”, New York Times, 
28 October 2002. 
345 Chesterman, p8. 
346 Francis Fukuyama, State building, governance and world order in the 21st Century, (Profile 
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about required change 347 . We have seen however, that when seen from the 
perspective of those implementing the programmes for change on behalf of the 
international community, the problem could be perceived as less one of lacking 
resources but more of limited absorptive capacity. Even as late as in spring of 2005, 
when the Bonn Process was nearing its end--- the report of the Secretary General 
stated: 
 
“While there has been a slight increase in the absorptive capacity of the 
operating and development budgets, the Government still lacks the capacity 
to meet donor requirements for the project documents and feasibility studies 
that are necessary for the release of donor funds. Further assistance is 
required to redress this lack of capacity.348”      
 
Some parts of the government ---Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani being the most vocal 
advocate, as he was committed to the national execution programme approach and 
has in fact brought about significant accomplishments through the national 
programmes as we have seen in Chapter 8 of Part III--- criticized that donor 
community was not directing resources to the government and other national entities 
struggling enhance legitimacy and credibility through concrete action, instead 
channeling most of the resources through bilateral or multilateral agencies for 
execution. For instance, the Tokyo Conference for Reconstruction, held 21-22 January 
2002, that concluded it would require US$ 12.2 billion over five years to rebuild 
Afghanistan, agreed on setting up a centralized trust fund (“Afghanistan Interim 
Authority Trust Fund” later renamed “Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund” in July 2002) 
jointly managed by the Afghan government, the Asian Development Bank, the World 
Bank, the UN Development Programme and the Islamic Development Bank. But of the 
US$ 4.5 billion pledged at the Tokyo Conference (of which US$ 1.8 billion was 
earmarked for 2002)349 nothing went into the Trust Fund and most of the amount 
pledged in Tokyo eventually went into humanitarian relief rather than for 
reconstruction outside of the Trust Fund mechanism. This led some observers to call 
                                                                                                                                               
Books, 2004)  
347 UN Secretariat voiced such point on many briefings to the Security Council including on 19 
September 2002 (S/PV.4611, SC/7506), 6 April 2004 (S/PV.4941, SC/8053) and 23 August 2005 
(S/PV.5249, SC/8478). For instance, see Statement by President Karzai to the UN General 
Assembly, 13 September 2002. 
348 S/2005/183, para 47. 
349  Pledge figures based on summary document from the Tokyo Conference 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf) 
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the Trust Fund “an orphan of the aid effort350”. In a book published in 2008 ambitiously 
titled “Fixing failed states”, Ghani and co-author Lockhart argue in detail how 
international assistance not coordinated through the government can undermine the 
legitimacy of the central government 351 , in an unintended and ironic manner 
considering that the international community is trying to support the government.     
 
While these criticisms towards donor orientation are fully legitimate from the local and 
theoretical point of view, the reasons that generated such donor orientation are also 
well understood. The lack of capacity on the part of the Afghan state bureaucracy was 
so acute that although all adhered to the official motto of engaging in longer-term 
institutional capacity building, there was a genuine need to get the initial urgent work 
done ---and done very quickly to move to further stages within a limited timeframe--- 
that could not be expected working through the local counterparts, considering the 
conditions that Afghan state bureaucracy was in. To begin with, the assumption that 
state bureaucracy existed from the beginning of the Bonn process is misleading. Many 
ministries were somewhat of an artificial construction, composed of some former state 
civil servants (many employed under largely dysfunctional governments of the past two 
decades) and many that were added on the pay-roll without proper screening for 
qualification. Proper screening and training of employees were not possible in many 
ministries and at this stage many were not even paid salary and therefore engaged in 
other gainful activities. A Civil Service Commission envisioned in the Bonn Agreement 
was set up only in June 2003 as the “Independent Administrative Reform and Civil 
Service Commission” and its institutional weight was minimal throughout the Bonn 
Process, as attested by the fact that it was staffed with only one-third of its projected 
staffing in 2005352. Also in terms of infrastructure, most government buildings were 
shattered and lacked basic equipment ranging from desks to computers to writing 
equipments. Some ministries disputed for month over land and premise allocation.  
 
At a more fundamental level, government and its entities at various level of the state 
were not seen as competency-based institutions that are there to perform certain 
function for the citizens. From the outset of the Bonn Process, senior government 
                                                 
350 Rashid 2008, p178. 
351 Ashraf Ghani & Clair Lockart, Fixing failed states: A framework for rebuilding a fractured 
world (Oxford University Press, 2008), p10-12 as well as in many examples related to 
Afghanistan in various parts of the book. 
352 “Afghanistan: state building, sustaining growth and reducing poverty”, Report by the World 
Bank, 2005, p52. 
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positions (even at the cabinet level) were treated as a reward for political loyalty, 
rather than based on merit and competence353. By extension, many ministries lacked 
effective leadership or professional expertise and institutional duplication was 
commonplace as need for positions created government entities rather than the need 
for functions to be performed by these entities. Such state of affairs witnessed during 
the early phase of the Bonn Process improved somewhat towards the end of the Bonn 
Process354 but the difficulty of building government capacity persisted. By 2005, the 
common analysis was that support and capacity building were provided to the top layer 
of the government but not to layers of bureaucracy implementing government policy 
vis-à-vis the citizens, especially in the provinces. Some observe that this also fueled 
serious divide between Kabul and the provinces. To begin with, center-region relation 
was strenuous due to serious deficit in legitimacy of the central government in the 
views of the power-holders in the provinces. The fact that the central government even 
lacked fiscal control, power over appointments and actual monitoring of service 
delivery further weakened the legitimacy and relevance of the central government in 
the eyes of the population in the Provinces.  
 
2.2.3 Lack of donor coordination 
 
Of the many complicated issues raised in this stand of dilemma, failing to address the 
issue of problem on the donor-side to coordinate their assistance will render this 
analysis severely incomplete. As briefly described above in 2.2.1 with reference to the 
complex combination of lack of capacity in the Afghan government and the need for 
accountability in international standards, “donors” are not a unified bloc and lack of 
coordination among them created additional difficulties in effectively managing 
peacebuilding efforts. While most donors agree on the grand ideals expressed in the 
Bonn Agreement, the underlying assumptions of how to reach these objectives and 
how to prioritize among various urgent needs greatly differ from one donor to another. 
In addition to these differences which are fundamentally reflection of the particular 
donor’s own systems and political orientation, there are several factors that further 
complicates the efforts to make donor behaviour coherent as a whole.  
 
Most bilateral donors ---needing to justify the use of, and request for further, public 
funds from domestic taxpayers--- are under pressure to show their government’s 
                                                 
353 William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan (Hurst & Co, 2006), p51-54. 
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particular contribution, in a manner that can be perceived as being different and more 
meaningful than assistance given by other donors. Many multilateral “donors” are also 
implementers of technical assistance projects ---many, especially the UN, having to live 
with increased mandates with greater share of dependence on voluntary contributions-
-- are under pressure to win resources to be channeled through their own vehicles 
instead of other agencies’. Most donors ---both bilateral and multilateral--- are 
desperate to be associated with projects with high visibility, especially those conducted 
in relatively secure geographical areas. Few donors are willing to contribute to less 
visible and immediate-impact oriented (“sexy” as it would be referred to by many in 
the aid community) assistance especially in areas with high security incidents. These 
include, for instance, infrastructure development in locations with high instability or 
pay recurrent costs such as energy bills to continue to operate equipment provided by 
other donors, which are often in critical need of assistance. Donors have common 
characteristics in this regard and these factors easily lead to duplications and gaps in 
assistance. While the efforts made at the numerous donor coordination meetings were 
genuine and not mere rhetoric as all players did see the negative consequence of lack 
of donor coordination, these underlying conditions made it very difficult to attain actual 
coordination. In addition, as described in Chapter 8.4 of Part III, unlike in many other 
post-conflict countries, in the case of Afghanistan some parts of the government soon 
developed national programmes that offered alternatives modalities for execution of 
assistance activities. These national programmes were admirable and achieved many 
meaningful results in terms of coordinated response to actual problems of 
reconstruction, this also further crowded the scene. 
 
An important voice of reason in this context came from Ashraf Ghani who moved from 
being an advisor to the UN SRSG onto the government-side in the wake of the Bonn 
talks, initially heading the government’s Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority 
(ACCA) and then becoming the Finance Minster. Ghani advocated relentlessly for a 
centralized coordination of international assistance funds through the Afghan 
government, as described in the previous chapters. While his remarks were respected 
and support was expressed for the principle of Afghan ownership, Ghani’s plans for a 
government coordination of international assistance was fundamentally ignored by the 
donor community355. This was partly due to various constraints and interests that the 
donors had themselves as described above. But what exacerbated the situation was 
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the reality of the wider Afghan government capacity, as frustrating as it may be for 
figures such as Ghani. Contrary to Ghani’s vision, many in the Afghan Ministries and 
provincial/local offices lacked the technical capacity or foresight to coordinate 
assistance and instead requested and/or welcomed similar assistance proposals by 
several donors that would eventually lead to duplication and confusion. This was most 
likely the case due to the fact that the officials thought “one or the other deal may not 
materialize and that it is better to have too many offers than none”356, perhaps a 
reflection of the mentality that many Afghans developed over years of uncertainty. 
  
The result was that despite the huge amount of donor funding poured into the country, 
little reconstruction took place from the viewpoint of ordinary Afghans, especially in the 
critical initial year after Bonn. It was unfortunate that this coincided with the relatively 
short window of opportunity after the change in regime at the end of 2001 when the 
entire Afghan population was ready to embrace fundamental changes in their 
behavior357. Making decisive and visible progress in reconstruction and promotion of 
the rule of law through coordinated and targeted assistance during this period could 
have made a huge impact in convincing the Afghan population that a new era has 
begun and this could have also positively influenced the wider development of 
transition in the years that followed. These opportunities were missed due to lack of 
realistic scenario to coordinate assistance interventions.    
 
As for how such reality may be improved in future situations, the topic of the 
importance of accountability being questioned in the donors’ respective constituency 
will be explored in detail in Part V Chapter 3.    
 
2.2.4 Did the “light footprint” approach work? 
 
The philosophy guiding the international community’s engagement in Afghan 
reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts was characterized by the concept of “light 
footprint” articulated in the Secretary General’s report of March 2002358.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
355 Rashid 2008, p174-179. 
356 Kato interview and discussion with educated Afghans serving in the government or UN, 
Kabul 2004.   
357 Ibid. 
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“UNAMA should undertake close coordination and consultation with the 
Afghan Interim Authority and other Afghan actors to ensure that Afghan 
priorities lead the mission’s assistance effort. … UNAMA should aim to bolster 
Afghan capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited 
an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, thereby 
leaving a light expatriate `footprint’.” 
 
In sharp contrast to the operations in Kosovo or East Timor where UN administered the 
transitional process with massive presence, UN’s engagement in Afghanistan under the 
Bonn Process was intentionally kept at minimal level with the view to supporting the 
Afghan-led process. In addition to Kosovo and East Timor, UN’s Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era was also different from other operations UN 
conducted in the post-Cold War era such as Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in that it had no operational responsibility for administering any part of 
Afghanistan359. This approach was based largely on the personal conviction of the 
SRSG Brahimi who placed utmost importance on local ownership of the process360. As 
we have seen in Chapter 5 of Part I, his belief that the mandates of UN missions 
should reflect the realities of available resources was already evident in the Brahimi 
Report of 2000. Some observers attributes this to Brahimi’s realism in choosing an 
appropriate approach for the UN in a country where the active political elites were 
unlikely to favour being dictated by the international community and the lack of 
willingness from the international community to guarantee resources required for a 
more intrusive operation was evident361.   
 
While the UN’s integrated mission, UNAMA, kept to its words and deployed relatively 
modest number of staff and carefully assisted the will of the Afghan government, this 
in itself did not lead to “light footprints” by the expatriate community as other bilateral 
donors filled the space. In addition, as the process moved forward, many remarked 
that despite Brahimi’s best efforts, UN presence itself was also not as light as it was 
intended to be and that “the arcane regulations which govern the operation of the UN 
system have on occasion obstructed local capacity building efforts362”. By the end of 
                                                                                                                                               
358 S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, para 98. 
359 Richard Caplan, International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), p14. 
360 Brahimi commented that in the UN-administered transition process as in Kosovo and East 
Timor he saw resemblance to neo-colonialism. It was on these grounds that he declined to be 
appointed the SRSG to East Timor. (Sack interview, p4-6)  
361 William Maley, 2006, p109-112. 
362  Nicholas Stockton, Strategic coordination in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Research and 
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2002, every major Ministry had number of international advisors sitting near the 
Minister’s office guiding or performing the work of the Ministry. In the case of some 
Ministries, there were numerous international advisers placed by different donor 
governments, sometimes providing contradictory advice. There were some Ministries 
with more international consultants than Afghans performing tasks at the policy level. 
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani who argued ---as we have seen in the previous chapter--
- for channeling of resources to Afghan government institutions, acknowledging the 
need to meet international standard in performance, took the approach of “capacity 
enhancement” through contracting foreign consultants and company to perform tasks 
for his Ministry. Some donors were arguing among each other over policy orientation 
that would impact the course of Afghanistan’s legal framework or institutional 
arrangements. By the end of the Bonn Process, it is fair to conclude that foreign 
influence was evident everywhere in Kabul and the notion of “light footprint” seemed 
dusty and largely counter-factual. 
       
On the other hand, some observers argued that the UN’s policy of being the supporter 
to Afghan decisions were inadequate ---at least in some areas--- at a time when the 
central government was weak and susceptible to pressure from armed groups. Chris 
Johnson and Jolyon Leslie assesses that the concept of “light footprint” became used 
over time as an excuse for the UN and other international players for not facing their 
responsibility in guiding the Afghan authorities through difficult questions of 
transition363 . Based on extensive ground research and observations, Anders Tang 
Friborg concludes as follows: 
 
“… even a sovereign government might prefer to refer difficult political decisions 
to a neutral international institution when faced with an unstable security 
environment and strong pressure from numerous illegitimate political and 
military stakeholders. These could include decisions regarding appointments of 
key military personnel, judges at the Supreme Court, electoral disputes or 
disarmament. A weak, incoming government also need impartial information 
about the military and political situation on the ground. With its neutral status 
and unanimous respect for Mr. Brahimi, UNAMA was from the outset in a unique 
position to assist the Afghan government. Results have been achieved, but the 
limited size of the political pillar of UNAMA has hampered its ability to make use 
                                                                                                                                               
Coordination Unit, August 2002) quoted in Maley 2006. 
363 Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: the mirage of peace (Zed Books, 2004), p200. 
Johnson and Leslie point to the shortcomings of international response in the areas of human 
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of its entire potential. It can also be discussed if UNAMA at times has been too 
reluctant to influence the political process … UNAMA ought to have done more 
in a number of key areas such as protection of human rights, judicial reforms, 
preparation for the national elections, disarmament and dissemination of neutral 
information about political realities in the field.364”      
   
It may be said that involvement of international actors and their “heavy footprints” are, 
to a certain extent, common and inevitable feature of most countries going through a 
post-conflict peacebuilding phase. Injection of foreign public funds ---sine qua non for 
most post-conflict transition--- places certain requirement in execution and reporting, 
which a war-torn country is unlikely to be able to meet on its own. In addition, many 
donors prefer to give a human face to their assistance and aim to find individuals that 
can function as a pipe between them and the assisted365. Most government agencies 
welcome such offers of expertise, as the existing technical capacity is extremely low, 
as we have seen in detail in the previous Chapter. Just how much assistance is 
beneficial to the host country in the long run is a difficult question to assess, however, 
as such set up could also have negative impact to the host county, if capacity building 
programmes are not effectively conducted and dependency to foreign expertise 
develop.  
 
Ultimately, various interests and needs of actors on all sides must be balanced and 
met, as without such consideration and only appealing on idealistic/philanthropic 
grounds, the assistance will not be forthcoming as donor governments need to be 
accountable to their own tax payers. However, this realist consideration needs to be 
balanced with the need to be made to match the local population's fundamental 
preferences and capacity, otherwise the arrangement will not be sustainable, as well as 
being morally unacceptable in the 21st Century inter-state norms. The responsibility of 
the United Nations staff negotiating on behalf of it to ensure as large a match between 
these sometimes opposing direction of needs as possible ---necessarily with a slight tilt 
towards the realist view of the world--- is considerable. It should be concluded that 
from this perspective, those who negotiated and supported the Bonn Process on behalf 
of the United Nations were more than successful. But for the result to be matching the 
needs of the reality, it had to be coupled with success in persuading donor 
                                                                                                                                               
rights and transitional justice. 
364 Anders Tang Friborg, “Afghanistan: Lessons learned from a post-war situation”, Danish 
Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Working paper no 2004/5, p9. 
365 Kato interview with several donor country representatives, Kabul, July 2004.  
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governments to act in accordance with good conscience and foresight i.e. fostering the 
spirit of “do onto others as you would have do onto you” and avoid what may be 
perceived as double talk as much as possible. This latter condition was not fulfilled in 
the Afghan experience. 
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1. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
As we have seen in Part II, the Post-Cold War world witnessed numerous intra-state 
conflicts that were fundamentally different in nature to conflicts among states 
envisioned in the UN Charter366. The international community is exploring various 
models and means to deal with these conflicts and some of them had the UN in the 
center of the international effort. The authorization of enforcement action by a 
multinational force in the Persian Gulf in 1991 demonstrated a united Security Council, 
signaling a substantive departure from its ineffectiveness plagued with superpower 
vetoes through much of the first four decades. This period witnessed and 
unprecedented rise in expectation for UN’s ability to prevent and solve conflicts. But 
especially after the widely publicized “failures of the UN” to deal with conflicts in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, different models also became actively explored. In the 
case of Bosnia and Kosovo, it was the military interventions of the NATO forces that 
ended the conflict in question, and other regional actors such as EC and OSCE play a 
central role in the implementation of the post-conflict peace process. In Africa, regional 
organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC play a major role in dealing 
with conflicts, often in collaboration with the UN but sometimes acting independently367.  
 
In the post-9.11 Afghanistan, military intervention by US and UK destroyed the Taliban 
regime and created space for building peace and while the UN played a key role in 
supporting the design and implementation of the Bonn Agreement, its efforts in the 
country was marked with an orientation for “light footprints” as we have seen in Parts 
III and VI. In relation to Iraq, US is engaged directly since its invasion and removal of 
the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, although UN has a presence it is clearly taking a 
support role while the US runs the process368. Mindful of these various forms of 
international intervention in conflicts in support of peace, in this chapter we shall 
examine in closer detail the particular strength and weakness of UN peace operations. 
 
                                                 
366 UN Charter Article 2.4 stipulates the principle of prohibition of use of force but it is described 
in the context of inter-state relations, not within a state: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state…” (Emphasis in italics added by Kato.) 
367 For instance, African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was created and operated by the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Council, asking for approval by the Security Council in a 
post-facto manner. (www.operationspaix.net/-AMISOM-) 
368 Tom Lasseter, “UN’s Brahimi: Bremer the ‘Dictator of Iraq’ in shaping Iraqi government”, 
Common Dreams News Center, 3 June 2004 (www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file+/ 
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1.1 Weakness: enforcing peace through military means 
 
As an extensive empirical research on the topic made by Doyle and Sambanis369 
concludes, UN is generally not good at “making war” but can be good at “building 
peace”. By “making war” we are referring to peace enforcement action through military 
means. Such forceful action was part of the underlying expectation in the model of 
collective security guaranteed by the UN envisioned at the time of birth of the UN and 
its Charter and therefore hope was high for such role to be played by the UN in the 
early 1990s, after the end of a long impasse under the Cold War bipolar structure. But 
as we have seen in the cases of operations eventually categorized as failure of the UN 
in Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia, UN operations with peace enforcement mandate have 
no real record of success to date. One may argue that it is not the mandate of peace 
enforcement per se that led these specific operations to fail but other combined factors 
such as lack of adequate resources or problems in command structure of the particular 
operation, but the fact remains that these underlying problems will remain for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
As we have seen in Part II, the system of collective security envisioned in the Charter 
is not operational, as the resources required were never made available. Current 
military operations conducted in the name of the UN is done in the framework of 
“peacekeeping” which is in itself a artificial creation, best efforts at responding to 
conflict situations within realistic constraints. Therefore, one has to accept the fact and 
begin theorizing from the premise that there is no centralized UN force, even if it is 
contrary to the design of the Charter and the institutional set up of the UN under the 
collective security model. This means that even with the best efforts at coordination, 
military intervention that are made in the name of the UN is still very much a mix-bag 
of national contingents with highly different standards and norms, and the 
performance of the “UN troops/peacekeepers” are dependant on the quality, 
orientation of the individual troop contributing states.  
 
Under such circumstance of skewed structure half way between theories and reality, it 
is not possible to correctly judge the success or failure of UN peace enforcement 
operations. Any casual observer can conclude that most developments of the past two 
decades point to the unlikeliness of the UN force being realized. On the contrary, as we 
                                                                                                                                               
headlines04/06/03-01.htm) 
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have seen, the trend is to encourage UN’s collaboration and partnership with other 
regional organizations or bilateral supporters where peace enforcement operation is 
required. This amply illustrates the curious way in which International Relations as a 
discipline develops independent of doctrines and theoretical models, rather being 
moved by the reality which is coloured by innovation in thinking, matching it with 
available options.   
 
As a reflection of above recognition, the emphasis given to military solutions (“peace 
enforcement”) in the Agenda for Peace ---along the lines envisioned in the Charter--- 
has given way in the Brahimi Report to the notion that UN’s engagement with settling 
and preventing conflicts will be centered not around military means but around its 
engagement in political processes, supporting forging of consensus and reconstruction 
work which creates the foundation for peaceful society. This shift has placed greater 
emphasis on “peacebuilding” in the recent years and the case of Afghanistan aptly 
mirror this development. 
 
1.2 Strength: Legitimacy and the power of ideals  
 
Turning to the strength of peace operations conducted by the UN ---especially seen in 
terms of comparative advantage to other actors in the international scene that are 
engaged in operations to protect or build peace--- two central features are to be 
identified: they relate to the question of legitimacy and what this dissertation will refer 
to as “the power of ideals”. 
 
There is little dispute that despite many criticisms, the UN as the world’s only universal 
international body where nations small and large meet to translate the lofty ideals of 
the UN charter into reality, still possesses unparalleled ability to provide legitimacy to 
internationally sanctioned action. This is highly relevant at two distinct levels of 
analysis. First is at the level of community of nation states, when the “international 
community” and its composing entities decide on making certain interventions, the 
legitimacy provided to the action by UN by defining it as a requirement agreed by the 
community of nations give a powerful reasoning to mobilize and justify use of public 
funds towards the domestic constituencies. This is true in times of peace for activities 
in support of development, for instance, but even more acutely the case at times of 
                                                                                                                                               
369 Dolyle and Sambanis, p69-143. 
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dealing with conflicts, which inevitably raises discussion in most domestic contexts 
whether the intervention is justified in light of international law, norms and standards 
which most countries claims to abide by. In some cases ---such as the action against 
Iraq led by the US and the UK in 2003--- the division among the five Permanent 
Members of the Security Council may lead individual Member States to give up on 
“going the UN route” and to nonetheless take action without the blessing of the United 
Nations. This approach is pursued at times by powerful states ---and especially in the 
case of the US, the isolationist tendencies surface every now and then depending on 
the issue--- but when they do, they anticipate certain amount of criticism from other 
states and from within their country that would question the legitimacy of the action. 
This is inevitable as in the course of human history many, if not most, wars have been 
fought for a “just cause” in the opinion of the leaders of states engaged and many acts 
of aggression ---such as invasions of foreign territories, declaration of war, subjugation 
to colonialism--- have been made with justifications only acceptable to the invading 
state. In many actual circumstances in relations between states, it is difficult to 
distinguish acts of necessary and justifiable intervention in another state from acts of 
aggression. It was for this reason that mechanisms such as the League of Nations and 
later the United Nations were created so that, at least in theory, necessary 
interventions can be properly sanctioned by the wider international community. Even if 
this theoretically elegant solution is not always applicable in practice due to the reality 
of divergent positions and interests among states, it does not diminish the underlying 
structure of generating legitimacy at the international level.  
 
Furthermore, the question of legitimacy is not relevant only at the level of international 
community but it is also an important factor at the level of local population’s perception. 
Population of countries or territories in need of international support to end conflict 
and rebuild peace are often suspicious of external intervention as in many cases, they 
have experienced foreign-power intervention in the context of the conflict that either 
exacerbated the conflict or made the continuation of the conflict possible through 
support in resources to a particular party in the conflict. Given such circumstance, it 
often helps to mitigate the suspicion and resistance by the local population for external 
intervention, if the United Nations as a neutral actor with moral authority ---at least in 
people’s expectations--- takes the lead in navigating through the political process of 
transition. Without such form of legitimization, many of the acts conducted ---both the 
downright military engagement and the peacebuilding efforts--- resemble conditions of 
foreign invasion and subsequent occupation or colonialism which creates a strong 
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sense of resentment on the part of the local population and this could lead to further 
destabilization, as seen in the case of Iraq since 2003. Finally, at the domestic level, 
UN’s legitimacy and neutrality ---when combined with the right personalities 
representing it--- may play a critical role in bringing and keeping various parties on 
board with the peace process, since history of conflict often gives limited legitimacy 
and trust for a particular party/individual in position of legitimate power370.                 
 
The second feature which this dissertation considers as a unique strength of UN peace 
operations relate to something less tangible but equally important to the concept of 
legitimacy in ensuring successful outcomes in operations for peace. It stems from the 
power of ideals that the UN symbolizes and the hope and expectation it raises in 
people in many parts of the world. While some of the public debate concerning the UN 
in highly developed industrialized countries ---most notably in the US where a powerful 
strand of anti-UN position is discernable among its political elites, and some very vocal 
ones highlighting the inefficiency and incapacity of the UN has contributed to making a 
very negative images of the world body--- gives an impression that UN’s moral 
authority is severely damaged, there is a very different picture one encounters in 
conversation with local population in countries in, or just emerging from, violent 
conflicts. For many in this group ---which are numerous in size---, intervention of UN 
gives hope that there will be a just and tangible transition to security and a possibility 
for realizing a safer lifestyle that they crave. Many express high expectations that “now 
that the UN is here, we are safe as the whole world is watching us and those making 
atrocious acts will not be left as they are. UN will protect us and help us” which is often 
almost heartbreaking to those representing the UN vis-à-vis these ordinary people, 
knowing the reality of limitation of the UN. It is evident that these ordinary people in 
conflict/post-conflict countries have no knowledge of how “UN” works, its limitations 
due to its intergovernmental nature or the discrepancy between its ideals at the 
normative level and the resources and possible options at the practical level, and as 
they were often trapped in conflicts and extreme hardship, they have never heard of 
Srebrenica or the Rwandan genocide. The United Nations still has the power to signify 
the power of ideals and to bring hope to people just emerging from conflicts and this is 
a unique strength of the United Nations peace operations that should be carefully 
nurtured.  
                                                 
370 See reflection by Brahimi on this point in Mary Sack, “An interview with Lakhdar Brahimi” in 
Journal of International Affairs, 22 September 2004, Columbia University School of International 
Public Affairs. 
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If the power of ideals are used properly and matched by concrete actions that make 
tangible improvement in living conditions of the population without delay, it can play a 
crucial role in bringing about cultural change from a mindset and operating rules 
prevailing in times of conflict to a mindset and operating rules necessary for time of 
peace371. Such change is essential in fostering further foundations for lasting peace ---
i.e. to promote action based on respect for the rule of law and human rights--- that are 
at the core of peacebuilding objectives. 
  
A philosophical question underlying every peace operation is whether international 
peacebuilding operations should and can be asked to alter the underlying social fabric 
of the country that created the conflict in the first place. While questions of sovereignty, 
ownership and other normative considerations are raised by some observers372, this 
dissertation perceives that the answer to this question would have to be a “yes” if the 
goal of peace operations is to produce conditions for lasting and self-sustaining peace. 
Then, UN’s potential in this area of its unique strength is of great significance and 
deserves being factored in more strategically in future operations, not just at the 
idealistic level. 
 
2. FACTORS CONSTRAINING THE UN'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH CONFLICTS 
 
2.1 Unrealistic mandates and unmatched resources 
 
It should be noted at the outset that one factor seriously affecting UN's capacity to 
perform effectively in conflict situations is its lack of resources in comparison to the 
mandates given. Notwithstanding the existence of divergent views on the UN's ability 
to act as the key chaperon in conflict resolution, UN has emerged as the body to take 
primary responsibility for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era and the Security 
Council mandated UN to take on increasing responsibility over the past two decades. 
However, even as mandates for UN peace operations increased, the means and 
resources given to the UN to translate these mandates into action did not increase in a 
                                                 
371 On the other hand, if this expectation is not met by the international community as a whole 
during the critical initial period where hope is prevailing (therefore the timing is a critical factor), 
it can lead to dangerous disappointment on the part of the local population and hampers the 
necessary change in mindset and operating rules, as seen in our case study of Afghanistan. 
Brahimi Report also refers to this point tacitly in para 86-91 “Defining what ‘rapid and effective 
deployment entails’”.  
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corresponding manner. Most importantly, the lack of willingness on the part of 
effective troop contributing countries to the military component of these UN operations 
and the fact that UN has to rely on ad hoc voluntary contribution to fund these 
operations pauses serious difficulty for the UN to carry out its mandate in an effective 
manner373. The inability of the UN to develop an independent military capacity has 
become an accepted state of affairs and has no alteration plans in sight. This situation 
accounts for the sometimes-odd selection of UN's operations where some conflict 
deserving intervention may not be met with appropriate action374.  
 
Empirical analysis by many specialists in peace operations375 point to several common 
conclusions: United Nations peace operations work best when there is a high level of 
consistency between the needs of the particular conflictual circumstance and the 
mandate given by the Security Council. The mandate should not be overly ambitious or 
inconsistent with the prevailing reality on the ground. It should be defined in clear 
terms based on realistic assessment of resources that will be made available 
immediately by donors and troop contributing states for the particular operation. The 
mandate should also not be too rigid and should leave room for flexible approach in 
implementation on the ground within the confines of the general principles, as once 
the operation is launched, the time it takes for possible redefinition by the Council of 
the mandated arrangement is not as fast as the speed at which the circumstances may 
change on the ground.  
 
Through examining several UN operations that are considered to be failures, such as 
Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia, one is bound to notice that most of these missions were 
created with unrealistic mandates with resources far from sufficient to conduct 
mandated activities. For instance, Doyle and Sambanis assess that the UN operation in 
Rwanda was marked with “an inadequate mandate (one that did not reflect the 
responsibilities envisaged in the treaty, which was better focused on the true 
challenges) and crucially meager international capacity that resulted in weak 
implementation”376.  
                                                                                                                                               
372 Chesterman, p126-153. 
373 “Commitment gap” is discussed in Brahimi Report, para56-64. 
374  As Simon Chesterman points out, UN activism is generally limited to circumstances 
coinciding with the national interest of a state or a group of states that were prepared to lead. 
Therefore, some operations are unable to produce desired results due to lack of contribution 
from the Member State, exposing a serious weaknesses of UN-led operations. 
375 Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Dobbins et al 2005.  
376 Doyle and Sambanis, p281. 
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On the other hand, the case of Afghanistan we have examined in detail in this 
dissertation offers a different picture. The agreement that bound the parties ending 
conflict as well as the Security Council mandated activities of international military 
assistance force and UN’s civilian assistance mission were all designed with a marked 
sense of realism, matching (i) the international landscape where various actors (most 
notably the US who initiated the removal of the Taliban regime) were designing their 
own engagement, (ii) the national context in Afghanistan where the local political elites 
had strong opinions and all united in the historically grounded distaste for foreign 
imposition, and (iii) the relatively small scale of resources that were likely to be made 
available for the UN operation in the country, considering the enormity of the challenge. 
As a result, the UN operation in the country is generally considered to be a success, 
especially when assessed against the mandates given by the Security Council. However, 
assessment of operational success measured against the given mandate does not 
necessarily guarantee success in the overall aim of building self-sustaining and lasting 
peace in the country. In the case of Afghanistan, it could be said that despite the 
operational success of the UN in the country, several mandates were realistic but not 
sufficient to address the needs of the country, as illustrated in the mandate of the 
international security assistance force (ISAF)’s coverage being limited to Kabul and the 
surrounding area for the critical first two years. We have seen in detail the impact of 
this on tense and worsening security conditions in many provinces, spread of 
warlordism and illicit activities including opium economy that made mockery of the 
legitimate reconstruction efforts, which all added to weakening the credibility of the 
central government and increased tension in the country. It could be said that the UN 
managed to get a realistic mandate and since more was not possible, it at least 
clarified its responsibility in a manner not seen in earlier operations. This is tactically an 
important and appropriate move by the UN as failing to take such realistic approach 
made UN subject of criticism when the real factors constraining its abilities lied 
elsewhere, however nonetheless it is also important to remember the ultimate 
objective of the UN in brining peace to the country and its efforts should be measured 
against these goals as well.               
 
All of the above observations underscore the very heavy responsibility of Security 
Council Members, especially it’s permanent members ---the so-called “P5”---, and 
those in the UN secretariat advising the Council members and assisting in charting the 
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course377, in making sure that appropriate mandates are formulated and once they are 
given, the mandated activities be matched with resources without delay.  
 
2.2 Lack of coherence in Member States’ policy  
 
In addition to the problems arising with misguided mandates and lack of necessary 
resources, another factor severely constraining the ability of the United Nations to 
conduct effective peace operations relates to the behavior of Member States, 
particularly of powerful donor states. In some cases, despite taking an active part in 
formulating the international engagement centered around the UN and publicly 
supporting UN’s peace operations in a particular conflict, when it comes to the stage of 
actual implementation on the ground, many bilateral donor agencies engage in 
activities that compete or conflict with UN’s activities. The fact that this is often the 
case with states that actively worked to have UN’s activities authorized ---or even 
those that contributes financially to UN activities on ear-marked basis--- points to the 
high likelihood that this state of affairs is a result less of intentional acts to challenge 
UN’s work but more a reflection of lack of coherence in the internal policymaking of the 
donor country in concern. It is most likely arising from institutional independence and 
rivalry among various departments of the government, or political pressure of sorts, 
but the top management of the country should be made aware of and carefully 
acknowledge the negative consequences of lack of coherence in their action on the 
overall result and the often inefficient ---sometimes downright wasteful--- use of public 
funds that occurs as a result of these dynamics. 
     
To illustrate the nature and scope of the problem, it may be worth citing a practical 
example: Following the conclusion of the peace agreement and endorsement/ 
authorization of UN activities by the Security Council, a particular donor country 
contributes 378  US$ 1 million to a UN-administered projectized activity to enhance 
                                                 
377 Brahimi Report also alludes on the UN Secretariat’s responsibility to advise and identify 
requirements based on needs rather than based on what seems realistic to be met by the 
member States. (Brahimi Report, para 59) 
378 To be more specific, at this stage it is most likely only be a “pledge” and the actual collection 
of funds may take months and many UN agencies cannot start committing or disbursing funds 
for project activities unless at lease some threshold amount is collected in the bank account. 
This means that the operation need to be funded temporarily through other existing resources 
and that new commitments such as hiring of project staff or placement of procurement orders 
will be delayed. This and many other bureaucratic delayed that slow down UN’s capacity to 
operate indicated, at minimum, shared responsibility between the donor country and the UN 
agency when delay occurs as a result.      
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capacity of a particular government institution ---let us say as a way of example, the 
Ministry of Interior--- designed to be executed over two years time period. While UN is 
in its initial state of project implementation where great amount of needs assessment, 
planning and organizing take place with little visible outcomes, the same donor decides 
to launch a bilateral assistance project that covers the same Ministry’s capacity building 
with a slightly wider mandate at the scale of US$ 15 million to be spent in one year 
duration379. This may have been a result of injection of fresh funding due to renewed 
interest in the topic at the political level or in response to change in public opinion 
generated by the media. Causes vary but the common effect is that consumed by the 
urgency and political considerations to absorb and allocate new funding, the highest 
level of consistency with ongoing and already committed activities are not sought. In 
the case of some donors, these projects are largely subcontracted to contractors from 
the donor country and they will be under pressure to finish their project in a limited 
timeframe. These contractors have very little incentive to coordinate at substantive 
level with entities such as the UN that are often engaged in relatively longer term 
capacity building with due considerations for local ownership and sustainability. As a 
result, the contractor implementing bilateral assistance may provide certain types of 
training or equipment (e.g. radio equipment for patrolling police officers) at a much 
larger scale and this would necessitate the UN to scrap or substantially change its 
plans that took months to develop and process. Add to this picture several additional 
donors that provide bilateral assistance to the same Ministry with similar objectives. 
Also, the same donor government may likely have different arms of the governments 
operating with murky division of labour, each with separate sources of funding and 
political priority. Compounded by the combination of lack of donor coordination and 
recipient government’s tendency to “ask everyone for everything” without prioritization 
or coordination (both discussed in Part IV), these lack of coherence and consistency in 
donor activities creates atrocious lack of efficiency in the overall assistance by the 
international community.  
     
                                                 
379 Those in charge of these decisions in the donor capital may argue that their change in plan 
was driven by a frustration with the slow pace UN implements its activities. From their vintage 
point of view, under political pressure to deliver visible results quickly, they “had to explore 
different tracks as well”. (Based on Kato interview with donor embassy officials in Kabul and 
Islamabad, July 2004) But when these “disappointments with UN and subsequent change in 
plan” come in the timeframe of several months from the initial contribution agreement, it is 
hard to justify their claim in its entirety, as they should have known the realistic constraints on 
UN operations which make UN action slower than those of some Member States’ bilateral 
assistance programme. At the least, it is lack of foresight on the part of the donor country and 
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While it is understandable that domestic policy-makers’ expectations and requirements 
in the donor country may favour multiple-track approach combining activities that 
deliver quick results ---which many donors see as necessary for public opinion--- and 
longer term intervention as well as to try out different avenues of assistance, in the 
reality on the ground, such actions by donors taken without detailed calculations and 
follow up of ensuring highest level of consistency in the overall effort, lead to great 
confusion and inefficiency for the overall efforts and this factor must be acknowledged.          
 
2.3 Institutional silos plaguing the system  
 
Having highlighted the constraints deriving from the Member States, on the other side 
of the spectrum that needs to be assessed is the failure of the UN bureaucracy to live 
up to the challenges by responding as an integrated coherent entity. Despite being 
normatively united in the mission of creating a better world for the citizens of the world, 
various parts of the United Nations system have many different priorities that they 
consider to be more important than others and institutional competition hinders the 
most efficient implementation of a peacebuilding operation. While lack of coordination 
and institutional rivalries that negatively affects the peacebuilding process abundantly 
exist in the wider framework of the donor community ---and indeed among the 
recipients as well---, this sub-chapter will focus on the dynamics within the UN system 
organizations where institutional silos are the norm rather than the exception.  
 
It is worth recalling what the “UN system” has come to mean. The United Nations 
family of organizations, formally referred to as the “United Nations system”, is made up 
of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations programmes and funds and the 
specialized agencies. As summarized in the table below, the secretariat and, to a large 
extent the programmes and funds, are governed by the same policymaking bodies of 
the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Councils and the Security Council, all of 
which are three principle organs of the United Nations operating in the same UN 
headquarters in New York.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
it is most ironic that this leads to further “slowness” in UN’s delivery.   
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         Table 10: Composition and characteristics of the UN system organizations380 
 UN Secretariat Programmes 
and Funds 
Specialized 
agencies 
Other affiliated 
organizations 
Reporting 
to 
GA; a principle 
organ of the UN 
Subsidiary 
bodies of GA 
ECOSOC (&/or 
GA) 
Various 
Governing 
bodies  
GA GA Own  
governing 
bodies 
Own governing 
bodies 
Budget UN Regular 
Budget and 
voluntary 
contribution 
Own budget Own budget Own budget 
Example DPA, DPKO, 
OCHA, DESA, 
regional 
commissions, 
int’l tribunals 
UNDP, UNICEF, 
UNCTAD, UNEP, 
UNFPA, UNIFEM, 
WFP,  
ILO, FAO, WHO, 
UNIDO, ICAO, 
UNESCO, IMO, 
IFAD, the World 
Bank group, IMF 
IAEA, OPCW, 
WTO, CTBTO 
 
Although there are many cases where different policymaking organs based in New 
York produce mandates to the UN that are not entirely coherent, decisions made in 
these three principle organs are relatively unified as they are often attended by the 
same delegations of Member States based in, or coordinated by, their Permanent 
Missions in New York. This ensures some level of coherence in mandates and policy 
guidance from Member States that shape the resultant decisions taken by these organs. 
The same cannot be said for decisions taken by the governing bodies of the specialized 
agencies which are officially defined as “autonomous organizations working with the 
United Nations and each other through the coordinating mechanism of the Economic 
and Social Council”. As even the official PR publication produced by the UN Secretariat 
states: “The specialized agencies, linked to the United Nations through special 
agreements, report to the Economic and Social Council and/or the General Assembly. 
They have their own governing bodies and budgets, and set their own standards and 
guidelines.381” In theory, this is not a problem if the internal policy formulation and 
execution procedure in the Member States are well controlled and coordinated. In 
reality, this is not always so straightforward as different institutional (and sometimes 
even individual) agendas and/or rivalries among various parts of the Member States 
government dealing with various technical aspects of the UN system’s work tend to 
give mandates that are not consistent or realistic when conceived as a whole. 
                                                 
380 Table created by the author. 
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Institutional turf battles among international agencies often correspond to the 
competition among the national ministries responsible for the particular technical area. 
In many donor countries, the resources generated for certain activity area of the UN 
systems often depends heavily on the position and influence of the 
Ministry/Department that are in charge and although Ministry of Foreign Affairs or its 
equivalent struggles to keep the bigger UN picture in mind, overall coordination among 
various contributions and mandates tend to be in deficit. 
 
There are also differences at a more structural level as well. While the United Nations 
itself has universal membership and in its principle organ decision-making bodies all 
decisions are taken on the principle of one state one vote formula, some of the 
specialized agencies have much more restricted membership and the voting may be 
weighed382. This creates different context in which mandates are given to UN system 
organizations. The most obvious case in terms of governance structure can be found in 
the Bretton Woods institutes, the World Bank Group383 and the International Monetary 
Fund ---perhaps much better known in terms of organizational category as 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)--- that have fundamentally different identity 
as reflected in their membership and decision making mechanism. In the case of the 
World Bank, for instance, the level of autonomy is so high and the scale of channeled 
resources are so great that it is only in a nominal sense that the specialized agency 
reports to the UN through ECOSOC. In reality, in the case of the World Bank and 
several other cases, the specialized agency’s action taken in line with the mandates 
and resources given by the respective governing body of the World Bank shape, to a 
great extent, the content of UN system’s intervention in the particular area.   
 
When the delegates from a particular functional ministry of a Member State join with 
their international counterparts in a UN systems governing body and give mandate to a 
UN systems organization with functional focus ---whether it be trade, cultural heritage, 
                                                                                                                                               
381 United Nations, Basic facts about the United Nations (2000) 
382 Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules For The World: International Organizations In 
Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004), p223. 
383 The World Bank is a group of five institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The common goal of all institutions is to reduce 
poverty around the world by strengthening the economies of poor nations. Their aim is to 
improve people’s living standards by promoting economic growth and development. The Bank’s 
governing body is the Board of Governors, in which all member states are represented. General 
operations are delegated to a smaller group, the Board of Executive Directors, with the 
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environmental protection, health, education, arms control, gender issues, transnational 
organized crime, labour issues, post system or any other of the multitude of topics 
mandated to the entities in the UN system--- that pave the way for uncoordinated 
action for the UN system as a whole, where does the responsibility for improvement 
lie? The blames for the resultant lack of coordination in the action taken by the UN 
system is often placed exclusively on the UN as a question of internal competition. 
While it is very important to assess further the responsibility of the UN staff to make 
much greater efforts at coordination, the responsibility and the leverage that the 
Member States have in changing this reality should also not go unacknowledged.  
 
All of the above notwithstanding, it is still relevant to emphasis the central role that the 
UN staff needs to play in improving coordination and achieving the greatest level of 
coherence and impact. Articulating the wider problem of the current international 
system, including the critical role played by the Member States, is by no means to 
diminish the serious need for better coordination efforts within the UN system 
organizations, especially among the core UN secretariat departments and sister 
agencies, which is so deplorably lacking at present. And the resulting inefficiency is 
most obviously unacceptable in peacebuilding operations where due to the integrated 
nature of the required interventions many UN system organizations (together with a 
host of other actors, both bilateral and multilateral) interact with one another in a 
relatively small space. As we have seen in the case study of Afghanistan, various 
mechanisms ---such as the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), the United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDF), and consolidated appeals at the field level 
and the Central Executive Board (CEB), the Executive Committee on Peace and 
Security (ECPS), the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA), the 
United Nations Development Group (UNDG), Executive Committee on Humanitarian 
Affairs (ECHA) and the Policy Committee (PC) at the headquarters level--- are available 
to coordinate efforts among the UN entities. But they are only as good as the people 
working in the constituting entities. Coordination is less about the division of labour (as 
the current discussion tends to circle around) than finding ways to work in an 
integrated manner, based on unique expertise and resources various entities can bring 
on board. So far, this breakthrough in thinking and practice has not been made. It is 
believed that this state of affairs led Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to address to his 
senior most staff in the CEB retreat in the summer of 2008:    
                                                                                                                                               
President of the Bank serving as Chairman of the Board.  
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 “… We must acknowledge how resistant we are to change. It cripples us in our 
most important job—to function as a team … we are still too process-oriented. We 
get too bogged down in internal or bureaucratic technicalities. We waste incredible 
amounts of time on largely meaningless matters. …Our job is to change the UN—
and, through it, the world. This is the big picture. I am frustrated by our failure, so 
often, to see it.  
… Department heads squabble among themselves over posts and budgets and 
bureaucratic prerogatives, as though as they somehow owned them. But our 
departments, agencies and programmes are not personal fiefdoms. ... we must 
change our UN culture. We must move faster. Simplify. Deregulate. De-centralize. 
Break down barriers and create more mobility within the organization, so that we 
can draw more fully on the talents of our staff.  
… Do not mistake me. I value independence. Initiative too. But we must remember 
that independence is not absolute. We are part of one organization, one UN. 
Independence does not free us from the need for consultation and collaboration 
and teamwork. There are no exceptions, even in offices intended to be the most 
independent. Those of us who act otherwise need a personal reality check. Ego 
may be getting in our way. … Let us build networks within the UN to break down 
bureaucracy. 
… Our work is urgent. Let us infuse it with a sense of speed and urgency – the 
passion of accomplishment. Let us not confuse our inner world—the physical halls 
of this UN—with the real world. Let us always put real-world results ahead of 
bureaucratic UN process. 
… When you are trying to do something that is tough, when you are trying to 
change the status quo, people will resist. Your subordinates will come to you and 
whisper in your ear. “Boss,” they will say. “Your leadership will be undermined. We 
will lose power within the organization. Resources will be taken away by So and 
So.” Don’t listen to them. They are thinking of their own position or benefit, not 
the larger interest of the UN, or what we are trying to accomplish as a team.  
… One UN is not a slogan. It is a management imperative. It is the first principle of 
effectiveness..384" 
 
With an unusual candidness, the Secretary General articulates the inefficiency caused 
by the institutional silos plaguing the system that ends in disappointing the hope of 
people that awaits effective intervention by the United Nations. It could be assessed 
that the fact that such message is being sent from the highest level of the organization 
                                                 
384 Secretary general’s message to staff shared with all staff through iSeek (Secretariat-wide 
intranet): "Our job is to change the UN —and, through it, the world" (29 August 2008). 
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to all staff is a positive sign in itself. It could also be said, however that it illustrates the 
depth and seriousness of the problem that faces the road for United Nations to 
transform itself to a coherent organization that can deliver better as one. For the real 
changes to occur, the most important thing that needs to take place is a change in UN 
staff’s mindset and behavior. Every effort should be made by the management of the 
UN, consistently supported by the Member States, to bring about such change in its 
staff, and in some cases where change in mindset and behavior do not occur, they 
should be given the scope to separate and change the staff who perpetuate the 
fragmented approach. These are interesting topics of great importance but like the 
question of the overall UN reform, the topic of improving UN’s internal management 
goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, and therefore detailed discussion will be 
saved for another occasion. Through this sub-chapter, by carefully assessing the two 
sides of the problem ---the Member States on the one hand and the UN institutions 
and its staff on the other--- which usually never make it beyond a polemical discussion 
of “finding who to blame”, this dissertation attempted to analyze the problem of UN’s 
institutional coordination in a comprehensive manner so as to identify possible means 
for change. The point being made was that while it is correct to argue that a large 
share of responsibility for lack of coordination and coherence in UN action rest with 
staff of the UN agencies, it is also important to assess and work on the systematic 
conditions underlying the UN system that create and perpetuate such lack of cohesion. 
  
3. MAXIMIZING UN'S ABILITY TO ASSIST IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 
 
3.1 Five key considerations 
 
In order to maximize UN’s ability to deal effectively with preventing and ending 
conflicts and building peace, this dissertation concludes from assessments made in this 
and previous Parts that factors including the following are of paramount importance: 
  
1. Clear and realistic mandate with matching resources given to the UN 
2. Commitment of key Member States to enable UN to play its designated role 
3.  Leaving room for maneuver and adjustment to match local development  
4.  Need to focus and prioritize on certain objectives (& coordinate with others)  
5.  Selecting good SRSGs 
While the first two factors were already described at length in this Part and the need 
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for the third and fourth factors were evident in dealing with the dilemmas in post-
conflict peacebuilding that we discussed in Part IV, the human factor of UN’s 
engagement has not been assessed equivalently. Therefore in this final Chapter, we 
shall review the importance of the role of the SRSG in a post-conflict peacebuilding 
process, and then one other factor meriting discussion in relation to maximizing UN’s 
overall capacity i.e. United Nation’s role in fostering better public understanding of 
about itself as well as conflicts and post-conflict circumstances it is working with. 
 
While warning against constructing templates or models for post-conflict 
reconstruction, Simon Chesterman states that it is nevertheless possible to draw some 
generalizations and concludes that one of the most important lessons to be drawn 
from the recent UN operations is that personalities of local and international staff in 
charge can change the course of an operation385. The impact of this human factor to 
peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding process is very seldom analyzed ---most 
likely because of the difficulty to attribute outcomes to individuals and their particular 
contribution to a multi-faceted process such as those involved in peacebuilding--- but it 
is often recognized intrinsically by those involved in the process.   
 
One feature evident in the Afghan experience of post-conflict peacebuilding process 
under the Bonn Agreement was the critical and central role that the representative of 
the United Nations, the SRSG, played especially in the formulation and the initial 
implementation stage. It is without doubt that Brahimi’s perspectives and 
recommendations shaped the process profoundly. His contribution was substantiated 
on the following qualities he possessed: (i) wealth of knowledge about the Afghan 
conflict ---both its internal and external dimensions--- stemming from his hands-on 
experience of serving as the SRSG from July 1997- end of 1999 386 , (ii) strong 
conviction and clear vision of what UN’s role in post-conflict situations should be, as 
refined in the preparation of and expressed in the Brahimi Report. It could be assessed 
that these personal qualities helped Brahimi to function very effectively in ensuring 
factors 1, 3 and 4 listed above, namely, he succeeded in designing a peace process 
based on realistic needs and potentials387 and obtained mandate for the UN mission 
from the Security Council matching to it; he designed into the mandated structure 
                                                 
385 Chesterman, 2004, p6. 
386 Even though during that period Brahimi’s peacemaking efforts led to little result due to lack 
of genuine cooperation from some parties that were being mediated, as analyzed in Chapter 1 
of Part III.      
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sufficient flexibility to adjust operations according to developments on the ground and 
left room for political maneuver by not making the agreement too rigid or specific; he 
prioritized on the virtue of national ownership and local capacity building centered 
around the support to a strong central government under President Karzai ---which 
also led to prioritizing on security and stability which was a major weakness for the 
Karzai administration--- even realizing the costs that may have on some other areas of 
Bonn Agreement’s objectives, it could also be said that he prioritized on looking at now 
and the future, as opposed to looking into the past, these were his attempts at 
prioritization, recognizing that everything can not be attained all at once and that UN 
efforts need to focus. By having offered himself to be available to function as the SRSG, 
Brahimi also enabled the international community to deal effectively with factor 5. The 
only remaining factor that was ultimately beyond his control was factor 2 relating to 
Member States behavior. One could say that scoring favourably in 4 out of 5 success 
factors is rather exceptional given the complexity of ensuring a good match. The 
combination of these factors enabled the UN to function effectively in the case of 
Afghanistan under the Bonn Agreement and it could be assessed that it owed 
significantly to Brahimi’s personal contribution.     
 
3.2 Engaging the public and the need for UN to give accurate picture 
 
At a more fundamental level, United Nations officials and its supporters should begin to 
speak more candidly, to truly engage with the public ---especially targeting the more 
affluent and educated segments of the population who may be able to influence public 
opinion--- about difficult issues and complicated reality United Nations is faced with. 
This final argument put forward by this dissertation is a purely prescriptive observation.  
 
The world of diplomacy is distinctly traditionalist and conservative, placing great value 
on discreetness, as illustrated in the fact that being “diplomatic” in common parlance is 
often equated to not being honest or direct. It is undeniable that this is the context in 
which the United Nations’ political decisions are made. Furthermore, the working 
culture that tacitly governs the United Nations today is one shaped at a time when 
“states” were the only relevant category of actors that the United Nations had to deal 
with in conducting its work. Factoring these two conditions, it is only natural that the 
United Nations rarely makes direct statement addressed to the public on current affairs 
                                                                                                                                               
387 Echoing the importance attached to the need for realism in Brahimi Report, para 26.  
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that goes beyond rhetoric and idealism. However, as we have seen in Part II, the past 
two decades of United Nations’ history has seen great shift in thinking and in action 
regarding basic concepts and norms governing international relations and these may 
necessitate change in the way the United Nations engages with the public. 
 
For instance, we may examine the concept of sovereignty. While state actors continue 
to be the only composing members of the United Nations and the principles such as 
state sovereignty or non-intervention in domestic affairs of a state are still major 
guiding principles of the international community, these are becoming more of a 
relative concept and the voice to question unconditional applicability of these principles 
have grown and created a norm that these rights of a state should only be recognized 
for state entities that are legitimate388. Debates such as those around the concept of 
“responsibility to protect” and “humanitarian intervention389” developed over the past 
two decades, matching to the reality in which there are many “failed states” among the 
community of nations that compose the United Nations. In face of such sweeping 
changes in the landscape of political analysis, even the very concept of security has 
diversified from the traditional notion of “national security” to include the notion of 
“human security”390 where the level of analysis is brought to the level of individual 
                                                 
388 What constitutes a minimally required legitimacy of a state is also a subject of fierce debate 
but here it is meant to say that if those holding (or claiming) the position of a state government 
are perpetrating crime, abusing the rights of its citizens (or particular segments of it), principles 
of state sovereignty or non-interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign nation should not be 
used to allow atrocities to go on unhindered by the international community. There are also 
many difficult cases, where various parties to conflict claim its legitimacy as the government 
when in reality they are unable to exert control in a large part of its territory. This was the case 
with the seat of the Afghan government in the United Nations during the long years of conflict; 
from 1992, the Mujaheddin coalition government under President Rabbani sent its 
representative to the UN (taking over from the Communist regime holding the seat during the 
1980s) and this remained until 2001 but for the last several years, the Embassy was de facto 
speaking for one party to the conflict i.e. the Northern Alliance while the Taliban, claiming 
governing status and controlling 90% of the national territory, established a parallel, unofficial 
representation to the United Nations.          
389 While this dissertation will not review these two concepts in detail as it does not relate to its 
main these, the concepts of “responsibility to protect” and “humanitarian intervention” present 
important perspectives to the work and analysis of the United Nations peace operations. For 
background on these concepts, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving strangers: Humanitarian 
intervention in international society (Oxford University Press, 2000), Simon Chesterman, Just 
war or just peace?: Humanitarian intervention and international law (Oxford University Press, 
2001), and The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre, 2001)    
390 The term “human security” (in the sense of its current use) was first articulated in a report 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2004. Some of the proponents of 
human security concept would argue that it replaces the concept of national security but given 
the reality of the current world where states do continue to function as the main entities 
defining security needs, it seems more logical to place the concept of human security as a 
diversification of the security concept not replacing the concept of national security. For general 
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citizens of the world.  
 
In addition to the change in the concept of statehood at the international level, 
another major change that transformed some of the fundamental conditions of the 
world is related to the forces of globalization 391 . With the incredible rate of 
technological advancements witnessed in the second-half of the 20th Century, the 
world is smaller and the people living on this planet is tightly connected to each other 
than ever before recognized. Many of today’s biggest problems ---including 
environmental degradation and all its related natural catastrophes, terrorism and many 
other forms of serious crime, epidemics and other health concerns, illegal migration 
and trafficking of human beings, chaos in the world-wide financial market--- are 
transnational in nature and require responses that no government can make on its own. 
In such a world, a universal international coordinating mechanism such as the United 
Nations can ---and is expected to--- play a very critical role 392  but its sense of 
accountability needs to look beyond the Member States to which United Nations as a 
body is governed by and reporting to. While it is most highly likely that the United 
Nations will remain an intergovernmental body for the foreseeable future and the 
primary actors will continue to be state entities, the certainty of this prospect should 
not preclude the United Nations to engage wider with the general public within 
Member States to count on their conscientious interest and power to influence the 
national governments that represent them at the United Nations. Such direct 
engagement by the United Nations policy makers ---especially those engaged in areas 
such as peace and security--- have not been strategically attempted by the 
organization to date393.            
                                                                                                                                               
reference on the concept of human security see Sandra Jean Maclean, David R. Black & 
Timothy M. Shaw (Eds), A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance And New 
Multilateralisms (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) and for its linkage with conflicts and the 
peacebuilding process see Hideaki Shinoda and Ho-Won Jeong (eds), Conflict and human 
security: a search for new approaches of peacebuilding (Hiroshima University Institute for 
Peace Science, 2004).   
391 John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, 4th 
Edition (Oxford University Press, 2008); Kemal Dervis & Ceren Ozer, A Better Globalization: 
Legitimacy, Governance, and Reform (Center for Global Development, 2005); Paul Kennedy, 
Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (Vintage Books, 1993). 
392 A point tirelessly made by various delegations to the United Nations General Assembly 
plenary sessions each year. Classic academic work suggesting these points are Stephan Krasner, 
International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1982), Robert O. Keohane, “The demand for 
international regimes” in International Organizations, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p325-355. 
393 Various efforts to raise awareness of the public regarding the general work of the Untied 
Nations is being carried out by the Department of Public Information (DPI) and many UN 
system entities have specialists dealing with information and communication. However, their 
role is different from the type of engagement with public suggested here which would include 
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The central argument being presented in this sub-chapter is that those speaking on 
behalf of the United Nations should speak frankly and openly about the practical 
implications of decisions taken by the Member States directing on the work of the 
United Nations, presenting real choices and counting on informed public opinion to 
foster practice by governments that would enable the United Nations to deal effectively 
with conflicts and peacebuilding. Such proposition may at first instance be derided as 
being unrealistic or naïve, especially by those engaged with UN diplomacy. But it must 
be emphasized that it is an argument being made based on very realistic 
considerations. For a failure to create greater and more accurate understanding in 
public regarding the factors that constrain UN from taking certain effective action in 
preventing conflicts and serving people in need may bring “criticism towards the United 
Nations” beyond a limit where UN’s authority and capacity become increasingly 
diminished. If it reaches that level where disillusionment becomes the accepted norm, 
then UN will be caught in a vicious circle of not being able to perform due to lack of 
trust (resulting in mandate and resources) and not being able to gain trust due to lack 
of performance, at that stage UN’s inability will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Assessing from the climate surrounding the United Nations at the beginning of this new 
Millennium, it seems fair to assess that we are still not in this stage of desperation but 
it must be assessed that we are at a critical point where the changes need to begin as 
the disillusionment is growing excessively strong394.     
 
Codes of diplomacy and respect for the representatives of the Member States will 
always govern UN’s operating norm and tactfulness is required in any sensitive 
maneuvering but they should not function in a way where accountability is untraceable 
and intractable because no one dare speak the real picture. This is close to depriving 
the public ---“the people” as articulated in the Charter for whom UN serves--- from 
information and perspectives that should aid in shaping their view of the world, the UN 
and their governments. In the process, credit and responsibility for successes and 
                                                                                                                                               
frank and factual reference to ongoing activities. This may touch on difficulties or differences 
among Member States or within the Secretariat. Types of activities conducted by the United 
Nations at present are very different in nature as they focus on neutral information which may 
appear at times as being nothing more than a “public statement” not shedding greater light to 
the problem or possible solutions and dangers for the informed public.  
394 Events that severely diminished UN’s legitimacy include widely-publicized “failure of the UN” 
in ill-conceived and severely under-resourced peace-enforcement operations in Somalia, 
Rwanda and Bosnia (latter two including shocking and unacceptable outcomes such as the 
Rwandan genocide and the massacre of Srebrenica), the Iraq Oil-for-Food scandal which 
included the role of the son of Kofi Annan while he was still in office, and lastly the Security 
Council’s inability to agree on the position on Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent non-sanctioned 
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failures of the “UN” should be attributed to where they belong, whether within UN or in 
Member State governments. Too often, “the failure of UN” or the “inefficiency of the 
UN” is discussed in the media and national legislatures as if UN as an entity exists in a 
form equivalent to a centralized national government, where the government is 
responsible for and capacitated to setting its priorities, deciding on its interventions 
and given the power to determine resource allocation. This is simply not the case for 
the UN which is an intergovernmental body with mixed governance structure with no 
priority-setting or resource allocation power of its own. All decisions are taken by the 
Member States in the Principle Organs. All the mandates deciding on and designing the 
modality of UN peace operations are taken by the Security Council. The Secretariat is 
subject to the decisions of the General Assembly ---with current membership of 192 
states--- on critical resource matters, including human resource management. There is 
no equivalent of taxation to generate independent revenue and therefore the 
Secretariat is entirely dependant on assessed regular budget contributions and 
voluntary contribution from key donor states. The increasing share of the latter on the 
overall operating costs of the UN means that there is a tight-rope balancing act 
between the orientation of the donor countries (not to say they are united) and the 
vast majority of the beneficiary countries in determining priorities that are matching to 
the recipient’s overall plan and high in feasibility to attract donor funding “without 
becoming too donor-driven”. It is such a complex and disorganized enterprise and 
even among those engaged with the United Nations ---both on the Secretariat side and 
the Member State side--- very few seem to have an overall picture of the United 
Nations as an enterprise, as many are simply too occupied with one aspect of the 
organization’s work, looking at the burning tree that is blocking one’s view to see the 
forest behind it. It is worth asking how many people outside of those engaged with the 
United Nations are aware of all these underlying conditions and know how they 
collectively impact on the performance of “the United Nations”. It would be imperative 
to explore this question in future research and this type of consideration must be 
factored into the way the United Nations engages with the public.   
 
Despite being in such a state, it is assessed that the United Nations as an entity is 
more than just a sum of its composing parts and it can ---and it does--- play a 
significant role in ending and preventing conflicts and building peace, as this 
dissertation has demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan. This sub-chapter attempted 
                                                                                                                                               
military action by the US and UK (two Council members) bypassing the Council.  
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to argue that its full potential would be realized by additionally taking a more strategic 
approach in engaging the public, turning more attention to sub-state level owners of 
the United Nations.    
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This dissertation set out with the aim to contribute to a better comprehension of how 
the international community can best engage with countries emerging from conflict, 
supporting the effort of peacebuilding to avoid the recurrence of violent conflicts that 
would pause a threat to international peace and security and undermine human 
security of the citizens of the countries or sub-national entities. Through a review of 
the changing nature of UN’s engagement with conflicts in the post-Cold War era, 
observing how the practice of peace operations led development of conceptual 
framework for analysis, the context in which the case study presents itself in the 
international context was determined.   
 
The Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding process management was selected as a case 
study to analyze in depth due to the fact that it is one of the major arenas where the 
international community engaged in ending a conflict and building peace in the new 
Millennium that saw a fundamental paradigm shift in the aftermath of 9.11. In contrast 
to the United Nations operations launched in the end of the 1990s in Kosovo and East 
Timor, UN-led peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan took a determined “light footprint” 
approach. The peacebuilding support mission was coupled with a multilateral 
international security assistance force (ISAF) mandated by the Security Council to aid 
the Afghan government in maintaining security. However, ISAF’s role was severely 
limited during the first half of the Bonn Process as it was only deployed in Kabul and 
the surrounding area. Throughout the Bonn Process, in the eyes of many Afghans, the 
international military presence was more strongly equated to the Coalition Forces led 
by the US deployed in the context of the War on Terror, not for supporting in broader 
terms the Afghan government in realizing security to create space for peacebuilding. 
This dual military engagement by the international community complicated the 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement.  
 
One of the key variables underlying the whole process was the exclusion of a major 
party to the conflict in the country ---the Taliban--- from the Bonn Process, as their 
significance at the international level, equated to international terrorists and defined as 
the enemy of US and the coalition in the War on Terror, was taken to be more relevant 
than their significance at the country level. Taliban as an Afghan entity is less a 
“supporter of terrorism” than one among various groups of contending warlords 
composed of Pashtuns albeit with extremist views. Taliban also embodies partially the 
Pashtun population’s frustration towards non-Pashtun attempts for political dominance 
after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. By excluding the Taliban from the post-
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conflict transition process and not taking other measures to bring the non-Taliban 
conservative tribal Pashtuns solidly on board to the process, a sizable segment of the 
most numerous ethnic group of the country remained outside of the process they had 
to be a part of if post-conflict peacebuilding was to happen. It is most significant that 
in the formulation of the Bonn Agreement and its implementation phase, this key party 
to the conflict had no place in the process of political transition. As this framework 
remained unaltered during the entire Bonn Process against the background of 
continued War on Terror, this condition contributed to fostering growth of insurgency 
against the central government and the Coalition Forces and severely strained the 
process of state building and the overall political transition. Non-Taliban, traditional 
Pashtun leaders were either in exile and had weak local power base or were not 
sufficiently engaged in the process. Having Hamid Karzai as the President and several 
returnee Purshtuns serve as “technocrat Ministers” in the government was an elegant 
formula from an international perspective but it made the non-Pashtun ethnic groups 
feel marginalized while at the same time failing to genuinely bring in the Pashtun 
population into the transition process.     
 
Another critically important factor was the approach taken by the Afghan transition 
government and the international community to de-link regional power-holders from 
their powerbase. While on the one hand tolerating arbitrary use of force and breaking 
of the rule of law by some commanders and government officials (believed to be 
cooperative to the Coalition Forces in the War on Terror), labelling some other regional 
power holders with Mujahideen background as “warlords” and removing them from 
their locality was an inconsistent policy. Furthermore, by removing the sub-national 
level actors with the ability to maintain minimal order before the central government’s 
institutions could take over their function made security situation deteriorate in many 
parts of the country and this made life more dangerous and/or unfair for many 
Afghans living outside of Kabul.      
 
Due to these three factors (i.e. continuation of hostile foreign military engagement in 
the context of the War on Terror throughout the Bonn Process; exclusion of the 
Taliban from the political transition process and weak linkage to other Pashtun majority 
groups; and removal of regional commanders who could provide some form of law and 
order from their power base equating them top “warlords”), attaining and maintaining 
security had to be the supreme consideration of decision-makers behind the Bonn 
Process and its implementation. This had come sometimes at the cost of other 
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important objectives in the peacebuilding process described in the Agreement, such as 
state institution building, socio-economic development, accountability to past action 
and promotion of reconciliation between different ethnic groups. This dissertation 
constructed and proved the hypothesis that this was a situation where external 
conditions at the inter-state level (i.e. War on Terror) dictated the internal peace 
process at the intra-state level (i.e. not to include the Taliban in the peace process and 
therefore having to place security consideration above all other goals) and that in turn 
negatively affected the peace process to deliver desired result (i.e. security and lasting 
stable peace), with an impact back to both levels of analysis.  
 
Consequences of this overdimentional focus on security stemming from the these key 
variables included prevalence of “warlordism” where the rule of law was continuously 
overruled by the rule of gun from the viewpoint of the Afghan population. 
Accomodationist tendencies of the Afghan transitional administration and its 
international backers hindered the emergence of a new culture based on respect for 
law and humanity. These and several other complex dilemmas in post-conflict 
peacebuilding process were identified in the dissertation.  
 
Some maintained that the unwillingness of the Afghan transitional administration and 
the international community to confront those undermining the essential tenets of the 
peace process ---i.e. creating a coherent unified state governed by a strong central 
government in accordance with the Constitution, introducing the rule of law in the life 
of the Afghans which include promotion of respect for human rights, pluralism and 
diversity--- contributed to the declining support and confidence to the peace process 
on the part of the Afghan population, which in turn made progress additionally difficult. 
Others were of the opinion that pushing too much on principles would lead to a 
breakdown of the fragile balance on which the main actors chose to resolve differences 
without resorting to direct force. The latter was the view held more widely among the 
decision-makers both in the Afghan government and in the international community 
supporting it and therefore this policy-line prevailed. It is impossible to assess at this 
stage whether this was the right approach and what the longer-term consequence of 
various decisions based on this approach will be, but one fact to be acknowledged is 
that Afghanistan did manage to navigate through the thorny first years of post-conflict 
peacebuilding without having all the parties to the peace process reverting to armed 
conflict. It was assessed that even discounting the fact that a major party to the 
original conflict was excluded from this picture and continued to destabilize parts of the 
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country, this in itself should be considered a major achievement given the history of 
Afghanistan and the context the Process was set in.  
 
The dissertation took note that others argue that the international community, led by 
the United Nations, should have taken more intrusive measures to alter the power 
structure of the country and resolving underlying causes of conflictual relationship 
among the country’s various actors at the stage of designing the Bonn Agreement and 
in the initial stages of its implementation on the ground. It is important to question 
whether the position and behaviour of the international mediators were not too close 
to accepting the status quo, not aiming sufficiently to address the underlying causes of 
continued fighting and dissatisfaction among the Afghan population. However, given 
the prevailing reality and orientation in the country and in the international community, 
this dissertation acknowledged that there were no alternatives in a realistic sense for 
the United Nations guiding the process.  
 
Analyzed against the background of evolution of its engagement in conflicts, UN’s 
operation in the Afghan post-conflict peacebuilding under the Bonn Process was 
assessed as a success, albeit a qualified one. In actually bringing an end to a series of 
conflict that spanned for quarter of a Century and in supporting the country gain 
increasingly legitimate political governance structure, the Bonn Process should be rated 
highly. Although, even in these spheres, there were factors beyond UN’s control at the 
international level that weakened the level of success, such as the continuation of the 
combative engagement by foreign military presence that made brining in “insurgents” 
to the peace process highly difficult. A critical element that limited the success was 
related to changing the lives of ordinary Afghans by bringing about a society where 
individuals can feel that they live in a country/community based on the rule of law. On 
this front, peacebuilding efforts made under the Bonn Process can have less of a claim. 
Supremacy of security concerns led to double standards in the way key international 
actors and the central government dealt with warlords and potential spoilers and this 
also increased the conflictual nature of the process. However, the overall balance sheet 
needs to be made against what was realistically feasible. Considering the dynamics at 
the international-level, position of the key international partners of Afghanistan and the 
conditions prevailing in a country dormant from long years of lawlessness in addition to 
the originally high level of fragmentation, the dissertation concluded that the 
peacebuilding efforts under the Bonn Process achieved remarkable results and there 
are many lessons to be learnt for future endeavours in post-conflict peacebuilding 
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under circumstances where the process is highly conflictual.    
 
In an attempt to place the Afghan case study in the context of the evolution of UN 
peace operations, review and assessment of key developments in practice and 
conceptual frameworks surrounding UN’s engagement in conflicts were provided before 
the examination of the Afghan experience. Having reviewed and assessed the Afghan 
case study through identifying its characteristics, accomplishments and remaining tasks, 
as well as the underlying causes for lack of progress in certain areas and complex 
dilemmas facing the operation in Afghanistan, the dissertation’s final segment once 
again moved to macro-level analysis of UN peace operations.  
 
In order to determine the appropriate role for UN in matters relating to peace and 
security, identification of the unique strengths and weaknesses of the UN peace 
operations was attempted. UN is mal-equipped to deal with peace enforcement 
operations, mainly due to the absence of appropriate tools at its disposal. Even if such 
capacity was envisioned in the Charter at the time of UN’s inception, the reality of the 
world and the Member States’ preference as expressed in deeds and resource 
allocation indicates that this condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, the trend in the recent years has been to pursue partnership with regional 
organizations and bilateral or multilateral military force not under UN’s command when 
peace enforcement task is required. UN itself is moving towards such notion of 
concentrating on its core strength related to political and social aspects of the peace 
process, as articulated in various recent reports including the Millennium Report (2000), 
Brahimi Report (2000), High-level Panel’s report on Threats, Challenge and Change 
(2004), and SG’s report In Larger Freedom (2005) as discussed in detail in the 
dissertation.          
 
This is the background in which this dissertation identified as UN’s key strength in 
peace operations its ability to generate legitimacy and the power of ideals UN 
symbolizes. The latter can make significant contribution to the process in bringing 
about the necessary change in mentality and operational norm, signaling to the people 
undergoing transition a sharp departure from conflict-prone societal relationship. In 
addition to the clear weakness of UN in enforcing peace through military means, 
several factors constraining UN’s ability to perform effectively in peace operations ---
even when they do not involve peace enforcement mandates--- were analyzed in a 
threefold manner. First is related to the inappropriate/unrealistic mandates given by 
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the Member States to the UN through the Security Council and a severe lack of 
resources made available to implement the mandated operation. The second factor 
hindering effective UN operations in post-conflict peacebuilding setting is the lack of 
coherence and consistency in the Member States’ policy, especially in the 
implementation phase where a government may be pursuing multiple-track approach 
in assistance without strategic coordination or prioritization. This typically results in 
bilateral assistance projects duplicating or conflicting with UN’s assistance projects ---
sometimes funded by the same donor through another government department---. 
While many coordination meetings take place among various donors to avoid such 
situations, in a rush “to demonstrate that country/agency X is making a difference”, 
these situations ---extremely wasteful, confusing and disappointing in the eyes of those 
waiting to see a difference brought by international engagement--- will most likely be 
improved only through stronger monitoring in the donor country/agency from the 
perspective of public funds use accountability. The third key factor that hinders 
effective operations by UN in post-conflict peacebuilding is related to the way UN 
system organizations function in reality. While institutional silos and turf battles plague 
the UN system organizations which requires serious change in the minds of the people 
working for the world body ---in some cases, almost as profound a change in mentality 
and behaviour pattern as those required in population moving from conflict to post-
conflict rule-based society are required---, it is also important to recognize that like 
most other things related to the UN, the Member States have a key role in charting 
and enabling such change to occur as the silos often relate to the fundamental 
structure of the world enterprise. They are often reflection and extension of the 
institutional divide and lack of coherence observable in Member States, as different 
pockets and funding mechanisms, governance structures and priorities among various 
agencies are complicit in the problematic state of affairs surrounding the world body 
which consistently falls short of meeting the expectation of those in need around the 
world.        
 
Based on above observations, five key considerations were identified as factors 
conducive to maximizing UN’s ability to deal effectively with preventing and ending 
conflicts and building peace: (i) Clear and realistic mandate with matching resources 
given to the UN, (ii) Commitment of key Member States to enable the UN to play its 
designated role, (iii) Leaving room for maneuver and adjustment to match local 
development, (iv) Need to focus and prioritize on certain objectives (& coordinate with 
others), and (v) Selecting good SRSGs. The success of the Afghan experience as an UN 
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operation is attributable to the fact that four out of five (all except the second) were 
met to a great degree and it owed heavily on the contribution of SRSG Brahimi in the 
design and initial implementation phase, which underlines the importance of the fifth 
factor.  
 
The dissertation argued that at a more fundamental level, United Nations officials and 
its supporters should begin to speak more candidly, to truly engage the public ---
especially targeting the more affluent and educated segments of the population who 
may be able to influence public opinion--- about difficult issues and complicated reality 
the United Nations is faced with. The world of diplomacy is decidedly traditionalist and 
the UN work culture was set when the state entities were the only relevant actor from 
the viewpoint of the UN. But the changing understanding of statehood is being 
debated (including the challenges paused to basic concepts of state sovereignty and 
non-intervention in internal affairs by concepts such as “humanitarian intervention” and 
“the responsibility to protect”) and the forces of globalization are requiring 
transnational action and highlighting the relevance of non-state actors. These great 
shifts in thinking and in action regarding basic concepts and norms governing 
international relations necessitate change in the way the United Nations acts with its 
Member States and engages with the public. 
 
A failure to create greater and more accurate understanding in public regarding the 
factors that constrain UN from taking certain effective action in preventing conflicts 
and serving people in need may bring “criticism towards the United Nations” beyond a 
limit where UN’s authority and capacity become increasingly diminished. If it reaches 
that level where disillusionment becomes the accepted norm, then UN will be caught in 
a vicious circle of not being able to perform due to lack of trust (resulting in mandate 
and resources) and not being able to gain trust due to lack of performance. 
 
Codes of diplomacy and respect for the representatives of the Member States will 
always govern UN’s operating norm and tactfulness is required in any sensitive 
maneuvering but they should not function in a way where accountability is untraceable 
and intractable because no one dare speak the real picture. This is close to depriving 
the public ---“the people” as articulated in the Charter for whom UN serves--- from 
information and perspectives that should aid in shaping their view of the world, the UN 
and their governments. Too often, “the failure of UN” or the “inefficiency of the UN” is 
discussed in the media and national legislatures as if UN as an entity exists in a form 
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equivalent to a centralized national government. In reality, UN is a highly complex and 
disorganized enterprise and very few seem to have an overall picture of the United 
Nations as an enterprise. It is worth asking how many people outside of those engaged 
with the United Nations are aware of all these underlying conditions and know how 
they collectively impact on the performance of “the United Nations”. The dissertation 
suggested it would be imperative to explore this question in future research and this 
type of consideration must be factored into the way the United Nations engages with 
the public.   
 
Finally, it was assessed that the United Nations as an entity is more than just a sum of 
its composing parts and it can ---and it does--- play a significant role in the area of 
ending and preventing conflicts and building peace, as this dissertation has 
demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan. It was argued that its full potential of the 
United Nations peace operations would be realized by additionally taking a more 
strategic approach in engaging the public, turning more attention to sub-state level 
owners of the United Nations.    
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AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING  
THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS395 
(“Bonn Agreement”) 
  
The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, 
In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, 
Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting 
peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country, 
Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, 
Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political 
future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, 
Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan Mujahideen who, over the years, have defended the 
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major 
role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them 
both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved 
homeland, Afghanistan, 
Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency 
interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor 
Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to be 
established pursuant to this agreement, 
Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all 
segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately 
represented at the UN Talks on Afghanistan,  
Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of 
a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not 
intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time, 
Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully 
constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to 
this agreement must meanwhile be put in place, 
Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a 
particularly important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to 
the establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan, 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
THE INTERIM AUTHORITY 
 
I. General provisions 
1) An Interim Authority shall be established upon the official transfer of power on 22 December 
2001. 
2) The Interim Authority shall consist of an Interim Administration presided over by a Chairman, 
a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, and a 
Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as such other courts as may be established by the 
Interim Administration. The composition, functions and governing procedures for the Interim 
Administration and the Special Independent Commission are set forth in this agreement. 
3) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the repository of Afghan 
sovereignty, with immediate effect. As such, it shall, throughout the interim period, represent 
Afghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the seat of Afghanistan at the United 
Nations and in its specialized agencies, as well as in other international institutions and 
conferences. 
4) An Emergency Loya Jirga shall be convened within six months of the establishment of the 
Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga will be opened by His Majesty Mohammed Zaher, 
the former King of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional 
Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such 
                                                 
395  Full text based on official translation quoted from the Afghan government website 
(www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm), also submitted to the United 
Nations as attachment to a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council dated 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154). 
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time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be 
held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. 
5) The Interim Authority shall cease to exist once the Transitional Authority has been 
established by the Emergency Loya Jirga. 
6) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the establishment of 
the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. In order to 
assist the Constitutional Loya Jirga prepare the proposed Constitution, the Transitional 
Administration shall, within two months of its commencement and with the assistance of the 
United Nations, establish a Constitutional Commission.  
 
II. Legal framework and judicial system 
1) The following legal framework shall be applicable on an interim basis until the adoption of 
the new Constitution referred to above: 
  
i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with those 
contained in this agreement, and b/ with the exception of those provisions relating to the 
monarchy and to the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution; and 
ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this 
agreement or with international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or with those 
applicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that the Interim Authority 
shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations. 
2) The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall be vested in a Supreme 
Court of Afghanistan, and such other courts as may be established by the Interim 
Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United 
Nations, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with 
Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions. 
 
III. Interim Administration 
A. Composition 
1) The Interim Administration shall be composed of a Chairman, five Vice Chairmen and 24 
other members. Each member, except the Chairman, may head a department of the Interim 
Administration. 
2) The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan have invited His Majesty Mohammed Zaher, 
the former King of Afghanistan, to chair the Interim Administration. His Majesty has indicated 
that he would prefer that a suitable candidate acceptable to the participants be selected as the 
Chair of the Interim Administration. 
3) The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of the Interim Administration have 
been selected by the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to this 
agreement. The selection has been made on the basis of professional competence and personal 
integrity from lists submitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic, 
geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the participation 
of women.  
4) No person serving as a member of the Interim Administration may simultaneously hold 
membership of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga. 
 
B. Procedures 
1) The Chairman of the Interim Administration, or in his/her absence one of the Vice Chairmen, 
shall call and chair meetings and propose the agenda for these meetings.  
2) The Interim Administration shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. In order for 
any decision to be taken, at least 22 members must be in attendance. If a vote becomes 
necessary, decisions shall be taken by a majority of the members present and voting, unless 
otherwise stipulated in this agreement. The Chairman shall cast the deciding vote in the event 
that the members are divided equally.  
  
C. Functions 
1) The Interim Administration shall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of 
state, and shall have the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and good government of 
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Afghanistan. 
2) The Chairman of the Interim Administration or, in his/her absence, one of the Vice Chairmen, 
shall represent the Interim Administration as appropriate. 
3) Those members responsible for the administration of individual departments shall also be 
responsible for implementing the policies of the Interim Administration within their areas of 
responsibility. 
4) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Administration shall have full jurisdiction over 
the printing and delivery of the national currency and special drawing rights from international 
financial institutions. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the 
United Nations, a Central Bank of Afghanistan that will regulate the money supply of the 
country through transparent and accountable procedures. 
5) The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, an 
independent Civil Service Commission to provide the Interim Authority and the future 
Transitional Authority with shortlists of candidates for key posts in the administrative 
departments, as well as those of governors and uluswals, in order to ensure their competence 
and integrity. 
6) The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of the United Nations, establish an 
independent Human Rights Commission, whose responsibilities will include human rights 
monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and development of domestic human 
rights institutions. The Interim Administration may, with the assistance of the United Nations, 
also establish any other commissions to review matters not covered in this agreement.  
7) The members of the Interim Administration shall abide by a Code of Conduct elaborated in 
accordance with international standards. 
8) Failure by a member of the Interim Administration to abide by the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct shall lead to his/her suspension from that body. The decision to suspend a member 
shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the Interim Administration on the 
proposal of its Chairman or any of its Vice Chairmen. 
9) The functions and powers of members of the Interim Administration will be further 
elaborated, as appropriate, with the assistance of the United Nations. 
 
IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga 
1) The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga shall 
be established within one month of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Special 
Independent Commission will consist of twenty-one members, a number of whom should have 
expertise in constitutional or customary law. The members will be selected from lists of 
candidates submitted by participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan as well as Afghan 
professional and civil society groups. The United Nations will assist with the establishment and 
functioning of the commission and of a substantial secretariat.  
2) The Special Independent Commission will have the final authority for determining the 
procedures for and the number of people who will participate in the Emergency Loya Jirga. The 
Special Independent Commission will draft rules and procedures specifying (i) criteria for 
allocation of seats to the settled and nomadic population residing in the country; (ii) criteria for 
allocation of seats to the Afghan refugees living in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and Afghans 
from the diaspora; (iii) criteria for inclusion of civil society organizations and prominent 
individuals, including Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and traders, both within the country and in 
the diaspora. The Special Independent Commission will ensure that due attention is paid to the 
representation in the Emergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of women as well as all 
other segments of the Afghan population. 
3) The Special Independent Commission will publish and disseminate the rules and procedures 
for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the Emergency Loya 
Jirga convenes, together with the date for its commencement and its suggested location and 
duration.  
4) The Special Independent Commission will adopt and implement procedures for monitoring 
the process of nomination of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process 
of indirect election or selection is transparent and fair. To pre-empt conflict over nominations, 
the Special Independent Commission will specify mechanisms for filing of grievances and rules 
for arbitration of disputes.  
5) The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for the Transitional Administration 
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and will approve proposals for the structure and key personnel of the Transitional 
Administration.  
 
V. Final provisions 
1) Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in 
the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be 
reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces. 
2) The Interim Authority and the Emergency Loya Jirga shall act in accordance with basic 
principles and provisions contained in international instruments on human rights and 
international humanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party.  
3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in the fight against 
terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commit itself to respect international law and 
maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the 
international community. 
4) The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the 
Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure the participation of women as well as the equitable 
representation of all ethnic and religious communities in the Interim Administration and the 
Emergency Loya Jirga. 
5) All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with Security Council resolution 
1378 (14 November 2001) and other relevant Security Council resolutions relating to 
Afghanistan. 
6) Rules of procedure for the organs established under the Interim Authority will be elaborated 
as appropriate with the assistance of the United Nations. 
This agreement, of which the annexes constitute an integral part, done in Bonn on this 5th day 
of December 2001 in the English language, shall be the authentic text, in a single copy which 
shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations. Official texts shall be provided in 
Dari and Pashto, and such other languages as the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General may designate. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall send certified 
copies in English, Dari and Pashto to each of the participants. 
 
For the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan: 
Ms. Amena Afzali 
Mr. S. Hussain Anwari 
Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala 
Mr. Sayed Hamed Gailani 
Mr. Rahmatullah Musa Ghazi 
Eng. Abdul Hakim 
Mr. Houmayoun Jareer 
Mr. Abbas Karimi 
Mr. Mustafa Kazimi 
Dr. Azizullah Ludin 
Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud 
Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni 
Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri 
Mr. Mohammad Natiqi 
Mr. Yunus Qanooni 
Dr. Zalmai Rassoul 
Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq 
Dr. Mohammad Jalil Shams 
Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat 
Mr. Humayun Tandar 
Mrs. Sima Wali 
General Abdul Rahim Wardak 
Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran 
 
Witnessed for the United Nations by: 
Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan 
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation zielt auf ein besseres Verständnis ab, wie sich die 
internationale Gemeinschaft am besten in Nachkriegsländern engagiert, um sie bei 
ihren Maßnahmen im Rahmen des nationalen Wiederaufbaus zu unterstützen. 
 
Der erste Teil untersucht die sich wandelnde Charakteristik der UN-Operationen im 
Rahmen des Wiederaufbaus. Dabei wird auch Bezug genommen auf verschiedene 
Definitionen und Ereignisse, die für die Literatur maßgeblich waren, die sich 
insbesondere auf Konflikte der Ära nach dem Kalten Krieg konzentriert. Im zweiten 
Abschnitt wird der durch die „Bonner Vereinbarung“ geregelte Plan zum Wiederaufbau 
Afghanistans besprochen, indem sein Ursprung, Inhalt, Ablauf analysiert wird sowie die 
Faktoren, die die Umsetzung des Plans beeinflussten. Anschließend wird der Bonn-
Prozess bewertet sowohl hinsichtlich seiner Erfolge als auch seiner Mängel und zwei 
Hauptprobleme im Prozess des Wiederaufbaus identifiziert. 
 
Das erste Hauptproblem bezieht sich auf den Ausschluss der Taliban und die Haltung 
gegenüber den Warlords, was auf die Bevorzugung des Krieges gegen den Terror 
gegenüber den nationalen Wiederaufbau Afghanistans zurückzuführen ist. Dieses 
Problem resultiert aus dem konfliktgeladenen Friedensprozess, einschließlich der 
Wahrnehmung eines Doppelstandards und dem schwierigen Ausgleich zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen Bedürfnissen von Sicherheit einerseits und Gerechtigkeit 
andererseits. Das zweite Hauptproblem bezieht sich auf die Beteiligung der 
internationalen Gemeinschaft. Der Druck auf die afghanischen staatlichen 
Organisationen und auf die Ziele des Friedensprozesses durch die Wünsche der 
internationalen Geberorganisationen werden bewertet, indem die Grundsätze wie ”light 
footprint“ und „afghanische Eigenverantwortung“ geprüft werden.   
 
Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Afghanistan-Fallstudie werden schließlich die 
Stärken und Schwächen der UN Friedensmissionen bestimmt durch die Identifikation 
von Faktoren, die die Fähigkeit der UN beschränken, in Konfliktsituationen effektiver zu 
handeln. Des weiteren werden Wege erforscht, um die Leistungsfähigkeit der UNO 
bezüglich effektiven Handelns im Rahmen von Friedensmissionen zu maximieren.  
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Abstract (English) 
 
This dissertation aims to contribute to a better comprehension of how the international 
community can best engage with countries emerging from conflict, supporting the 
effort of post-conflict peacebuilding.  
 
The first segment examines the changing nature of UN operations in post-conflict 
settings, drawing on various definitions and events that shaped the literature on UN’s 
engagement with conflicts with particular focus on the post-Cold War era. The second 
segment will review the Afghan post-conflict transition process governed by the Bonn 
Agreement by analyzing its origin, content, progress and factors that affected its 
implementation. Subsequently, assessment of the Bonn Process will be made both in 
terms of its achievements and shortcomings, as well as by identifying two broad stands 
of dilemmas in post-conflict peacebuilding process.  
 
The first strand of dilemmas relates to the exclusion of the Taliban as well as the 
stance towards warlords, both of which were affected by the primacy given to the War 
on Terror as opposed to rebuilding of the Afghan state. This strand of dilemmas arise 
from what is referred to as conflictual peacebuilding, including analysis on the 
perception of double standards as well as the difficult balance that had to be struck 
between the two distinct needs for security and justice. The second strand of dilemmas 
relates to the involvement of the international community. Examining the guiding 
principle such as the “light footprint” and “Afghan ownership” assessing the results, the 
impact of the demands placed by international donor agencies to the Afghan state 
institutions and on the objective of the peacebuilding process will be assessed.  
 
Based on the findings of the Afghan case study, the final segment will determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of UN peace operations, identifying factors constraining 
UN’s ability to deal more effectively with conflict situations and explore ways to 
maximize UN’s capacity to deal effectively with post-conflict peacebuilding. 
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